Provision versus Appropriation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Social Dilemmas

Social dilemmas characterize decision environments in which individuals' exclusive pursuit of their own material self‐interest can produce inefficient allocations. Social dilemmas are most commonly studied in provision games, such as public goods games and trust games, in which the social dilemma can be manifested in foregone opportunities to create surplus. Appropriation games are sometimes used to study social dilemmas that can be manifested in destruction of surplus, as is typical in common‐pool resource extraction games. A central question is whether social dilemmas are more serious for inhibiting creation of surplus or in promoting its destruction. This question is addressed in this study with an experiment involving three pairs of payoff‐equivalent provision and appropriation games. Some game pairs are symmetric, whereas others involve asymmetric power relationships. We find that play of symmetric provision and appropriation games produces comparable efficiency. In contrast, power asymmetry leads to significantly lower efficiency in an appropriation game than in a payoff‐equivalent provision game. This outcome can be rationalized by reciprocal preference theory but not by models of unconditional social preferences.     

The usage of technology in preventing and detecting fraud

Auditors of information systems technology （IT） play a major role in the prevention of significant fraud and investigation. Fraud is hard to detect and even more difficult to prevent. All the auditors are responsible for detection, determination of fraud and use of anti-fraud programs. With rapid developments in information, communication and technology, it is no surprise that companies grow and secure IT system, but with the development of technology was developed and fraud schemes. Detection or not the auditor of the fraud, not fulfilling his work reflects you, or not drafting of a plan audit standards and procedures, but he has to do with personal ability auditor, to analyze the findings during the audit, use of tests, the natural limitations of internal control and the fact that most of the findings of the auditor of nature are more persuasive than effective. When you conduct an audit, auditor has a professional skeptic attitude that considers the risk of circumvention of control procedures by management and recognizes that simple fact, the audit procedures that are effective in connection with the discovery of errors, are not suitable for detection and identification fraud. This requires from the auditor to establish a procedure for considering the risk of fraud, in order to detect the exact appearance not as a result of fraud. A particular impact has The Model of Fraud Detection Strategy, as an 8 steps model for identifying fraud, using IT to collect, define and analyze the data and anomalies that highlight indicators of fraud.     

Is there a plausible theory for decision under risk? A dual calibration critique

Can any prominent theory of decision under risk rationalize both small-stakes risk aversion and large-stakes risk aversion? Do some prominent theories fail to rationalize patterns of same-stakes risk aversion? How do reference payoffs enter in the answer to these questions? What would be the characteristics of a theory of decision under risk that would be immune to calibration critique? We offer a theoretical duality analysis that addresses these questions. We report dual propositions and corollaries that calibrate the implications of nonlinear transformation of probabilities or payoffs (or both). We also report several experiments that provide data on the empirical relevance of the two types of calibration patterns.     

Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity for modeling economic behavior

This paper reports three experiments with triadic or dyadic designs. The experiments include the moonlighting game in which first-mover actions can elicit positively or negatively reciprocal reactions from second movers. First movers can be motivated by trust in positive reciprocity or fear of negative reciprocity, in addition to unconditional other-regarding preferences. Second movers can be motivated by unconditional other-regarding preferences as well as positive or negative reciprocity. The experimental designs include control treatments that discriminate among actions with alternative motivations. Data from our three experiments and a fourth one are used to explore methodological questions, including the effects on behavioral hypothesis tests of within-subjects vs. across-subjects designs, single-blind vs. double-blind payoffs, random vs. dictator first-mover control treatments, and strategy responses vs. sequential play. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64