The division of labour and market structure

Most firms produce most of the time under conditions of substantial economies of scale. The division of labour, according to Adam Smith the mainspring of wealth, is intrinsically an economies of scale phenomenon. Market structure in most industries in characterized by a small number of suppliers and a larger number of customers. I explain this law of small numbers as the equilibrium of two forces: the deconcentration effect of imitation and the market spliting effect of further refinements in the division of labour by innovation. A deconcentrated market creates larger incentives for market splitting (product differentiation) by innovation than a concentrated market. But market splitting raises concentration in the market and it raises the number of different markets in the economy. Before the economies of scale of old products are fully exploited, new products are being offered which again are produced under conditions of economies of scale.     

Optimale Aufteilung des Stichprobenumfangs bei mehreren Merkmalen

Zusammenfassung Es wird gezeigt, daß sich das vonNeyman undTschuprow für ein einziges Merkmal gelöste Problem der optimalen Aufteilung des Stichprobenumfangs auf vorgegebene Schichten auf ein nichtlineares Programm mit linearen Restriktionen und nichtlinearer Zielfunktion zurückführen läßt. Auf Grund der Konvexitätseigenschaft der Zielfunktion ergibt sich, daß das Minimum der Zielfunktion (Minimum der Streuung des Stichprobenmittels ) stets eindeutig ist. Der beiNeyman undTschuprow mögliche Fall, daß sich in derh-ten Schicht ein Stichprobenumfang ergibt, der größer als der Umfang in der Gesamtheit ist, kann hier nicht auftreten.Durch Einführung einer verallgemeinerten Streuung wird das Problem der optimalen Aufteilung bei vorgegebener Schichtung imk-dimensionalen Merkmalsraum aufk Merkmale verallgemeinert. Es wird gezeigt, daß diese verallgemeinerte Streuung (=Zielfunktion eines nichtlinearen Programms) im allgemeinen nicht über dem ganzen konvexen Bereich der zulässigen Lösungen konvex (von unten) ist. Ein Teilbereich des zulässigen Bereichs, über dem die Zielfunktion konvex ist, wird angegeben. Schließlich werden hierzu vergleichende Ergebnisse gebracht.     

Dancing to the Donors' Tune? Policy Choice in Aid‐Dependent Countries

Current aid rhetoric emphasizes the selective allocation of otherwise unconditional funds in support of the recipients' own plans, in contrast to the old donor practice of bundling money and policies. I show that when recipients have private information, policies reflecting their preferences and knowledge might result in such a regime. However, generous transfers can also induce them to conform to the outcome‐oriented expectations of donors at the expense of lower aid impact. Such behaviour is consistent with an abundance of case‐study evidence. Moderate disagreements over what the optimal policy is could actually produce better results. Certain forms of both donor competition and coordination might also eliminate this distortion, while a donor concern for need only removes incentives for aid‐seeking in the least needy countries. In summary, optimal aid policies are highly context‐specific, and donors should thus concentrate their efforts to practise more informed selectivity.     

Comparative randomized inverse sampling

According to previous literature, we define randomized inverse sampling for comparing two treatments with respect to a binary response as the sampling that stops when a total fixed number of successes, irrespective of the treatments, are observed. We have obtained elsewhere the asymptotic distributions for the counting variables involved and have shown them to be equivalent to the corresponding asymptotic distributions for multinomial sampling. In this paper, we start deriving the same basic results using different techniques, and we then show how they give rise to genuinely novel procedures when translated into finite sample approximations. As the main example, a novel confidence interval for the logarithm of the odds ratio of two success probabilities can be constructed in the case of comparative randomized inverse sampling. Some advantages over the standard multinomial sampling in terms of coverage probabilities are visible when no adjustment for cells with zero counts is applied; otherwise, the two sampling schemes appear to be fairly equivalent. This is a reassurance that under certain circumstances, inverse sampling can be safely chosen over more traditional sampling schemes.     

International Capital Flows in the Model with Limited Commitment and Incomplete Markets

Recent literature has proposed two alternative types of financial frictions, i.e., limited commitment and incomplete markets, to explain the empirical patterns of international capital flows between developed and developing countries in the past two decades. This paper integrates these two frictions into a two-country overlapping-generations framework to facilitate a direct comparison of their respective effects. In our model, limited commitment distorts the investment made by agents with different productivity, which creates a wedge between the interest rates on equity capital vs. credit capital; while incomplete markets distort the investment among projects with different riskiness, which creates a wedge between the risk-free rate and the mean rate of return to risky capital. We show that the two approaches are observationally equivalent with respect to their implications for international capital flows, production efficiency, and aggregate output.     

Empirical determination of aggregate demand and supply curves: The example of the RWI Business Cycle Model

Macroeconometric models are often criticised for being too complex and difficult to read in theoretical terms. To overcome these difficulties, Hickman suggested the calculation of a model's implicit aggregate demand/supply (AD/AS) structure. The method helps to understand models and their main properties in theoretical terms and facilitates detailed model comparisons. This paper uses the AD/AS–IS/LM apparatus to analyse the simulation properties of the RWI (Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) Business Cycle Model, a medium-sized short-term macroeconometric model for Germany. The results confirm theoretical expectations for AD and AS elasticities and reveal particular reactions linked to peculiar model specifications such as an endogenous government sector. The results are also much in line with a previous study in a multi-country model context.     

What drives stock market integration? An analysis using agribusiness stocks

This article explores the drivers of regional stock market integration with a focus on the agribusiness sector across relevant regional trade blocs around the world. We implement panel cointegration models to analyze the stock indices of agribusiness firms in the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), European Union (EU), Asia‐Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Based on the literature on market integration and stock return pricing, we identify nine possible determinants of stock market integration, which we separate into three categories: individual market performance, macroeconomic conditions, and agricultural trade. In our analysis, we account for agriculture‐specific factors to control for possible structural shifts in financial markets regimes by including the two main commodity price bubbles during last 20 years. Our results show that most of the variables included in our categories have been important factors in promoting regional stock market integration. Moreover, integration among regional stock markets was strengthened by the implementation of trade agreements. This effect is stronger in trade blocs with fewer members, such as NAFTA and MERCOSUR, compared with larger and more heterogeneous blocs, such as the EU and APEC.     

Exchange rate determination: a theory of the decisive role of central bank cooperation and conflict

Economists’ faith that variable exchange rates benevolently equilibrate has been empirically disconfirmed. That faith is here tackled at its theoretical core with an exchange rate model that although ultra abstract, includes the undeniable fundamentals of market power and differential goals of central bankers and large-scale private players. It permits a game theoretic analysis under the assumption that all agents maximize their payoffs. The paper then relaxes the assumption of maximising agents, allowing for a more complex and thus realistic second version of the model that is interpretable within SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory of risk and uncertainty. In an experimental setting, this second version of the model points to: a) the inability of agents in central banks, governments and the private real and financial sectors to operate in maximising ways; b) destructive central bank conflict; and c) the widely discrepant outcomes arising from the dynamics of individual personality differences. The paper’s theoretical and empirical findings thus both point to the merits of a single world currency.