Creditors’ and Shareholders’ Reporting Demands in Public Versus Private Firms: Evidence from Europe*

In this study we investigate whether the importance of accounting information in contracting and communication with shareholders and creditors affects earnings timeliness in publicly disclosed general‐purpose financial statements. To operationalize the relationship between timeliness demands and the importance of accounting information to shareholders and creditors, we compare the (asymmetry in) earnings timeliness of public firms with that of private firms. We attribute public versus private firm differences in timeliness to shareholders’ demands when a country’s institutions provide strong investor protection. Similarly, we attribute these differences to creditors’ demands when the institutions provide strong creditor protection. Our analysis of public and private firms in 13 Western European countries suggests that creditors and shareholders have different timeliness demands. In particular, we find that the public versus private firm difference in asymmetric timeliness is not associated with a country’s degree of investor protection but positively associated with a country’s degree of creditor protection. The results further suggest that shareholders demand symmetric rather than asymmetric timeliness. An important implication of our study is that general‐purpose financial statements are responsive to creditors’ reporting demands, which contrasts with the idea that these — primarily private — creditors would use special‐purpose reports.     

Two Naked Emperors?* Concerns about the Stability & Growth Pact and Second Thoughts about Central Bank Independence

This paper addresses two sets of issues relevant to current and prospective future E(M)U members: the consequences of the Stability & Growth Pact for fiscal‐financial sustainability and macroeconomic stability, and some risks associated with operational independence of the central bank. To be effective as a lender of last resort or to stabilise demand when short nominal interest rates are close to their zero lower bound, the central bank must coordinate and cooperate with the fiscal authorities. Central bank independence is unlikely to survive if such coordination and cooperation are not forthcoming.     

WHEN DO VERTICAL RESTRAINTS HARM COMPETITION? THE ECONOMICS‐BASED APPROACH AND ITS APPLICATION IN THE BATSA CASE

An “effects‐based” or “economics‐based” approach to competition policy requires a theory of harm that causally links a business practice and its allegedly anti‐competitive effects and also weighs anti competitive effects against the pro‐competitive effects of the practice. This implies a shift away from per se prohibitions of certain practices towards case‐by‐case analysis – a move that has been hotly debated, especially in Europe. Using a case study of the recently concluded British American Tobacco case, we study the core features of an effects‐based approach to vertical restraints. We find the approach followed in the British American Tobacco South Africa case generally consistent with an effects‐based analysis, but highlight some limitations.