BRAND AGRICULTURE AND ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY: WHEN ARE HIGHLY DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS SUSTAINABLE IN THE REMOTE PERIPHERY?

This paper presents a general equilibrium model of new economic geography, incorporating brand agriculture that produces differentiated agricultural products. Focusing on the core‐periphery space, we show that highly differentiated brand agriculture can be sustained in the periphery even when access to the core market is not particularly good. This result supports the promotion of innovative products in rural areas in order to avoid direct price competition in generic commodities markets under unfavorable conditions.     

Whether to Abolish or Introduce Dual Regulation as Trade and Environmental Policy?

China, which has already introduced an environmental tax in an effort to decarbonize, has recently begun emissions trading and is using two environmental policies in tandem, but there are concerns about the impact on growth and trade. Trade and environmental policies affect firms' entry and exit, resulting in changes in aggregate productivity and pollution emissions. This study compares the impacts of single regulation and dual regulation on welfare, using a research-and-development based growth model with heterogeneous firms. Under single regulation, the cleansing effect of trade liberalization could be undermined. Under dual regulation, trade liberalization decreases pollution and improves average productivity whereas decreasing total permits reduces pollution. From the perspective of improving welfare it is desirable to choose dual regulation because trade liberalization can reduce total pollution emissions via the cleansing effect of trade liberalization.     

The Effect of Whistle-Blowing Incentives on Collusion: An Experimental Study of Leniency Programs

Policymakers are increasingly using whistle-blowing incentives aimed at curtailing illegal or unethical behavior. We theoretically and experimentally investigate one version of whistle-blowing incentive: leniency programs aimed at curbing anticompetitive activities by firms, by reducing the punishment faced by a cartel member who reports the cartel's behavior. The theoretical model captures the two important effects of whistle-blowing incentives: the direct effect, a reduction in the stability of cartels, and the counterproductive indirect effect, an increase in the incentives to form cartels in the first place by lowering the cost of exiting them. As these point in opposite directions, the net theoretical effect is indeterminate. Our laboratory experiment compares two leniency programs—full immunity from fines and partial immunity—against a baseline with no whistle-blowing incentives in place. We find evidence of the direct effect but not the indirect effect, and thus both programs reduce the extent of price fixing and the damage associated with it.