Can Japan succeed in “Chigyo-ka” (intelprise-formation)?

There are two aspects in today's information revolution that started in the late 1970s. The first is an aspect referred to as “the third industrial revolution,” which triggers the transition to the “21st century system of Industrialization.” The information revolution in this sense brings the creation of new “breakthrough industries (new multimedia industries).” And the second aspect of the information revolution possesses the characteristics of both a technological revolution and a social revolution and brings about the arrival of the third phase of the historical evolutionary process of the modern civilization, which proceeds through three phases, namely “militarization, industrialization, and then informatization.”If the bearers of modern industrialization are a “group of enterprises” that have been engaged in the race in order to gain “wealth” (generalized means of exchange/exploitation power), and if these enterprises' activities have been exercised in the world market where their products have been sold, then it is appropriate to call the bearers of informatization a “group of intelprises.” They will be engaged in the race to gain “wisdom” (generalized means of persuasion/induction power), then stages of their activities can be called a “global intelplace” where “sharables,” that is, information and knowledge, will be disseminated. And now, toward the 21st century, the third phase of modernization, which can be called the “informatization/intelprise formation” or the “wisdom game” (intellectualism), is about to begin.Japan's “ie society (a society based on the ie principle—literally, it means “house” but here it is interpreted as cultural principle for organizing a society), which has been going through the process of evolution on the Japan Archipelago, has developed a network-based organization with little stratification within its infrastructure. In this sense, Japanese society can be characterized as a “network-oriented society” in which intelprises and an intelplace in the broad sense have functioned as the essential components of the society since Middle Ages. In general, an intelplace and intelprises that operate actively within this framework serve as the flexible bases for different types of social relations and institutions, such as states and markets and eventually integrate these into the society to a certain extent. In fact, it took place quite regularly during the modernization “in the narrow sense,” or Westernization of Japanese society after the Meiji Restoration. There exist some problems, however. Some of the characteristics found in Japanese society may become obstacles to activities aimed at the sharing and promotion of information and knowledge in the global intelplace and Japanese participation in the “wisdom game.” Badly needed are serious efforts for Japanese intelprise-formation to reduce these obstacles as much as possible.     

The Middle-Eastern marriage pattern? Malthusian dynamics in nineteenth-century Egypt

Malthus predicted that fertility rises with income and that people regulate fertility via regulating marriage. However, evidence on the Malthusian equilibrium has been mostly confined to Europe and East Asia. We employ Egypt's population censuses of 1848 and 1868 to provide the first evidence on the preindustrial Malthusian dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa. At the aggregate level, we document rural Egyptian women having a high fertility rate that is close to the Western European level, combined with low age at marriage and low celibacy rate, that are closer to the East Asian levels. This resulted in a uniquely high fertility regime that was probably offset by the high child mortality. Next, we provide individual-level evidence on the positive correlation between fertility and income (occupation). We find that the higher fertility of rural white-collar men is attributed to their marriage behaviour, and not to marital fertility. Specifically, white-collar men's higher polygyny explains 45 per cent of their fertility advantage, whereas their higher marriage rate and lower wife's age at marriage explains 55 per cent. Therefore, polygyny was an additional factor that led to a steeper income–fertility curve than in Western Europe by enabling the rural middle class to out-breed the poor.