ON THE OPTIMAL QUANTITY OF PUBLIC GOODS AND RELATED ISSUES

This paper seeks to reopen a discussion on what the profession has considered settled and closed, namely the issue of the optimal quantity of a pure public good. We argue that determination of the optimal quantity by the intersection of the collective willingness to pay curve and the supply curve is inappropriate because it exaggerates the aggregate demand for the public good, thus giving rise to misleading supply decisions. The reason lies in the basic properties of pure public goods, in particular that of non‐rival consumption (joint supply). The paper submits that the optimal quantity of a public good is the largest quantity demanded by any single consumer (individually or as a collective). The individual demand curves are required in the analysis only for the purposes of determining the optimal benefit taxes and an equitable cost sharing formula. We show that under such a formula, based on benefit shares, the budget will be balanced, and since the tax burden is smaller than the benefits, less resentment to taxation could be anticipated under this framework.