Resistance to Trade Liberalization in Unionized Sector

This paper studies the lobbying against trade liberalization by both a firm and a union in the same industry. We find that the relationship between their political activities depends on the effect of political activity by one on the marginal effectiveness of political activity by the other. We also show that, when they are strongly risk-averse and their political activities are strategic complements, trade liberalization is likely to be successful if business is brisk, the foreign firm's production cost is high or the number of union members is small. However, when they are not strongly risk-averse, these results hold reversely.     

Mixed duopoly: Differential game approach

This study formulates a dynamic mixed oligopoly model, in which a state‐owned public firm competes against a private firm over multiple periods. We adopt a differential game formulated by Fershtman and Kamien [Econometrica 55 (1987), pp. 1151–1164] and investigate how the dynamic competition affects the optimal privatization policy. We characterize the open‐loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE) and Markov‐perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE). We show that in the MPNE, an increase in the degree of privatization has a nonmonotonic effect on the price, increasing it in a wide range of parameter spaces, which is in sharp contrast to the result in the OLNE or static analyses. We also find that the optimal degree of privatization is higher in the MPNE than that in the OLNE and static equilibrium. These results suggest that intertemporal strategic behavior changes the optimal privatization policy.     

IFRS Adoption and Accounting Conservatism of Japanese Firms with Governance System Transition

International Advances in Economic Research - This study examines whether there is a difference in the degree of accounting conservatism between firms that voluntarily adopt International Financial...     

The effects of the raising-the-official-pension-age policy in an overlapping generations economy

This paper studies how economic variables are affected by raising the official pension age. Although it is said that such a policy increases output, this paper shows that such a statement is not necessarily true. Moreover, the paper finds that the social security benefit can decrease, which implies that it might be impossible to sustain the same level of benefit only by such a policy.     

Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information

We investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to an agent. We characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) [20] that restricts the message spaces. The principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss. We show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes. We also extend the results of the single-agent model to the multi-agent model.     

The task and challenge for Japan in the 21st century: An introduction

Since the collapse of an asset-inflated economic bubble in Japan started in the second half of the 1980s, it has brought about an entirely different assessment of this country. For all admiration claimed for it, the Japanese economy proved to be subject to Newton's law of gravitation. Opinions were beginning to divide over Japanese technology, too, after it was once believed to be leading the world. In fact, Japan has a big task to solve in the years before the 21st century. How will the Japanese face up to upheavals in the world, or how will they respond to their domestic problems such as demographic and rigid structures?Few messages from Japan have so far been available with regard to these questions. The world is left in a puzzle over the questions. Our task in this issue is to make clear what the Japanese are thinking and preparing to do in the years before the 21st century, and “what it is that they have to produce an influence on the world.”Specifically, discussions center on moves toward a knowledge-based society, research and development projects, manufacturing technologies, business strategies, industrial ecology, and the possibilities of a trilemma. In this article, I make some observations as a background to those subjects.     

An Hedonic Analysis of the Rental Office Market in the Tokyo Central Business District: 1985–1994 Fiscal Years

We study the rental office market in the Tokyo central business district by estimating hedonic equations for the office rent for 1985–94 fiscal years. This period includes the "Bubble" of asset prices, followed by its deflation. We find that the characteristics related to transportational conveniences are less effective in explaining office rents than the characteristics related to the agglomeration of offices and the amenity characteristics of the office buildings themselves. Using a skewed error-term specification, we show that the discount in rental transactions is not irrelevant. The hedonic office rent indices and possible policy implications are also presented.
JEL Classification Numbers: L85, R32.     

Welfare effects of bubbles in an endogenous growth model

This paper examines welfare effects of asset bubbles in an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations. In our model, a steady-state equilibrium with bubbles exists only if the presence of bubbles raises the welfare level of the initial generation. Bubbles can be beneficial to generations born at relatively early dates, whereas they reduce the welfare level of sufficiently distant future generations. Increasing the rate of supply of the useless asset improves the lifetime utilities of future generations.     

Preferences for Educational Status,Human Capital Accumulation,and Growth

Using an overlapping generations model in which human capital accumulation has positive external effects on the production of the human capital of future generations, this paper analyzes implications of agents’ having preferences for educational status, represented by human capital holdings relative to the social average. Examining the value and sign of the optimal distortionary tax in the optimal taxation scheme, we analyze the efficiency of the level of human capital accumulation in a decentralized economy. The desire for educational status can compensate for insufficient accumulation of human capital stemming from human capital externalities directed toward future generations.