Tariffs, licensing and market structure

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that exclusive owners of an advanced technology are always better off when producing as a monopolist than when competing against another firm. Competition against a less-efficient firm weakens the power that a host country can exert on the incumbent in the form of its tariff policy. We show that this gives a motive for a monopolist to license its technology to another foreign firm. A host country gains more from increased competition if it can induce the foreign incumbent to transfer technology to the host country firm. We show that the host country can do so by tariff commitment. We also discuss the implications of bargaining under licensing and Bertrand competition in the product market. Hence, this paper qualifies and extends the recent work of Kabiraj and Marjit [Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer. European Economic Review 47, 113-124].     

Geography,Informal Information Flows and Mutual Fund Portfolios

This paper explores how informal information channels impact mutual fund performance. We measure the strengths of two location‐based information channels: 1) information transfers among fund managers (fund‐fund links) and 2) transfers between managers and the companies in which they invest (fund‐company links). We find that each channel increases investment performance in the absence of the other, but decreases it when acting in combination. Stock selection associated with the presence of one channel, but the absence of the other, earns positive future returns. Our results indicate that the economic benefits of informal information channels depend critically on the nature of their interactions.     

Conservation,Discrimination, and Salvation: Investors’ Social Concerns in the Stock Market

Stocks appear to have investor clienteles based on their business practices and products. The variety in expressive benefits each individual receives from owning controversial stocks causes them to modify their portfolio to accommodate their beliefs. We examine the ownership of firms with social concerns and sin stocks (tobacco, alcohol and gambling). Women tilt their portfolios towards stocks with progressive labor policies for women and minorities. Younger investors avoid companies with poor environmental records but seek companies with progressive labor policies. Democratic voters favor stocks with progressive policies regarding women/minorities and gays/lesbians and are less likely to own sin stocks. Christian objections to homosexuality lead their members to invest less in stocks with progressive labor policies for gays and lesbians. The Christian denominations vary, though, in regard to sin stocks. Catholics are more likely while Mormons are less likely to own a sin stock relative to other investors. Socially responsible investors are clearly not all alike. Social characteristics that are important to one investor may not be important to another socially conscious investor.     

Does technology licensing matter for privatization?

In mixed oligopolies, technology licensing from a cost‐efficient firm to a cost‐inefficient firm has been widely observed. This paper examines the relationship between privatization and licensing (by public or private firms) with the consideration of either a domestic or a foreign private firm. We find that (a) in the case of a domestic private firm, public licensing facilitates privatization, but private licensing hinders privatization; (b) in the case of a foreign private firm, both public and private licensing facilitate privatization. Our results yield important policy implications on privatization.     

Profit Raising Entry

Common wisdom suggests that entry reduces profits of incumbent firms. On the contrary, we demonstrate that if the incumbents differ in marginal costs and the entrants behave like Stackelberg followers, then entry may benefit the cost efficient incumbents while hurting the cost inefficient ones. And the total outputs of all incumbents may be higher under entry.     

Privatization, Incentive Delegation and Foreign Direct Investment

Despite the empirical relevance, the privatization literature paid little attention to the effects of the owner-manager relationship and the implications of foreign direct investment (FDI). We focus on these aspects, and show the relationship between privatization and greenfield FDI when the owners design strategic managerial incentive contracts. We show that there is complementarity between privatization and greenfield FDI. Whether incentive delegation (compared to no incentive delegation) increases the degree of privatization in the presence of FDI is ambiguous; it depends on whether the degree of privatization that attracts FDI is higher or lower than the degree of privatization that maximizes domestic welfare under FDI.     

PREMATURE MORTALITY AND POVERTY MEASUREMENT

There is a glaring paradox in all commonly used measures of poverty. The death of a poor person, because of poverty, reduces poverty according to these measures. This surely violates our basic intuitions of how poverty measures should behave. It cannot be right in concept that differentially higher mortality among the poor serves to reduce poverty. This article begins the task of developing poverty measures that are not perversely mortality sensitive. A family of measures is proposed that is an intuitive modification of standard poverty measures to take into account the fact that the rich live longer than the poor.     

International Outsourcing and R&D: Long‐Run Implications for Consumers*

We show that international outsourcing and R&D by the outsourced firm may be either substitutes or complements. Outsourcing increases the R&D investment in small markets and in highly competitive product markets, whereas it decreases the R&D investment in large markets. If the outsourced firm can be technologically very efficient under exporting, outsourcing can make the consumers worse off by reducing the R&D investment. If there is skill differential in the production process and outsourcing occurs only in the unskilled activities, R&D‐reducing outsourcing occurs in a relatively low‐skilled industry. If outsourcing of the unskilled jobs reduces the effective cost of the skilled workers by increasing the productivities of the skilled workers, outsourcing provides further disincentive for R&D compared to the situation where outsourcing of the unskilled jobs does not affect the effective cost of the skilled workers.     

Corporate Governance Reforms in India

In recent years India has been moving further in the direction of adopting an Anglo-American model of corporate governance. This decision, the result more of international economic and political pressures than public debate, in effect represents a new development strategy for the world's most populous democracy. In light of this situation, it is important to ask two basic questions: 1) why has the Anglo-American model of corporate governance been adopted? and; 2) can it be justified? This paper addresses the first of these questions by distinguish and examining three historical models of governance in India: 1) the managing agency model in the colonial period; 2) the business house model that emerged after independence, and; 3) the Anglo-American model which has recently been adopted (and is still emerging). The second question is approached through an examination of the "development impact" of the new model, as indicated by such measures as growth, employment and respect for shareholder rights.