The Falsification of Four Popular Hypotheses About the Asian Crisis

Various claims have been made about the causes of the Asian crisis and its spread. Here, we use data on the behaviour of capital flows during the crisis to test the strong forms of four such hypotheses, that portfolio investors and hedge funds played a dominant role in initiating and/or spreading the crisis; that moral hazard kept efficient markets from predicting the crisis; and, finally, the common lender hypothesis of Kaminsky and Reinhart. In the process we also test implications of the Calvo-Mendoza model of rational investor ignorance. All are falsified as monocausal explanations. For example, portfolio investments that could not have been subject to substantial moral hazard continued to flow into Asia until very shortly before the crisis. Likewise, banks were a much larger source of capital outflows during the crisis than were portfolio investors. While falsified in their strongest forms, several of these hypotheses in less strong forms should play a role in a more nuanced analysis. It is necessary to move past simple single-factor approaches in order to produce a more complete, synthetic explanation of this episode.     

Neighbourhood Effects in Pesticide Use: Evidence from the Rural Philippines

This study investigates how pesticide use by neighbouring farmers affects a given farmer's pesticide use. Although it is common knowledge that pesticide use has spatial externalities, few empirical economic studies explicitly analyse this issue. Applying a spatial panel econometric model to plot‐level panel data for Bohol, Philippines, this study shows that pesticide use, especially for herbicides, is spatially correlated, although there is no statistically significant spatial correlation in unobserved shocks. This implies that farmers apply pesticides by referring to the behaviour of neighbouring farmers rather than responding directly to the intensity of their own infestation.     

Expertenwissen im politischen Prozess — Nutzen,Grenzen und Gefahren

Since the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis, confidence in politicians as well as the economists in their advisory expert panels seems to be at an all-time low. Why do politicians reject science-based advice unless it fits into their political agenda? Are economists misunderstood by politicians and vice versa? The tension between the ideal of evidence-based policy-making and the reality of policy-based evidence-making is hardly a new phenomenon. Therefore, the expectation that Donald Trump, the Brexiteers and European populists will necessarily disappoint their voters because they simply cannot deliver what they have promised is misleading. Experts would be well advised to use the debate on the post-factual era as an impetus to reflect critically on their profession. One opinion expressed in this Zeitgespräch is that the contested societal and political impact of modern economics is due to its restricted scientific self-concept. A more open, pluralistic and transdisciplinary self-definition of economics would strengthen its societal influence. Another contributor ponders the proper incentives to persuade academic economists to provide economic policy advice. Key is the independence of advisory institutions like the German Council of Economic Experts. The selection of people with the best scientific qualifications will ensure the reputation of such institutions.     

Inequalities of opportunity in the access and use of telecommunication services in Togo

The liberalization of the telecommunications sector in Togo aimed at ensuring access to a better quality of telecommunication services at affordable prices to everyone. While the liberalization policy has increased competition in the sector and reduced significantly telecommunication services prices charged to costumers, statistics on the access and use of telecommunication services in Togo reveal disparities with respect to individuals' socio-economic characteristics which could be an indication of the existence of inequalities of opportunities in the access and use of these services.This paper investigates the inequalities of opportunity in the access and use of telecommunication services in Togo using a parametric approach. The results of estimations indicate that, inequalities of opportunities are larger for men and the elderly than respectively women and youths and are more pronounced in urban areas and regions such as the Plateaux and Savanna regions. Moreover, the circumstance variables such as the ‘place of residence’ and the ‘region’ are the key variables in explaining the inequalities of opportunities in the access and use of telecommunication services in Togo. So, policies toward reducing inequalities of opportunity in the access and use of telecommunication services in Togo should be designed with regards to men, the elderly, and people living in urban areas and regions such as the Plateaux and Savanna regions.     

Discipline, Signaling, and Currency Boards

The paper models the choice between currency boards (CBs) and adjustable pegs (or managed floating). Countries adopting CBs have grown faster and inflated less on average than countries adopting other regimes. The explanation hinges on key features of CBs: policy discipline and inflation credibility. The authors find separating equilibria in which a weak government chooses a CB as a discipline device while a tough government chooses a standard peg for its policy flexibility. Paradoxically, the weak government can then outperform the tough government on average. In simulations performed, CBs welfare can exceed peg welfare even when unemployment persistence is strong.     

Does conditional market skewness resolve the puzzling market risk-return relationship?

In this paper, we employ instrumental variables methods that allow time-varying risk and reward-to-risk to test various conditional asset pricing models. We find a negative partial relation between the market excess return and conditional market variance. In contrast with recent findings, we show that this negative relationship is not due to the omission of the hedge term associated with the ICAPM. However, conditional market skewness seems to partly account for this negative risk-return relationship.     

Director Tenure Diversity and Board Monitoring Effectiveness

This study examines the impact of director tenure diversity on board effectiveness. We find that tenure‐diverse boards exhibit significantly higher CEO performance‐turnover sensitivity and that firms with tenure‐diverse audit committees are less likely to experience accounting restatements. Furthermore, we document that tenure‐diverse compensation committees also award less excess compensation and are less likely to overcompensate. Even though tenure‐diverse boards seem to exhibit superior monitoring performance, there is limited evidence that their firms exhibit superior financial performance. The findings suggest that recent calls for board renewal, to the extent that it would increase tenure diversity rather than just decrease average board tenure, may help enhance board monitoring.     

Resolving the Presidential Puzzle

Many financial economists are puzzled by the fact that stock returns are higher under Democratic than Republican presidencies. In this paper, we test whether this return differential is explained by risk using a conditional version of the Fama and French (1993) model that allows risk to vary across political cycles. We find that the presidential puzzle can be explained when risk is properly taken into account. Much of the return differential can be attributed to the fact that Democratic presidencies are associated with higher market and default risk premiums than their Republican counterparts.