Habit Formation in an Overlapping Generations Model with Borrowing Constraints

We introduce habit‐formation in the three‐period OLG borrowing‐constrained framework of Constantinides et al. (2002) by allowing the utility of the middle‐aged (old) to depend on consumption when young (middle‐aged). This specification enables us to separate the effect of the two habit parameters (middle‐aged and old) since each representative age‐group can face different levels of habit persistence. The two‐habit setup underlines some important issues with regards to savings and security returns which do not always conform to the standard findings in the literature. In addition, the model produces equity premium consistent with US data for relatively small levels of risk aversion.     

Age‐Dependent Increasing Risk Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle

We introduce a new preference structure—age‐dependent increasing risk aversion (IRA)—in a three‐period overlapping generations model with borrowing constraints, and examine the behavior of equity premium in this framework. We find that IRA preferences generate results that are more consistent with U.S. data for the equity premium, level of savings and portfolio shares, without assuming unreasonable levels of risk aversion. We find that the relative difference between the two risk aversions (how much more risk‐averse old agents are relative to the middle‐aged) matters more than the average risk aversion in the economy (how much more risk‐averse both cohorts are). Our findings are robust with respect to a number of model generalizations.     

Disruptive technologies: a business model perspective on cloud computing

A viable business model is crucial for the successful commercialisation of disruptive technologies. The cloud computing industry provides an ideal example for exploring how various elements of a business model contribute to a product's success (or failure). We examine how Amazon.com, Salesforce.com and Siebel responded to the disruptive power of the cloud computing technology. Our findings suggest disruptive technology per se is not the reason for the collapse of large corporations, but rather the failure to adapt or create new business models to incorporate novel technology. Our findings have direct implications for strategic managers and entrepreneurs seeking to leverage disruptive technologies through the right business model.     

The fed and the term structure: Addressing simultaneity within a structural VAR model

This paper applies a new identification approach to estimate the contemporaneous relation between the term structure and monetary policy within a VAR framework. To achieve identification, we combine high-frequency Treasury futures and fed funds futures data with the VAR methodology. Results indicate that policy actions have a slope effect in the yield curve. We also find that the Fed responds to Treasury yields and that this response is stronger for the short and intermediate rates and less aggressive for long-yields. All estimated parameters are significant and robust to various model specifications.     

Causes and effects

Most companies make charitable donations, but few approach their contributions with an eye toward enhancing their brands. Those that do take such an approach commit talent and know-how, not just dollars, to a pressing but carefully chosen social need and then tell the world about the cause and their service to it. Through the association, both the business and the cause benefit in ways they could not otherwise. Organizations such as Avon, ConAgra Foods, and Chevrolet have recognized that a sustained cause-branding program can improve their reputations, boost their employees' morale, strengthen relations with business partners, and drive sales. And the targeted causes receive far more money than they could have from direct corporate gifts alone. The authors examine these best practices and offer four principles for building successful cause-branding programs. First, they say, a company should select a cause that advances its corporate goals. That is, unless the competitive logic for supporting the cause is clear, a company shouldn't even consider putting its finite resources behind it. Second, a business should commit to a cause before picking its charitable partners. Otherwise, a cause-branding program may become too dependent on its partners. Third, a company should put all its assets to work, especially its employees. It should leverage the professional skills of its workers as well as its other assets such as distribution networks. And fourth, a company should promote its philanthropic initiatives through every possible channel. In addition to using the media, it should communicate its efforts through the Web, annual reports, direct mail, and so on. Cause branding is a way to turn the obligations of corporate citizenship into a valuable asset. When the cause is well chosen, the commitment genuine, and the program well executed, the cause helps the company, and the company helps the cause.     

Equity market and the transmission channels of monetary policy: Before and after the zero lower bound

We examine the effectiveness of the interest rate channel and the credit channel of monetary policy before and after the zero lower bound (ZLB), using intraday stock returns. We construct a number of industry-specific and firm-specific indicators to capture the sensitivity of firms' demand to interest rates (interest rate channel) and firms' financial constraints (credit channel). We find that the transmission of monetary policy has shifted across both periods. Conventional monetary policy works through both the neoclassical interest rate channel and the credit channel, while unconventional policy is propagated primarily via the credit channel which became even more effective at the ZLB. Before the ZLB the transmission channels operate primarily through target rate shocks rather than forward guidance announcements, whereas both forward guidance and large scale asset purchases were equally important for the credit channel at the ZLB. We also find strong evidence that transmission channels are asymmetric depending on the state of the stock market (bull/bear, tighter/easier credit conditions, high/low volatility), and the type of policy surprises (positive/negative). Our findings are robust with respect to a number of model extensions and alternative specifications.