Attaching Workers through In-Kind Payments: Theory and Evidence from Russia

External shocks may cause a decline in the productivity of fixedcapital in certain regions of an economy. Exogenous obstaclesto migration make it hard for workers in those regions to reallocateto more prosperous regions. In addition, firms may devise "attachment"strategies to keep workers from moving out of a local labormarket. When workers are compensated in kind, they find it difficultto raise the cash needed for migration. This endogenous obstacleto migration has not yet been considered in the literature.The article shows that the feasibility of attachment dependson the inherited structure of local labor markets: attachmentcan exist in equilibrium only if the labor market is sufficientlyconcentrated. Attachment is beneficial for both employers andemployees but hurts the unemployed and the self-employed. Ananalysis of matched household-firm data from the Russian Federationcorroborates the theory.     

Whistle‐Blowing and Incentives in Firms

Whistle‐blowing is an important mechanism of corporate governance. We show that whistle‐blowing has negative effects on productive efficiency by undermining the incentives within a corporate hierarchy. In our model, a top manager intends to overreport earnings; a division manager may have evidence about the intended overreporting. We show that the division manager is more likely to have such evidence when the performance of his own division is low. Top management may offer a bribe to prevent the manager from blowing the whistle. This provides the division manager with an additional payoff when his division’s output is low. Therefore, potential whistle‐blowing undermines the division manager’s incentives to exert effort, which results in a less efficient outcome.     

Management Quality, Ownership, Firm Performance and Market Pressure in Russia

We investigate whether management quality explains firm performance in Russia. We find that it explains relatively little in terms of firm performance, but it does explain some of the differences between firms in Russia’s Far East and the rest of Russia. Firms that have always been in private ownership perform better than state-owned firms. While management practices may not yet affect firm performance in a measurable way, they may do so in the future. This conjecture motivates us to look at the determinants of firms’ adoption of good management practices. We find that market pressure, both in the product and the labour market, has some impact on adoption of management practices, in particular in the Far East. It thus appears that the economy in Russia’s Far East may function according to different rules than in the rest of Russia, as market forces seem to be stronger there, in particular, because the Far East is more exposed to foreign competition than the rest of Russia.     

A note on CEO compensation, elimination tournaments and bankruptcy risk

We investigate an economy in which firms have different risks to go bankrupt. We observe two things: first, workers in firms with higher bankruptcy risk (bad firms) always work less than workers in good firms. Second, the CEOs of bad firms may nonetheless receive larger wages.JEL Classification: J40, L20, M50Alexander Matros: We are grateful to Karl Wärneryd and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. Much of this paper was written while Matros was a Research Fellow at University College London and Friebel was at SITE, Stockholm. We are grateful for their research environmennt. The support of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) is gratefully acknowledged. This work was part of the programme of the ESRC Research Center for Economic Learning and Social Evolution.     

Bureaucracies in the Russian Voucher Privatization

The paper analyses the implementation of voucher privatization in Russia in the framework of incentive theory. The central government needs the support of local privatization agencies. These agencies possess private knowledge concerning: a) their personal reform attitude; b) local privatization conditions. According to the trade-off between rent extraction and efficiency, the speed of privatization (the efficiency goal) is constrained by the informational rents that the government must pay to local agents. Through voucher privatization, the government learns about local privatization conditions. Surprisingly, this additional information does not necessarily lead to more privatization. In fact, the government may even slow down reforms in order to save on bureaucrats' rents. This result of the model matches with the facts of Russian privatization in the period 1992–93.