Common Stock Returns in Corporate Takeover Bids: The Case of Brokerage House Acquisitions

This paper examines the common stock returns of three groups of bidders that purchased brokerage houses. Only in the cases of horizontal mergers, one brokerage house purchasing another, are there abnormal returns associated with the purchase. Neither bank holding company bidders nor non-financial bidders gain significantly when purchasing a brokerage house. Bank holding company bidders face considerable regulatory delays, and these economic disturbances may eliminate their gains. Bank holding company expansion into these non-bank activities does not appear, at the time of announcement, to either hurt or benefit them; hence, this expansion does not appear to further the loss exposure of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.     

The impact of skewness in the hedging decision

The impact of skewness in the hedger's objective function is tested using a model of hedging derived from a third‐order Taylor Series approximation of expected utility. To determine the effect of price skewness upon hedging and speculation, analytical results are derived using an example of cotton storage. Findings suggest that when forward risk premiums and price skewness in the spot asset have opposite signs, speculation increases relative to the mean‐variance model. When the signs are identical, speculation will decrease, contradicting findings of mean‐variance models. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:503–520, 2006     

America's need for an ‘Ethical Renaissance’

Remember the words of Cain, “Am I my brother's keeper?” God said to him that “his brother's blood cries out from the ground”. What do these words suggest for the role of government? I assert that there is an ethic of accountability, caring and sharing fundamental to individual and corporate life. Creation was provided for all humanity. Until we can grasp a global view of resource stewardship we cannot begin to consider wise utilization. The goal must be an ethical renaissance that will bring security more effective than any military force.     

Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts

Hatfield and Milgrom [Hatfield, John William, Milgrom, Paul R., 2005. Matching with contracts. Amer. Econ. Rev. 95, 913–935] present a unified model of matching with contracts, which includes the standard two-sided matching and some package auction models as special cases. They show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors if hospitals' preferences satisfy substitutes and the law of aggregate demand. We show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for doctors under these same conditions. That is, no group of doctors can make each of its members strictly better off by jointly misreporting their preferences. We derive as a corollary of this result that no individually rational allocation is preferred by all the doctors to the doctor-optimal stable allocation.     

Corporate control through the criminal system — An alternative proposal

Corporate violations of the law are occurring with increasing frequency and with increasing public attention. Solutions to date have proved ineffectual because of the problem of determining whom is to be punished for the offense of the corporation. Instead of individual jail terms or corporate fines, we propose that the dissolution of the corporation be considered as a more effectual means of conforming corporate behavior to the norms of the legal system. Paul Lansing is Associate Professor of Business Law. Previous articles have appeared in theAmerican Business Law Journal, Nebraska Law Review, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, The Journal of Corporation Law and others.     

Collaborating with Competitors: How Do Small Firm Accounting Associations and Networks Successfully Manage Coopetitive Tensions?*

The “coopetition” paradox exists when two or more organizations are simultaneously involved in cooperative and competitive interactions. In the accounting industry, small firms encounter coopetition when they align themselves with other independent firms to form accounting associations and networks (AANs). AANs are a type of interorganizational relationship (IOR) that provide opportunities for member firms to collaborate by sharing important resources such as expertise, best practices, and manpower. However, member firms also compete in the marketplace for clients and human capital, which incentivizes uncooperative and opportunistic behavior. If managed inadequately, coopetitive tensions can significantly hamper AAN benefits and may lead to IOR failure. Given the considerable longevity of AANs, we interview 42 high‐level accounting professionals to understand AANs' apparent successful management of these tensions. Leveraging coopetition and IOR theory, our analysis suggests that transactional mechanisms (contractual agreements, organizational structure, selection/monitoring processes) and relational mechanisms (trust, social ties, reciprocity) play key roles in encouraging healthy cooperation and competition among member firms. One of our main conclusions is that these mechanisms contribute to AAN success because they are leveraged comprehensively across each IOR life cycle phase, and they are mutually reinforcing, with transactional mechanisms providing the foundation to inspire confidence and encourage the development of relational mechanisms. Our research enriches existing accounting and coopetition literature, provides a new perspective for AANs, and responds to calls to understand key factors of IOR success.     

An Empirical Investigation of Alternative Contingent Claims Models for Pricing Residential Mortgages

Researchers have employed option pricing techniques to analyze mortgage financing and valuation. Alternative models (one-, two-, and three-variable models) employing different variables (short- and long-term interest rates and building value) have been designed to price mortgage securities. No prior research has addressed the question of whether the pricing accuracy of these contingent claims models improves as states increase or whether contingent claims models' valuation abilities generate reasonable estimates of primary mortgage market prices. The articles investigates the relative efficiency of each of these alternative mortgage valuation models in predicting primary market mortgage values. Our results show that a two-variable model (short rate and building value) is the most efficient. Valuation results indicate a positive pricing spread between the primary market and the theoretically estimated value.     

The Effect of Deadline Pressure on Pre‐Negotiation Positions: A Comparison of Auditors and Client Management

This study compares auditors' and chief financial officers' pre‐negotiation judgments and considers the potential differential impact the end of the audit (deadline pressure) has on each party. General negotiation literature suggests that individuals change their behaviors as deadline pressure increases (i.e., when there is less time in which to conduct a negotiation) in order to increase the probability of reaching an agreement. In an audit context, the end‐of‐engagement deadline is often based on regulatory filing deadlines (e.g., SEC filings for public companies), which are not determined by either negotiating party. The audit context is also unique in that there are asymmetric consequences for each party (the auditor and client management) for failing to reach an agreement and different negotiation tactics used by the two parties potentially leading to differing levels of concessions. We predict that auditors, who are in a stronger negotiation position, will generally concede less than client management when determining their pre‐negotiation position and will tend to use more contentious strategies. However, such contentious strategies require time. Thus, we expect, based on negotiation theory, that as deadline pressure increases, auditors' concessionary behavior will be more affected than that of client management. Consistent with expectations, results of our experiment suggest that CFOs concede more than auditors in general; however, auditors are more reactive to deadline pressure and increase concessions when faced with high deadline pressure, while CFOs do not. We also measure planned strategy use and find results to be consistent with theory: when deadline pressure is high, auditors are less likely to use contentious tactics, while CFOs' strategy choices are unaffected by deadline pressure. These results suggest that characteristics of the unique auditor–client negotiation environment, such as deadline pressures, have potentially differential effects on both parties due to the differing negotiation strategies employed by these parties.     

Income smoothing behavior of U.S. banks under revised international capital requirements

The use of the loan-loss provision to smooth reported income by large bank holding companies is a much-investigated practice. To the extent that the variability of net income is a measure of risk, income smoothing may reduce the perceived riskiness of the bank and thus increase stock value. Managers may have added incentive to smooth income in response to the structure of their compensation package. The Basel Accord of 1988 phased in new definitions of regulatory capital for banks. These changes have increased the incentives for income smoothing. Most previous studies on income smoothing and loan-loss reserves predate the implementation of the Basel Accord. Others use data that include the transition period. This study revisits the subject, using only post-Accord data. Results of this study are compared with previous results. The evidence confirms the continued existence of income smoothing and supports the proposition that banks have become more aggressive in using loan-loss reserves as a tool for income smoothing.