北欧电子健康概况与区域信息系统实例 电子健康在瑞典、丹麦和挪威:大范围应用地区电子健康解决方案

当今,全世界各国家和地区的卫生部门都在借助电子健康,改进他们的卫生系统,使国民或者病人受益.电子健康在这里,是指所有医疗保健方面的信息通讯技术的应用.为了改进医疗健康服务,信息通讯技术在以下三方面有很大的应用:·教育国民和专业人员如何诊治和预防疾病;·公共卫生的监督和规划;·生物医学研究和诊疗常规的知识库管理.     

Creative destruction and labor's options

New technology, the fall of Eastern European socialism, new international trade agreements, and a resurgence of classical liberalism have greatly augmented the pace of capitalism's creative destruction. The principal benefits of this process have come in the form of new, better, and less-expensive consumer goods. But this process also generates a generalized sense of insecurity that most afflicts labor. Yet, the dominant ideology that has accompanied this latest burst of creative destruction has not been terribly sympathetic to labor's plight. After analyzing the character of this most recent burst of creative destruction, this paper explores the various options available to labor within a generally hostile ideological climate. The principle focus is on how labor's most promising options may not be found primarily in restablishing constrants upon markets, but rather in gaining greater control over production in the form of greater participation in both firm decision-making and ownership.     

Trading for the future: Signaling in permit markets

Permit markets are celebrated as a policy instrument since they allow (i) firms to equalize marginal costs through trade and (ii) the regulator to distribute the burden in a politically desirable way. These two concerns, however, may conflict in a dynamic setting. Anticipating the regulator's future desire to give more permits to firms that appear to need them, firms purchase permits to signal their need. This raises the price above marginal costs and the market becomes inefficient. If the social cost of pollution is high and the government intervenes frequently in the market, the distortions are greater than the gains from trade and non-tradable permits are better. The analysis helps to understand permit markets and how they should be designed.     

The Challenge of Humanistic Economics

The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) created the Hospital Compare Program in 2003 to increase transparency between healthcare providers and consumers. Implemented in 2005, this transparency consists of hospitals' collecting and making publicly available a set of hospital quality score measures. The CMS induced participation by financially penalizing hospitals that did not publicly report a specific subset of these measures (called “starter” measures). Three years into the program, the penalty for non-reporting both the starter measures and other (“non-starter”) measures was increased. I use a difference-in-differences methodology to analyze the effect of the increased CMS penalty on the likelihood that a hospital publicly reported its starter and non-starter measure scores. I find that the penalty had an economically and statistically insignificant effect on the probability that a hospital publicly reported its starter scores, but a statistically significant 8.0 percent effect (p-value<0.01) on whether it reported its non-starter scores. These findings are robust to a series of alternative empirical specifications.