矿产资源保障能力评价与分析——以锰矿为例

矿产资源保障能力不仅是矿产资源开发利用程度对国家经济发展支撑能力的反映,也是资源安全程度的重要体现。为了科学地分析评价我国矿产资源保障能力,文章从资源禀赋、国内供需、国际市场三方面构建矿产资源保障能力指标体系,形成包含三类基本指标十种要素指标的体系框架,建立熵权TO P S IS模型矿产资源保障能力评价方法,并以锰矿为例,对我国锰矿资源保障能力进行评价与分析。结果表明,2009—2018年我国锰矿资源保障能力经历了较安全、基本安全、较危险三个阶段,总体呈下降趋势。     

改善圆钢切断口形变的力分析与方法研究

分析了引发钢件二次加工中切口材料损耗的断口形变力学机理,提出一种动刀片偏离安装、实现滚动切断的改良切制方法。运用Adams分析表明,该方法能改善圆钢在钢筋切断机上的断口圆度,从而能减少钢件二次加工量,提高材料利用率。     

侵权责任法第八十七条的博弈论分析

由于高空抛物侵权责任实际上是侵权人与无辜第三人之间的博弈,通过博弈论这一法经济学分析方法对高空抛物侵权责任进行分析,将无辜第三人分为侵权人之外的可能加害的建筑物使用人和物业公司两种,通过两者的优势比较得出的结论是物业公司赔偿方案比现行高空抛物侵权责任立法更有效率。     

董事会断裂带与企业薪酬差距

高管与普通员工之间的薪酬差距不仅影响着企业的激励效率与企业价值,还关系到社会的公平与稳定。断裂带是Lau and Murnighan(1998)提出的假想的分割线概念,即可以将团队划分为多个小团体。以2005—2019年中国A股上市公司为样本,本文从董事会断裂带这一视角探索董事会中小团体的差异性对于薪酬差距的影响和后果。本文研究发现:(1)董事会断裂带的存在加剧了企业高管与普通员工之间的薪酬差距;(2)分解董事会断裂带的类型后,由深层特征形成的断裂带对于薪酬差距的影响高于由表层特征形成的断裂带;(3)区分行业竞争的程度后,公司所在行业的激烈竞争有助于缓解董事会断裂带造成的薪酬差距扩大;(4)从经济后果来看,董事会断裂带造成的薪酬差距对企业绩效具有显著的负向影响。本文的研究有助于深入理解企业薪酬差距形成的机制及其后果,同时对于完善我国董事会的监督机制也有一定的现实启发。     

Board faultlines and the value of cash holdings: Evidence from Chinese listed companies

Faultlines can affect a board of director’s effectiveness in supervising senior managers, which in turn affects the value of a company’s cash holdings. Based on sample data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2016, we examine the relationship between board faultlines and the value of cash holdings. The empirical results indicate that board faultlines have a significant inhibitory effect on cash holding value. This inhibitory effect is stronger for board faultlines resulting from deep-level attributes. Furthermore, the inhibitory effect of board faultlines is stronger in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than in non-SOEs. As an important governance mechanism, management shareholdings can reduce agency costs and mitigate the negative impact of board fissures on cash holdings. Overall, we enrich the literature on the economic consequences of board faultlines and their influence on cash holding value. We also offer companies practical suggestions for improving the supervisory mechanism of their board of directors.     

股指成份股调整与公司盈余管理——基于一项准自然实验的研究

文章以沪深300指数2007年6月至2018年6月23次调整的成份股和同期公布的备选股为研究样本,考察了成份股调整对公司盈余管理的影响。研究发现:(1)与备选股相比,成份股调整后公司的应计盈余管理没有受到显著影响,而真实盈余管理水平则显著下降;(2)区分真实盈余管理的不同类型,成份股调整主要通过异常现金流降低了真实盈余管理水平;(3)在持续时间方面,成份股调整对真实盈余管理的影响在调入指数三年之后依然存在;(4)成份股调整降低真实盈余管理的作用在独立董事比例低和非国有企业样本中更加显著。上述结果表明,成份股调整的"监督效应"降低了公司的真实盈余管理水平,且在其他监督渠道较弱的情况下更加显著。文章丰富了成份股调整经济后果和盈余管理影响因素的研究,并有助于监管者和投资者认识股票指数调整对公司行为和会计信息的现实影响,以监管和防范投资风险。     

Indigenous Characteristics of Chinese Corporate Social Responsibility Conceptual Paradigm

The purpose of this study is to identify China’s indigenous conceptual dimensions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and to increase the knowledge and comprehension about CSR in specific context. We conducted an inductive analysis of CSR in China based on an open-ended survey of 630 CEOs and business owners in 12 provinces (municipalities) in China. In the survey, we collected CSR sample responses. After examining the qualitative data, we identified nine dimensions of CSR, among which six dimensions are similar to their western counterparts; however, the other three dimensions were never mentioned in previous literature, which mostly study the cases in the western world. In addition, two of the widely accepted CSR dimensions in the western world have no embodiments in China. A comparative study of CSR between China and western countries also unveiled some unique dimensions of CSR in China. In conclusion, CSR manifested in China is different from that in western countries, and China’s CSR is closely related to its social and cultural background.     

Selective enforcement of regulation

Regulatory agencies may, whether outside of set rules or within their discretion, depart from the original goals or principles set for enforcing the rules, which we term selective enforcement. Taking China, a country in transition, as an example, and using cases and large-sample tests, we present empirical evidence of selective enforcement. The results show that the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) takes into account whether companies violating the rules have a state-owned background and the strength of that background when investigating and punishing non-compliance. After controlling for the degree of violation, state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) are punished less severely than private companies; and the higher the hierarchy of the SOE in question, the less severe the punishment. It also takes longer for SOEs to be punished. We also find that companies that violate the rules less seriously have a greater tendency to apply for refinancing than those that violate the rules more seriously. This may be because the severity of the violation can affect listed companies’ expectations of obtaining refinancing. The analysis and conclusions of this study prove useful in understanding the causes and consequences of selective enforcement in transition economies.     

Relative performance evaluation and executive compensation: Evidence from Chinese listed companies

This paper focuses on the effect of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on top managers’ compensation in Chinese public firms. Overall, we find no evidence of an RPE effect or any asymmetry in firms’ use of RPE. The results obtained using Albuquerque’s (2009) method are similar to those obtained using traditional methods. In addition, we find that RPE is used more in non-SOEs than in SOEs. This may be due to the regulation of compensation, various forms of incentives and the multiple tasks of managers in SOEs.