What's it worth? A general manager's guide to valuation

Behind every major resource-allocation decision a company makes lies some calculation of what that move is worth. So it is not surprising that valuation is the financial analytical skill general managers want to learn more than any other. Managers whose formal training is more than a few years old, however, are likely to have learned approaches that are becoming obsolete. What do generalists need in an updated valuation tool kit? In the 1970s, discounted-cash-flow analysis (DCF) emerged as best practice for valuing corporate assets. And one version of DCF-using the weighted-average cost of capital (WACC)-became the standard. Over the years, WACC has been used by most companies as a one-size-fits-all valuation tool. Today the WACC standard is insufficient. Improvements in computers and new theoretical insights have given rise to tools that outperform WACC in the three basic types of valuation problems managers face. Timothy Luehrman presents an overview of the three tools, explaining how they work and when to use them. For valuing operations, the DCF methodology of adjusted present value allows managers to break a problem into pieces that make managerial sense. For valuing opportunities, option pricing captures the contingent nature of investments in areas such as R&D and marketing. And for valuing ownership claims, the tool of equity cash flows helps managers value their company's stake in a joint venture, a strategic alliance, or an investment that uses project financing.     

Using APV (adjusted present value): a better tool for valuing operations

Anyone who learned valuation techniques more than a few years ago is probably due for a refresher course. For the past 25 years, managers have been taught that the best practice for valuing assets-that is, an existing business, factory, product line, or market position-is to use a discounted-cash-flow (DCF) methodology. That is still true. But the particular version of DCF that has been accepted as the standard-using the weighted-average cost of capital (WACC)-is now obsolete. Today's better alternative, adjusted present value (APV), is especially versatile and reliable. It will likely replace WACC as the DCF methodology of choice among generalists. Like WACC, APV is used to value operations, or assets-in-place-that is, any existing asset that will generate a stream of future cash flows. Timothy Luehrman explains APV and walks readers through a case example designed to teach them how to use it. He argues that APV always works when WACC does-and sometimes when WACC doesn't, because it requires fewer restrictive assumptions. And APV is less prone to yield serious errors than WACC is. But, most important, general managers will find that APV's power lies in the managerially relevant information it provides. APV can help managers analyze not only how much an asset is worth but also where the value comes from.     

The myth of Japan's low-cost capital

The low rate at which U.S. companies are investing in manufacturing and the resulting decline in America's competitive position has been a topic of grave concern for more than a decade. During that time, critics have offered many excuses for this shortsighted investment behavior. Yet one excuse has steadily gained adherents and is becoming something of an article of faith--that is, that capital in the United States is more expensive than in other countries, particularly Japan. It is both a popular and appealing argument. Yet authors W. Carl Kester and Timothy A. Luehrman, professors at the Harvard Business School, warn that this argument is not only false but also dangerous. They assert that the empirical evidence does not support the claim that the U.S. manufacturing sector has persistently faced significantly higher average capital costs than the Japanese manufacturing sector. The authors argue that differences in capital costs have been isolated and temporary, not broad and persistent. To prove their point, Kester and Luehrman critically dissect both the common wisdom and the academic studies on the topic. They conclude that in the new global economy, all companies--Japanese, American, European, and others--must compete for the same capital. Some will succeed in obtaining it on temporarily favorable terms, not because they are Japanese but because they are efficiently organized and governed. But as long as an alleged international cost-of-capital gap is their excuse, U.S. managers run the risk of retaliating counterproductively against U.S. trading partners or doing nothing at all inside corporations. In short, managers should stop complaining about how much capital costs and worry more about how to manage it after it's been raised.     

Strategy as a portfolio of real options

In financial terms, a business strategy is much more like a series of options than like a single projected cash flow. Executing a strategy almost always involves making a sequence of major decisions. Some actions are taken immediately while others are deliberately deferred so that managers can optimize their choices as circumstances evolve. While executives readily grasp the analogy between strategy and real options, until recently the mechanics of option pricing was so complex that few companies found it practical to use when formulating strategy. But advances in both computing power and our understanding of option pricing over the last 20 years now make it feasible to apply real-options thinking to strategic decision making. To analyze a strategy as a portfolio of related real options, this article exploits a framework presented by the author in "Investment Opportunities as Real Options: Getting Started on the Numbers" (HBR July-August 1998). That article explained how to get from discounted-cash-flow value to option value for a typical project; in other words, it was about reaching a number. This article extends that framework, exploring how, once you've worked out the numbers, you can use option pricing to improve decision making about the sequence and timing of a portfolio of strategic investments. Timothy Luehrman shows executives how to plot their strategies in two-dimensional "option space," giving them a way to "draw" a strategy in terms that are neither wholly strategic nor wholly financial, but some of both. Such pictures inject financial discipline and new insight into how a company's future opportunities can be actively cultivated and harvested.