排序方式: 共有17条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
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Yoko Nishihara Wataru Sunayama Kazunori Nishimura 《The Review of Socionetwork Strategies》2014,8(1):35-49
Bulletin Board Systems (BBSs) on the Web are used by many users posting comments on threads. Each thread carries a subject of discussion. Most users post comments related to a subject. However, unrelated comments are also posted. The unrelated comments distract users and diminish their understanding of the entire story of a thread. Comments unrelated to a subject have to be filtered automatically. This paper proposes a method that extracts comments related to a thread subject from a thread of BBS. The method extracts two types of comments: comments related to a thread subject (main comments), and comments related to main comments (sub-comments). The main comments are extracted by a user ID and keywords in the comments. The sub-comments are extracted by explicit and implicit anchor texts in the comments. We experimented with the proposed method and verified that comments extracted by the proposed method support participants in understanding the entire story of a thread. 相似文献
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Ko Nishihara 《Economic Theory》1999,13(2):483-494
Summary. Nishihara [3] showed that N-person prisoners' dilemma has a cooperative Nash equilibrium, if the players decide their actions sequentially in the order
determined by Nature under a certain information structure, and if each player's payoffs satisfy a certain inequality. This
paper examines the stability of this cooperative equilibrium against two matters: players' slight mistakes and deviations
by coalitions. The main results are as follows: (i) if the inequality on each player's payoffs strictly holds, then the cooperative
equilibrium is a strictly proper equilibrium; (ii) if N≤3, and if full cooperation is Pareto efficient in N-person prisoners' dilemma, then the cooperative equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium; (iii) the cooperative equilibrium is in general a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
Received: June 23, 1997; revised version: December 2, 1997 相似文献
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Scott John Vitell Encarnación Ramos Ceri M. Nishihara 《Journal of Business Ethics》2010,91(4):467-483
Ethics has assumed a dominant position in the current economic debate, and this study focuses on ethics as a legitimate underpinning
to good business decision making. Using a self-response survey of marketing managers in Spain, the current theory on ethical
decision making is extended. Results support the mediating influence of the PRESOR construct (an individual’s perception of
the importance of ethics and social responsibility for the effectiveness of the organization) on relativistic and idealistic
moral thinking when one is considering the moral intensity of a situation. In addition, the study found support for the relationship
between relativism (negative), idealism (positive), corporate ethical values, and job satisfaction, thereby providing additional
support for the prior theory. Finally, a thorough review of the extant literature and suggestions for future ethics research
in the marketing field are included. 相似文献
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Michi Nishihara Sudipto Sarkar Chuanqian Zhang 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2019,46(5-6):784-809
The concept of debt overhang (that is, an equity‐maximizing levered firm will under‐invest relative to a firm‐value‐maximizing firm) is well established in the literature. A number of papers have demonstrated it as delayed investment (when investment size is specified) or smaller investment (when investment time is specified). However, there is no work on the underinvestment effect when the firm chooses both size and timing of investment, as it usually does in real life. This is what our paper focuses on. When the firm has the flexibility to choose both size and time, the effect is complicated by the fact that delayed investment results in larger investment, which suggests that the underinvestment problem might be mitigated. We find, however, that the effect depends on how underinvestment is measured. When measured by the expected present value of investment, flexibility can mitigate or exacerbate the underinvestment problem, depending on the cost of installing capacity. But when measured by the agency cost, flexibility always exacerbates the underinvestment problem. It is shown numerically that, at the optimal leverage ratio, the agency cost with plausible parameter values can be economically significant. Thus, with the flexibility of choosing both time and size of investment, the debt overhang problem can be of significant practical relevance in corporate investment decisions. 相似文献
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A resolution of N-person prisoners' dilemma 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
Ko Nishihara 《Economic Theory》1997,10(3):531-540
Summary. The purpose of this paper is to show that cooperation is possible in N-person prisoners' dilemma if players have incomplete information on the order of their moves. We consider a modified version
of N-person prisoners' dilemma in which players sequentially move in the order determined by Nature, and during the play they
get some information about others. We provide an information partition and a condition of payoffs for which cooperation is
attained in an equilibrium. Further, for the case that full cooperation is not attained, we examine the largest partial cooperation
which is achieved in an equilibrium.
Received: March 5, 1995; revised version August 11, 1996 相似文献
7.
We propose a structural model with an optimal switching of diffusion regimes that integrates a wide range of investment reversibility. The default boundary and switching thresholds are endogenously determined, and they enable us to comprehend the interrelated problems of the investment decision, capital structure, and credit risks. We examine not only the under/overinvestment but also the under/overdisinvestment. The leverage ratio decreases when the firm has an option to invest in a reversible project, which can alleviate the capital structure puzzle. Furthermore, the model significantly reduces the wide dispersion of yield spreads depending on the credit grade of bonds. 相似文献
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Using a contingent claims model, we examine the impacts of both operating leverage and financial leverage on a firm's investment decisions in the context of capacity expansion. Our model shows that quasi‐fixed operating costs could significantly mitigate the underinvestment problem for debt‐financed firms. The existing debt induces equity holders to delay equity‐financed expansion because the expanded earnings base will also benefit the debt holders by lowering the bankruptcy risk. The operating costs decrease this type of wealth transfer from equity holders to debt holders by magnifying the bankruptcy risk of the existing debt upon investment. By applying the Cox proportional hazard model on a large sample of publicly traded U.S. firms over 1966–2016, we offer empirical support for the theoretical predictions. The results are robust to various measures of operating leverage. 相似文献
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This paper investigates the interactions between preemptive competition and leverage in a duopoly market. We investigate both a case in which the firms have optimal financial structures, and a case in which financing constraints require firms to finance their investments by debt. Our findings are that the second mover always leaves the duopoly market before the leader, although the leader may exit before the follower's entry. The leverage effects of debt financing can increase the value of a firm and accelerate investment, even in the presence of preemptive competition. Notably, financing constraints can delay preemptive investment and improve firm values in preemptive equilibrium. Indeed, the leader's high leverage due to financing constraints can lower the first-mover advantage and weaken preemptive competition. Especially with strong first-mover advantage, the financing constraint effects can dominate the leverage effects. These findings are almost consistent with the empirical evidence, which shows that high leverage leads to competitive disadvantage and mitigates product market competition. 相似文献
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This paper investigates a principal–agent model in which an owner (principal) optimizes a contract with a manager (agent) who has been delegated to undertake an investment project. In the model, we explore the effects of costly exploration by which the manager learns the real value of development cost. We show that high exploration cost can lead to a pooling policy not contingent on project type. Further, and more notably, we show that, in the presence of asymmetric information, higher exploration cost leads to wealth transfer from owner to manager and can ultimately improve social welfare. 相似文献