Weak Identification of Forward‐looking Models in Monetary Economics*

Recently, single‐equation estimation by the generalized method of moments (GMM) has become popular in the monetary economics literature, for estimating forward‐looking models with rational expectations. We discuss a method for analysing the empirical identification of such models that exploits their dynamic structure and the assumption of rational expectations. This allows us to judge the reliability of the resulting GMM estimation and inference and reveals the potential sources of weak identification. With reference to the New Keynesian Phillips curve of Galí and Gertler [Journal of Monetary Economics (1999) Vol. 44, 195] and the forward‐looking Taylor rules of Clarida, Galí and Gertler [Quarterly Journal of Economics (2000) Vol. 115, 147], we demonstrate that the usual ‘weak instruments’ problem can arise naturally, when the predictable variation in inflation is small relative to unpredictable future shocks (news). Hence, we conclude that those models are less reliably estimated over periods when inflation has been under effective policy control.     

An empirical inquiry into the short-run dynamics of output,prices and exchange market pressure

In this paper we develop a short-run disequilibrium model for the interaction of output, prices and exchange-market pressure. In this model we consider the trade-off between movements in exchange rates and movements in international reserves and we also incorporate and test purchasing power parity as a long-run hypothesis. The specification adopted preserves the properties of the monetary approach to exchange rates and the balance of payments in the long run. The theoretical model is applied to the small open economy of Greece for the period 1975–1981.     

Estimation of the monetary model of exchange-rate determination under rational expectations

This paper develops a sticky-price version of the monetary model of exchange-rate determination under rational expectations. The reduced-form difference equation for the exchange rate has two roots which lie on either side of unity. In the solution the stable root is solved backwards and the unstable forwards. The model is estimated by the full-information maximum-likelihood method on deutsche mark-dollar data. The results are supportive of the rational-expectations restrictions.     

On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Emission Permits

It is typical for economists andpolicy makers alike to presume that competitivemarkets allocate emission permits efficiently.This paper demonstrates that competition in theemission permits market cannot assureefficiency when the product market isoligopolistic. We provide the conditions underwhich a bureaucratic mechanism is welfaresuperior to a tradeable emission permitssystem. Price-taking behaviour in the permitsmarket ensures transfer of licenses to the lessefficient in abatement firms, which then becomemore aggressive in the product market,acquiring additional permits. As a result, theless efficient firms end up with a higher thanthe welfare maximizing share of emissionpermits. If the less efficient in abatementfirms are also less efficient in production,competitive trading of permits may result inlower output and welfare.     

Empirical Modelling of Money Demand in Periods of Structural Change: The Case of Greece*

This paper examines the behaviour of the demand for money in Greece during 1976Q1 to 2000Q4, a period that witnessed many of the influences that cause money‐demand instability. Two empirical methodologies, vector error correction (VEC) modelling and second‐generation random coefficient (RC) modelling, are used to estimate the demand for money. The coefficients of both the VEC and RC procedures support the hypothesis that the demand for money becomes more responsive to both the own rate of return on money balances and the opportunity cost of holding money because of financial deregulation. In general, both procedures also support the hypothesis that the income elasticity of money demand declines over time as a result of technological improvements in the payments system and the development of money substitutes, which lead to economies of scale in holding money.     

Cross-Industry Emission Permits Trading

The present paper examines the effectiveness of emission permits trading across industries. We find that, while permits trading in a competitive environment minimizes costs of compliance, it also enhances product market imperfections. We also find that a standard-setting regulation yields superior welfare results if policy makers have able information. Standard setting allows policy makers the flexibility of taking into account the existing imperfections in each industry. Although not surprising, this result has important policy implications in situations in which policy makers consider establishing permits trading between publicly owned dominant polluters and other industrial polluters. Since policy makers have able information on publicly-owned firms, it might be welfare improving to directly control emissions of the dominant publicly-owned polluters. Given that many of the major polluters in the real world are large firms in heavily concentrated industries many of which are also regulated, our result warrants policy makers' attention.     

Valuing a high-tech growth company: the case of EchoStar Communications Corporation

This article uses real options to value a high-tech company with significant growth option potential. The case of EchoStar Communications Corporation is used as an illustration. The company's growth opportunities are modeled and valued as a portfolio of growth options, namely options to expand its pay television, equipment, and internet services. Expansion of the main business can occur geographically (in the USA, internationally, and through partnerships) or through cross-selling of new products and services to its customer base. The internet business can expand via switching to digital subscriber line and through partnerships. The underlying asset (business) for the expansion options is the ‘base’ discounted cash flow (DCF), after removing the constant growth rate in the terminal-value DCF assumption. The options-based estimate of present value of growth opportunities (PVGO) value substitutes for the terminal growth DCF estimate. We show that our options-based portfolio PVGO provides a better estimate of the firm's growth prospects than the terminal growth DCF assumption.     

Tradeable Emission Permits Regulations in the Presence of Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets: Welfare Implications

In the present paper, we analyse the interaction of a competitive market for emission permits with an oligopolistic product market. It is well known that a competitive permits market achieves the cost minimizing distribution of abatement effort among the polluting firms for a given reduction in emissions. However, when the product market is oligopolistic, it may redistribute production inefficiently among firms. It has been suggested that this inefficiency can outweigh the gains obtained from using emission permits instead of command and control. Although this argument is clearly correct under full information, it is shown in the present paper that it reverses under incomplete information. In particular, it is shown that when tradeable emission permits are specified according to the standard textbook example, they yield higher social welfare than the command and control regulation.     

Environmental regulation and international trade

In this paper, we investigate how a country's choice of environmental policy instrument affects the international competitiveness of its firms. We show that in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the total market share of firms regulated through tradeable emission permits increases relative to that of the firms operating under command and control due to better allocation of total abatement among the firms in the country. Our work suggests that free trade situations should not only result in similar environmental standards but also in similar regulatory regimes. It may come as no surprise that the environmental authorities in Canada are seriously considering following the United States in instituting a tradeable emission permits mechanism.Most of the work was completed during the time that E.S. Sartzetakis was a post-doctoral fellow at the Department of Economics, Université Laval. He gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of the department during this period. Earlier, versions of the paper were presented at the fifth conference of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists and at the 1993 Rancontre Franco-Québécoise du GREEN. We would like to thank Joseph Doucet, Thomas Ross, and Aart de Zeeuw for extremely helpful suggestions. We would also like to thank two anonymous referees of this journal for their comments. Financial support from the LRSA of the Faculté des sciences de l'administration, Université Laval, the Groupe de rechearche en économie de l'énergie et des ressources naturelles (GREEN), Université Laval, and the Centre for International Business Studies (CIBS), University of British Columbia, is gratefully acknowledged. The responsibility for errors and omissions remains ours.     

Exploring the nexus between banking sector reform and performance: Evidence from newly acceded EU countries

The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between banking sector reform and bank performance – measured in terms of efficiency, total factor productivity growth and net interest margin – accounting for the effects through competition and bank risk-taking. To this end, we develop an empirical model of bank performance, which is consistently estimated using recent econometric techniques. The model is applied to bank panel data from ten newly acceded EU countries. The results indicate that both banking sector reform and competition exert a positive impact on bank efficiency, while the effect of reform on total factor productivity growth is significant only toward the end of the reform process. Finally, the effect of capital and credit risk on bank performance is in most cases negative, while it seems that higher liquid assets reduce the efficiency and productivity of banks.