Political and Interlocking Connections in the Boardroom on Private Equity Placements

This study examines the influence of directors who are politically connected and/or have boardroom interlocking on private equity placements (PEPs) in Chinese listed firms. We document that interlocked directors can significantly influence the propensity to apply for PEPs and approval of PEPs and reduce the cost of PEPs while providing greater access to proceeds from PEPs through lowering information asymmetry and information cost. Although politically connected directors have a significant role in the approval of PEPs, they are more likely to reduce the monitoring effects and increase agency problems, which lead to increased cost of PEPs and reduced proceeds from PEPs. The results also reveal that political connection diminishes the benefits of interlocking directors for firms having directors with both interlocking and political ties.     

The Effects of Environmental Information Disclosure and Energy Types on the Cost of Equity: Evidence from the Energy Industry in China

This study investigates whether environment information disclosure (EID) and different energy sources have any effect on the cost of equity capital (COEC), and how the EID effect on the COEC varies with different types of energy. We find a negative relationship between EID and COEC. Thus, EID reduces the agency problem and information asymmetry between firms and investors, and also supports the legitimacy and stakeholder theories’ explanation of the effect of EID on the COEC in China. We find a positive (negative) relationship between some energy sources such as gas, fossil-fuelled thermal power generation, and oil (hydro-power generation, solar, and wind) and the COEC. The finding explains the polluting nature, risk of replacement, regulation risk, and regulatory costs of different energy types, and those risks have been accounted by investors. We also find that when gas, fossil-fuelled thermal power, and oil firms increase their level of EID, their COEC increases, whereas when power grid, solar, and wind power firms increase their level of EID, their COEC decreases. This finding is supported by the combination of polluting nature, risk of replacement, regulation risk, and regulatory costs of different energy sources and legitimacy and stakeholder theories. Our findings are robust to several endogeneity checks and additional tests for several unique features of Chinese capital markets.