Choice of Accounting Method for Valuation of Investment Securities: Evidence from Hong Kong Firms

This study examines whether Hong Kong managers choose “benchmark” or “alternative” valuation method for investment securities, after the Hong Kong SSAP 24 became effective starting with fiscal‐year ending December 31, 1999. Tests are conducted on a sample of 292 firms, out of which 155 Hong Kong firms reported unrealized gains and losses and 128 firms that did not report holding gains/losses, but reported investment securities. The findings indicate that firms with strong relative performance, i.e. current year's EPS higher than that of the last year, chose the alternative valuation method when the investment securities had holding gains and recognized the unrealized holding gains in the equity section of the balance sheet. This finding is consistent with the Cookie Jar hypothesis because these holding gains would be used in the income statement in future periods, when needed. With regard to firms with strong relative performance and holding losses, the findings indicate that the benchmark valuation was used. The losses were reported in the income statement to the extent that they did not reduce the EPS below that of the last year. This finding is consistent with the Income Smoothing Hypothesis, because the use of benchmark valuation reduced EPS of the current year to bring it in line with that of the last year. Evidence on firms with weak economic performance and holding gains or losses provided weak support to the Income Smoothing Hypothesis and Big Bath Hypothesis. Additionally, the results indicate that the firms with high debt‐equity ratio preferred the benchmark method and recorded securities at cost. This treatment provided managers with an opportunity to liquidate or reclassify the securities in future periods and use the accrued gains, when needed. The findings are inconclusive with regard to the impact of bonus plan on the choice of valuation method.     

Stability and Segregation in Group Formation

This paper presents a model of group formation based on the assumption that individuals prefer to associate with people similar to them. It is shown that, in general, if the number of groups that can be formed is bounded, then a stable partition of the society into groups may not exist. (A partition is defined as stable if none of the individuals would prefer be in a different group than the one he is in.) However, if individuals' characteristics are one-dimensional, then a stable partition always exists. We give sufficient conditions for stable partitions to be segregating (in the sense that, for example, low-characteristic individuals are in one group and high-characteristic ones are in another) and Pareto efficient. In addition, we propose a dynamic model of individual myopic behavior describing the evolution of group formation to an eventual stable, segregating, and Pareto efficient partition. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, H41.     

The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation

Summary A multi-person bargaining model based on sequential demands is studied for coalitional games with increasing returns to scale for cooperation. We show that for such games the (subgame perfect) equilibrium behavior leads to a payoff distribution which approaches the Shapley value as the money unit approaches 0. Subgame consistency and strategic equilibria are the main tools used in the analysis. The model is then applied to study a problem of public good consumption.I wish to thank Reinhard Selten, who introduced me with the topic of non-cooperative coalition bargaining, for many constructive discussions. Al Roth's warm hospitality during the academic year 1990–1991, as well as many useful remarks are also gratefully acknowledged. Helpful discussions with Dieter Balkenborg, Tatsuro Ichiishi, Richard Mclean, Benny Moldovanu, Daniel Seidmann Avner Shaked are gratefully acknowledged as well. Part of this research was also supported by the Deutscheforschungsgemeinschaft SFB 303 at the University of Bonn.     

Pension Reform, Capital Markets and the Rate of Return

Abstract. This paper discusses the consequences of population aging and a fundamental pension reform – that is, a shift towards more pre‐funding – for capital markets in Germany. We use a stylized closed‐economy, overlapping‐generations model to compare the effects of the recent German pension reform with those of a more decisive reform that would freeze the current pay‐as‐you‐go contribution rate and thus result in a larger funded component of the pension system. We predict rates of return to capital under both reform scenarios over a long horizon, taking demographic projections as given. Our main finding is that the future decrease in the rate of return is much smaller than often claimed in the public debate. Our simulations show that the capital stock will decrease once the baby‐boom generations enter retirement, even if there were no fundamental pension reform. The corresponding decrease in the rate of return, the direct effect of population aging, is around 0.7 percentage points. While the capital market effects of the recent German pension reform are marginal, the rate of return to capital would decrease by an additional 0.5 percentage points under the more decisive reform proposal.     

Zielsetzungen der Versicherungsaufsicht

While financial state supervision has intensified legal supervision of insurance companies, the doctrine of the state’ s duty to protect constitutional rights of the insured has consistently been rolled back: merely legality control, the principle of subsidiarity in § 81 Insurance Supervision Act, the model of the informed consumer and the rejection of the trust models. Insurance companies are protected by national constitutional rights, European law and in particular by the principle of necessity. The aim of state supervision is not only to protect the insured, but also to guarantee a well-functioning private insurance industry. To some extent, state supervision is acquiring a merely warranting character; consensual administration is becoming more common — this does not, however, alter the aims of supervision.     

The Principled Legal Firm: Insights into the Professional Ideals and Ethical Values of Partners and Lawyers

Understanding how the professional ideals and values of partners influence lawyers’ everyday life is a relatively unexplored area given the inherent difficulties of gaining access to lawyers. This case study sheds light on the professional ideals and ethical values of partners and lawyers in a mid-tier Sydney law firm. Semi-structured interviews with partners and lawyers/legal clerks reveal how partners’ professional ideals and ethical values play a pivotal role in: (1) upholding positive normative evaluations of lawyer/firm propriety (moral legitimacy), (2) stressing the importance of a balanced working life (cognitive legitimacy) and (3) satisfying younger lawyers’ needs for personal support, autonomy and responsibility (pragmatic legitimacy). The principled actions of partners are portrayed as the cornerstone of shaping a moral community in legal practise.     

Top management turnover,firm performance and government control: Evidence from China's listed state-owned enterprises

Using a sample of 916 Chinese listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2001 to 2005, we find that the likelihood of top management turnover is negatively associated with firm performance, suggesting the existence of an effective corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy that is highly controlled by government. We also find that the negative turnover–performance relationship is stronger when the SOE is directly held by the central or local government, holding a monopolistic position in a local economy or in a strategic/regulated industry. The results indicate that the market-based corporate governance mechanism that disciplines top executives as a result of poor performance is not only used in Chinese SOEs, but is used more frequently when the governance control of SOEs is more intense. Our findings support the notion that government control strengthens rather than weakens the turnover–performance governance mechanism. Our additional analysis shows that this complementary effect is stronger in regions that lack pro-market institutions, such as investor protections and a functioning capital market.     

Corporate strategy and capital structure

The basic thesis of this exploratory investigation was that a corporate strategy perspective may complement the traditional financial paradigm in explaining capital structure in large U.S. corporations. Earlier fusion of strategic and financial literature led to a series of propositions antecedent to this work. Inclusion of Rumelt's diversification categories plus elsewhere validated financial contextual variables led to hypotheses for the present study. Results suggest a managerial choice perspective may help to explain the capital structure choice at the firm level of analysis.