Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem

In general, synergies across license valuations complicate the auction design process. Theory suggests that a simple (i.e., non-combinatorial) auction will have difficulty in assigning licenses efficiently in such an environment. This difficulty increases with increases in fitting complexity. In some environments, bidding may become mutually destructive. Experiments indicate that a properly designed combinatorial auction is superior to a simple auction in terms of economic efficiency and revenue generation in bidding environments with a low amount of fitting complexity. Concerns that a combinatorial auction will cause a threshold problem are not borne out when bidders for small packages can communicate.     

The Year in Economics at the FCC, 2010–11: Protecting Competition Online

The past year in economics at the Federal Communications Commission focused on protecting competition in developing online markets. Our review discusses important economic issues that are raised by the FCC’s Open Internet rulemaking (which is commonly referred to as “net neutrality”) and its review of Comcast’s programming joint venture with General Electric’s NBC Universal affiliate. The Open Internet rule focused on established online markets, while the Comcast/NBCU transaction addressed nascent competition online along with competition in video programming and distribution offline.     

Economic Analysis at the Federal Communications Commission

This article reviews some of the major economic issues faced by the FCC in thelast year. It focuses on the application of new analytic techniques at the FCC, andidentifies several areas in which further academic research would be valuable to theFCC.Currently serving as FCC Chief Economist