Fiscal Decentralization and Public Sector Size in Australia*

This paper examines the impact of fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental collusion, and the resulting fiscal dependence, on the size of the public sector in Australia. Contrary to evidence for the United States, fiscal decentralization is found to have no impact on public sector size in Australia. Three possible explanations for this finding were suggested the relatively small number of lower-level governments; the economic insignificance of local governments; and the relative immobility of citizens. Fiscal dependence of State governments on the Commonwealth proves a significant determinant of public sector size, consistent with findings for the United States.     

Liquidity and Market Structure

Market liquidity is modeled as being determined by the demand and supply of immediacy. Exogenous liquidity events coupled with the risk of delayed trade create a demand for immediacy. Market makers supply immediacy by their continuous presence and willingness to bear risk during the time period between the arrival of final buyers and sellers. In the long run the number of market makers adjusts to equate the supply and demand for immediacy. This determines the equilibrium level of liquidity in the market. The lower is the autocorrelation in rates of return, the higher is the equilibrium level of liquidity.     

ALCOHOL REGULATION AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TOWARDS CHILDREN

In recent years, economists have paid much attention to the demand for alcohol and the negative externalities associated with excessive drinking. Largely ignored in the literature is the link between alcohol use and domestic violence. Given the established positive relationship between alcohol consumption and acts of violence, the purpose of this paper is to examine the role that changes in the determinants of the demand for alcohol may play in reducing the incidence of violence aimed at children. Data on violence come from the 1976 Physical Violence in American Families survey. We estimate a model in which violent outcomes are affected by the state excise tax rate on beer; illegal drug prices, and other regulatory variables such as availability measures and laws restricting the advertising of alcohol. Results show that increasing the tax on beer can be an effective policy tool in reducing violence. Laws designed to make obtaining beer more difficult also may be effective in reducing violence, while restrictions on advertising and increases in illegal drug prices have no effects.     

Contingent capital and bank risk‐taking among British banks before the First World War1

The recent financial turmoil highlights the incentive of highly leveraged financial institutions to take excessive risk, given the protection of limited liability. During the nineteenth and early twentieth century, many banks operated under liability rules which obligated shareholders to bear larger costs of bank insolvency in the form of contingent, or even unlimited, liability. This article examines the empirical relationship between the size of banks' contingent liability and their risk‐taking behaviour using data on British banks from 1878 to 1912. We find that banks with more contingent liability appear to have taken less risk. We also find evidence that the risk‐reducing effects of contingent liability were larger for banks with higher leverage, suggesting that contingent capital mitigated the moral hazard problem at banks.