Contracting and Reporting Conservatism around a Change in Fiduciary Duties*

We exploit an influential 1991 Delaware court ruling to examine simultaneously two types of conservatism that play important roles in resolving creditor–owner agency conflicts: contracting conservatism and reporting conservatism. The ruling expanded managerial fiduciary duties in favor of creditors for Delaware-incorporated firms in the vicinity of insolvency. In those firms, following the ruling, debt contracts are less likely to include conservative adjustments to accounting numbers used for covenant compliance (i.e., contracting conservatism decreases), while public financial reporting becomes more conservative (i.e., reporting conservatism increases). The decrease in contracting conservatism is concentrated in firms that exhibit a greater increase in reporting conservatism, suggesting that reporting conservatism is more cost-effective in resolving agency conflicts. In addition, the substitution effect is more pronounced in firms facing greater business uncertainty and firms with greater board independence.     

Real Investment Implications of Employee Stock Option Exercises

This paper examines a real cost of awarding employee stock options. Based on the observation that managers are extremely concerned about earnings-per-share dilution in equity related compensation, we predict and find that firms experiencing significant employee stock option (ESO) exercises shift resources away from real investments towards the repurchase of their own stocks. We further find weak evidence of a decline in subsequent firm performance (as measured by return on assets) for several years following the cut in discretionary investments as a result of stock option exercises, though this result is sensitive to the metric used to measure performance. Collectively, our findings indicate that ESO exercises potentially impose a real cost on the firm in terms of foregone investment opportunities.     

The Effect of Aggregation of Accounting Information via Segment Reporting on Accounting Conservatism

In a sample of U.S. multiple-segment firms, we document a negative association between aggregation via segment reporting and timely loss recognition. A higher level of aggregation, as reflected in a firm’s reported organizational structure (the definition and characteristics of its segments), causes a multiple-segment firm to exhibit less cross-segment variation in profitability than a matched control portfolio of single-segment firms. We find that firms that engage in more aggregation report accounting numbers that provide less timely information about economic losses. We also observe that firms that provide more disaggregated segment data subsequent to adopting SFAS 131 experienced an increase in timely loss recognition. This result implies that higher quality segment reporting leads to an increase in timely loss recognition, which, per extant research, is associated with better governance. Our results complement results in Berger and Hann [2003. The impact of SFAS No. 131 on information and monitoring. Journal of Accounting Research, 41, 163–223] that show a decline in inefficient internal-capital-market transfers subsequent to the adoption of SFAS 131. Overall, we provide evidence supporting Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther’s [2010. The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50, 296–343] contention that accounting conservatism is, in part, a function of managers’ aggregation choices.     

与美国海关合作及实现知识产权保护最大化

知识产权的海关执法基本由美国海关与边境保护局（CBP）和美国移民及海关执法局（ICE）的相关部门负责,前者属于民事管理,后者属于刑事执法范畴。海关知识产权保护对于抵制仿冒产品、     

浅谈物流管理专业的实践教学

1 引言 物流管理是一门实践性很强的学科.物流管理专业为适应社会主义市场经济的需要,培养掌握扎实的现代物流管理基本理论和专门知识,能在生产、流通和服务领域中面向生产一线的操作层、管理层的高素质技能型人才.国家教育行政主管部门把物流专业人才列为全国十二类技能型紧缺人才之一.我国的物流教育也随着物流产业的蓬勃发展在不断的改革和创新,物流管理专业的实践教学已成为我国物流教育新的起跑点.     

The Determinants of the Amount of Information Disclosed about Corporate Restructurings

This paper examines the information voluntarily disclosed about corporate restructurings. In 1995 the FASB's Emerging Issues Task Force reached a consensus opinion about mandatory restructuring disclosures. I use these requirements to construct a statistic that measures the amount of information voluntarily disclosed for a sample of firms from 1990–1993. Disclosure levels increased dramatically when the SEC targeted restructurings as an area for increased oversight in late 1993. Controlling for this SEC action, I document a positive association between the amount of information disclosed and increased monitoring by shareholders, suggesting that monitoring complements disclosure rather than substitutes for it. The amount disclosed is negatively related to the appointment of a new CEO prior to the restructuring, perhaps reflecting the use of the restructuring charge to manage earnings for these firms.