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Journal of Business Ethics - Prior studies suggest that firms headquartered in areas with strong religious social norms have higher ethical standards. In this study, we examine whether the ethical... 相似文献
3.
Hanna J. Douglas Li Zining Shaw Wayne 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2019,53(2):527-550
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Prior studies have demonstrated that the net deferred tax liabilities of industrial firms are valued by market participants in a manner consistent... 相似文献
4.
Both soft, noncontractible, and hard, contractible, information are informative about managerial ability and future firm performance. If a manager's future compensation depends on expectations of ability or future performance, then the manager has implicit incentives to affect the information. We examine the real incentive effects of soft information in a dynamic agency with limited commitment. When long-term contracts are renegotiated, the rewards for future performance inherent in long-term contracts allow the principal partial control over the implicit incentives. This is because the soft information affects the basis for contract renegotiation. With short-term contracts, the principal has no control over the basis for contract negotiation, and thus long-term contracts generally dominate short-term contracts. With long-term contracts, the principal's control over implicit incentives is characterized in terms of effective contracting on an implicit aggregation of the soft information that arises from predicting (forming expectations of) future performance. We provide sufficient conditions for soft information to have no real incentive effects. In general, implicit incentives not controllable by the principal include fixed effects, such as career concerns driven by labor markets external to the agency. When controllable incentives span the fixed effects of career concerns, the latter have no real effects with regard to total managerial incentives—they would optimally be the same with or without career concerns. Our analysis suggests empirical tests for estimating career concerns that should explicitly incorporate noncontractible information. 相似文献
5.
Summary Theory suggests that optimal contracts should include many contingencies to achieve optimal risk sharing. However, in practice, few contracts are as complex as theory suggests. This paper develops a model which is consistent with this observation. The lack of risk sharing results from the interplay of two factors. First, contingencies must be based on information produced by measurement systems, which may be manipulable. Second, when two parties to a contract meet, they often have incomplete information. The type of contract offered may reveal information about the party who proposes it. Different types of agents have different preferences over contingent contracts, because they have different abilities to manipulate the measurement system. These differences in preferences allow the parties to signal their types through the contracts they offer. Noncontingent contracts may be chosen in equilibrium because they are the only contracts which do not give any type an incentive to distort the measurement system and, hence, do not reveal information about the party proposing the contract.We have benefited from conversations with Oliver Hart, Rick Lambert, Michael Riordan and Jean Tirole and the comments of Michel Habib, Nick Yannelis and two anonymous referees. Financial support from the National Science Foundation under grants SES-8920048 and SES-8720589 is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
6.
Maximum efforts in contests with asymmetric valuations 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Efforts may be reduced when players with different valuations participate in a contest. This paper considers the problem of designing a contest to elicit maximum aggregate effort from players with asymmetric valuations. Optimal designs for different classes of contest technologies are computed and characterized. A value weighted contest is optimal in the concave case. In the unconstrained case, the optimal contest is equivalent to a first price all-pay auction with a reserve price. The optimal design discounts the effort of the high valuation player in order to induce him to compete vigorously. 相似文献
7.
Keith H. Coble Thomas O. Knight George F. Patrick & Alan E. Baquet 《Review of Agricultural Economics》2002,24(2):309-321
A survey conducted in Mississippi, Texas, Indiana, and Nebraska elicited producers' preferences for various farm policy changes. This permitted examination of the diversity of preferences that single-state studies have not allowed. Five policy choices, including deficiency payments, loan programs, crop insurance, export programs, and disaster payments were examined. Logit model results predicting producer preferences for each of the five dichotomous policy choices are reported. Explanatory variables based on expected utility theory such as risk aversion, price and yield variability, and price–yield correlation are significant in various models. 相似文献
8.
We consider the effect on the degree of exchange rate pass‐through of the exchange rate regime in operation. We test the hypothesis that pass‐through will be lower under a float as firms may be reluctant to pass appreciations or depreciations on to their customers when there is a strong chance that they will be subsequently reversed. Taylor’s hypothesis that pass‐through will be lower in a low‐inflation environment is also considered. Both hypotheses are assessed in relation to the price of manufactured imports into New Zealand and we find that, whereas the shift to a float dramatically lowered the degree of pass‐through, the later shift to a low‐inflation regime has no significant additional effect on the pass‐through relationship. 相似文献
9.
Means-Testing the Child Benefit 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Improving the distributional impact of transfers may be costly if it reduces labor supply. In this paper we show how effects of changes in the design of the child benefit program can be examined by employing information from behavioral and non-behavioral simulations on micro data. The direct distributional effects are assessed by tax-benefit model calculations, while female labor supply responses to alternative child benefit schemes are simulated under the assumption that choices are discrete. Distributional effects after labor supply responses are also shown. The study confirms that greater targeting of the child benefit is traded against reductions in female labor supply. 相似文献
10.
Gary Cook 《Local Economy》1987,2(1):25-30
Following the earlier article on GLC and GLEB property letting, this contribution argues that an industrial lettings policy is inadequate for the promotion of good employment practices and sector strategy. 相似文献