排序方式: 共有55条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Ryan L. Davis Stephen N. Jurich Brian S. Roseman Ethan D. Watson 《Journal of Financial Services Research》2018,54(3):345-367
We provide a novel test of information-based theories of price clustering by examining trade, order, and the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) quote price clustering during periods when information is removed from the market. We use a natural experiment of short-sale restrictions resulting from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 201 to more effectively determine the impact of information on price clustering. We find evidence of increased price clustering for trades, orders, and NBBO prices during short-sale restrictions. Overall, our findings indicate that short-sale restrictions harm the price discovery process and lead to a reduction in market efficiency. 相似文献
2.
Using quarterly call report data from 2000 to 2016, we reexamine the relationship between net interest margins (NIM) and the yield curve for more than 5,500 U.S. commercial banks. In the full sample, yield curve and RGDP growth have positive effects on NIM, while inflation and deposit‐to‐loan ratios (D/L) have negative effects. Splitting the sample around the 2007–2009 crisis, we show the impact of yield curve and RGDP growth on NIM increasing during the “recovery” (2009Q3 to 2016Q4), and inflation and D/L changing signs. Positive effects of yield curve on profits vary with bank size and change over time. 相似文献
3.
This paper considers the identification of social interaction effects in the context of multivariate choices. First, we generalize the theoretical social interaction model to allow individuals to make interdependent choices in different activities. Based on the theoretical model, we propose a simultaneous equation network model and discuss the identification of social interaction effects in the econometric model. We also provide an empirical example to show the empirical salience of this model. Using the Add Health data, we find that a student's academic performance is not only affected by academic performance of his peers but also affected by screen‐related activities of his peers. 相似文献
4.
Ethan Ilzetzki 《Journal of development economics》2011,96(1):30-46
Recent research has demonstrated that while government expenditures are countercyclical in most industrialized countries, they tend to be procyclical in developing countries. We develop a dynamic political-economy model to explain this phenomenon. In the model, public expenditures provide insurance to uninsured households, and optimal fiscal policy is countercyclical. The introduction of a political friction, in which successive governments disagree on the desired distribution of public spending, can lead to procyclical fiscal policies. Numerical simulations of the model allow us to compare quantitatively the relative role of common explanations for fiscal procyclicality. We conclude that political distortions in the fiscal process can explain fiscal procyclicality better than other common explanations, such as borrowing constraints and macroeconomic volatility. 相似文献
5.
Elections with platform and valence competition 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We study a game in which candidates first choose platforms and then invest in costly valences (e.g., engage in campaign spending). The marginal return to valence depends on platform polarization—the closer platforms are, the more valence affects the election outcome. Consequently, candidates without policy preferences choose divergent platforms to soften valence competition. Moreover, exogenous increases in incentives for valence accumulation lead to both increased valence and increased polarization—the latter because candidates seek to avoid the costs of extra valence. As a result, the increase in valence is smaller than it would have been with exogenous platforms. Finally, the model highlights the overlooked substantive importance of common modeling assumptions. Changing the source of uncertainty in our model from noise around the median voter's ideal point to a shock to one candidate's valence (as is common in the literature) leads to complete platform convergence for all parameter values. 相似文献
6.
Jan K. Brueckner Darin N. Lee Pierre M. Picard Ethan Singer 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2015,24(3):457-484
This paper provides theory and evidence on airline bag fees, offering insights into a real‐world case of product unbundling. The theory predicts that an airline's fares should fall when it introduces a bag fee, but that the full‐trip price (the bag fee plus the new fare) could either rise or fall. The empirical evidence presented in the paper provides strong confirmation of the first prediction. The data also suggest that the average fare falls by less than the bag fee itself so that the full price of a trip rises for passengers who choose to check bags. 相似文献
7.
Ethan Pancer Lindsay McShane Maxwell Poole 《Journal of Marketing Management》2017,33(15-16):1236-1255
ABSTRACTThis article examines the influence of product considerations on the experience of schadenfreude – taking pleasure in the suffering of another consumer. We examine how schadenfreude is affected by the extent to which the person suffering a product failure deserves to own the product and the status of the failed product. This work also explicitly considers how these factors interact with those of the person observing the misfortune. These ideas are tested across three experiments. The results show that high product status increases schadenfreude via its exacerbating effects on envy and that a lack of perceived product deservingness increases schadenfreude via both envy and deservingness. These effects differ based on the corresponding factors of the observer where the observer’s own deservingness and lack of product status are found to exacerbate schadenfreude via envy. 相似文献
8.
Agricultural Contracts: Data and Research Needs 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
9.
Estimation of an efficient tomato contract 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
10.
What motivates people in rural villages to share? We first elicit a baseline level of sharing using a standard, anonymous dictator game. Then using variants of the dictator game that allow for either revealing the dictator's identity or allowing the dictator to choose the recipient, we attribute variation in sharing to three different motives. The first of these, directed altruism, is related to preferences, while the remaining two are incentive-related (sanctions and reciprocity). We observe high average levels of sharing in our baseline treatment, while variation across individuals depends importantly on the incentive-related motives. Finally, variation in measured reciprocity within the experiment predicts observed ‘real-world’ gift-giving, while other motives measured in the experiment do not predict behavior outside the experiment. 相似文献