Small Firm Growth: Intentions, Implementation and Impediments

Recent evidence suggests that many small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the UK experience difficulty growing from the start-up phase into larger well established firms. This research uses survey data from UK instruments, printing and software SMEs to explore the attitudes of SME managers towards growth, to identify the strategies they pursue to achieve growth, and to establish the main factors they perceive to be limiting their growth. We find that although most managers profess to value growth and follow expansionary strategies, the main limits on the growth of SMEs are the intensity of competition stemming from the recession, and the inability or unwillingness of management to deal with the increased administrative burden arising from expansion.     

Past Returns and Investment Trust Discounts

Abstract:   The relationship between past net asset value returns and the current discount on investment trusts is investigated. The relationship is weaker for the component that is common to all trusts in the same sector, and is significantly stronger for more liquid trusts. The time lag before returns have their full impact on discounts is consistent with the requirements of distinguishing 'skill' from noise. Although discounts vary widely even within the same sector, the range of variation appears to be consistent with an arbitrage equilibrium, in which the profits of exploiting apparent pricing anomalies are just insufficient to invite arbitrage trades.     

PRINCIPAL AND AGENCY TRADES BY STOCKBROKERS ARE COMPLEMENTARY: THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF DEREGULATING AGENCY TRADING AND BANNING PRINCIPAL TRADES

This paper models the demand for stockbrokers' services in Australia, consisting of two related services, agency trades and principal trades. The relationship between agency and principal trades is estimated. The results indicate that the two services are complements rather than substitutes. Using unique accounting information, a model of agency and principal trading activities is estimated to determine the welfare effects of (i) deregulating brokerage commissions and (ii) a ban on principal trading by brokers. The results show a sizeable welfare gain to investors (amounting to about 60% of the gross revenue of brokers) stemming from deregulation of the minimum charge for agency trades. The loss in profitability by brokers due to deregulation is also computed and shown to be negligible. The results also show that due to complementarity, a ban on principal trading, even with deregulation of agency trading, can impose an arbitrarily high cost on investors which could, in principle, offset the gains from agency deregulation.     

LOGISTICS OUTSOURCING RELATIONSHIPS: CUSTOMER PERSPECTIVES

This study attempts to infuse relationship marketing theory into the study of logistics outsourcing relationships. In particular, the study demonstrates that not all of the partnerships between customers and providers of third‐party logistics services are the same in terms of their level of development. The existence of distinct levels of partnership established previously in the logistics literature is partially supported and a relationship between level of partnership development and the customer perceptions of key relationship marketing elements and outcomes is established. While exploratory in nature, these findings suggest there are benefits for the increased costs of developing closer partnerships.     

Existence of a competitive equilibrium in a one sector growth model with heterogeneous agents and irreversible investment

Summary. We prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous and gross investment is constrained to be non negative. We do so by converting the infinite-dimensional fixed point problem stated in terms of prices and commodities into a finite-dimensional Negishi problem involving individual weights in a social value function. This method allows us to obtain detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria. Because of the simplicity of the techniques utilized our approach is amenable to be adapted by practitioners in analogous problems often studied in macroeconomics. Received: September 13, 2001; revised version: December 9, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to Tapan Mitra for pointing out errors as well as making very valuable suggestions. Thanks are due to Raouf Boucekkine and Jorge Duran for additional helpful discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her helpful comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Belgian Ministry of Scientific Research (Grant ARC 99/04-235 “Growth and incentive design”) and of the Belgian Federal Goverment (Grant PAI P5/10, “Equilibrium theory and optimization for public policy and industry regulation”). Correspondence to: C. Le Van