ICT and agricultural productivity: evidence from cross-country data

This article carries out agricultural production function estimations, based on data for the period 1995–2000 on 81 countries, to present empirical evidence on the relationship between the adoption of information and communication technology (ICT) and agricultural productivity. It is found that new ICT has a significantly positive impact on agricultural productivity. The evidence suggests that the adoption of modern industrial inputs in agricultural production relies on the information and communication infrastructure. However, the empirical evidence from this study also suggests that new ICT could be a factor for the divergence between countries in terms of overall agricultural productivity. Not only do we find that the ICT adoption levels of the richer countries are much higher than those of the poorer countries, but also that returns from ICT in agricultural production of the richer countries are about two times higher than those of the poorer countries. A plausible explanation for the poorer countries' relatively low productivity elasticity of ICT is the lack of important complementary factors, such as a substantial base of human capital.     

Governance and agricultural productivity: A cross-national analysis

In this study we examine the relationship between governance and agricultural performance by employing the World Bank’s Aggregate Governance Indicators. Based on a cross-country panel sample, two methods are employed to test the hypothesis that better governance fosters agricultural productivity. The empirical results of both methods support the hypothesis. As for the first method, the estimation results of the widely-used inter-country aggregate agricultural production function show that a country with better governance can produce more agricultural outputs, given the same amounts of agricultural inputs, the same education level, and the same climate condition. As for the second method, the empirical results of a structural equation model reveal that, given the same amounts of agricultural capital stock and land, an agricultural worker in a country with better governance produces more. Better governance can indirectly improve agricultural productivity by driving agricultural capital accumulation. Our empirical work lends support to the claim of Hayami and Ruttan [Hayami, Y., Ruttan, V., 1985. Agricultural Development: An International Perspective. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore] that governance is a basic factor explaining the poor economic performance of many developing countries. In order to improve the agricultural performance of many developing countries, apart from physical and education investments, more emphasis should be placed on improving the governance infrastructure of these countries.     

CAN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY IMPROVE STOCK MARKET EFFICIENCY? A CROSS‐COUNTRY STUDY

The rapid advance of information and communication technology (ICT) has revolutionized the dissemination of stock market information. Based on the noise trading theory, this study discusses whether the changes brought by ICT have promoted the transparency of stock market information or instead flooded the stock market with misinformation. A cross‐country panel dataset of 71 countries from 2002 to 2014 was established. The empirical methodologies include panel unit root tests, panel variance ratio tests, and panel multiple regressions. The results of panel unit root tests and panel variance ratio tests show that stock markets in countries with high ICT diffusion are efficient while stock markets in countries with low or medium ICT diffusion are not all efficient. The results of panel regressions further show that the effect of ICT diffusion in reducing market noises was more significant than its effect in magnifying the noises.     

THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND ROUNDABOUT PRODUCTION: ALLYN YOUNG REVISITED

Abstract.  This paper investigates Allyn Young's two important doctrines concerning the division of labor and roundabout production. First, apart from advancing the state of knowledge, the progressive division of labor that can occur within a given population encourages the adoption of more specialized, differentiated intermediate goods in the production process. Second, the level of division of labor and the extent of the market depend on each other. Using a general equilibrium model with increasing returns to specialization, economies of complementarity between intermediate goods, and transaction costs, we demonstrate that the level of division of labor and the number of intermediate goods increase concurrently as transaction conditions are improved.     

Uncertainty, Insurance, and Division of Labor

This paper develops an equilibrium model to investigate the relationships between transaction uncertainties, risk aversion, insurance, specialization, per capita real income, and productivity progress. It is shown that transaction uncertainties can restrict the division of labor; the level of division of labor decreases with the degree of risk aversion; insurance will promote the equilibrium level of division of labor, per capita real income, and productivity.     

Governance and Agricultural Production Efficiency: A Cross‐Country Aggregate Frontier Analysis

This study uses a stochastic frontier approach to investigate the relationship between six governance indicators and agricultural efficiency. We find that improvements in rule of law, control of corruption and government effectiveness enhance agricultural productivity significantly if each indicator enters the inefficiency equation independently. When all six indicators are included in the equation, we find that an improvement in rule of law raises agricultural efficiency significantly, but increases in voice and accountability and political stability appear to significantly reduce agricultural efficiency. Grouping the six indicators into three dimensions, we find that an improvement in ‘respect for institutional framework’ raises agricultural efficiency significantly, but an enhancement in ‘selection of authority’ reduces agricultural efficiency significantly. Our results imply that poorer countries can enhance their agricultural efficiency substantially by strengthening the state and citizens’ respect for institutional framework. However, our results show that greater democracy is associated with lower agricultural efficiency. This finding is consistent with interest group capture and political failure arguments of the political economy literature.