Distinctive characteristics of entities with an internal audit department and the association of the quality of such departments with errors*

Abstract. This research identifies those characteristics that could potentially influence a choice to create an internal audit department and tests via discriminant analysis to evaluate whether such attributes significantly distinguish between companies with and without an internal audit department. In addition, qualitative characteristics of such departments are described, as is the association of such traits with errors and the overall control environment. A sample of 260 companies is examined. Companies with internal audit departments are observed to be significantly larger, more highly regulated, more competitive, more profitable, more liquid, more conservative in accounting policies, more competent in their management and accounting personnel, and subject to better management controls. Key discriminant variables are the degree of regulation, decentralization, size, the duration of association with present auditors, the existence of an audit committee, EDP control, and pressures by external parties on management to achieve budgetary goals. Qualitative attributes of internal audit are systematically associated with the overall quality of the control environment, as well as errors. The most important attribute appears to be the independence of internal audit in terms of the propriety of the reporting level. An advantage of internal auditing is that external auditors report a 10 percent reduction in the number of hours incurred and greater flexibility appears to exist in the proportion of work performed in off-peak periods. Résumé. Les auteurs dressent l'inventaire des caractéristiques susceptibles d'influer sur le choix de créer un service de vérification interne et soumettent ces attributs à des tests, par voie d'analyse discriminante, afin de déterminer s'ils permettent d'établir une distinction claire entre les entreprises ayant et n'ayant pas de service de vérification interne. De plus, ils décrivent les caractéristiques qualitatives de ces services, de même que l'association de ces carctéristiques aux erreurs et au contexte global du contrôle. Les auteurs procèdent à l'examen d'un échantillon de 260 entreprises. L'étude révèle que les entreprises possédant des services de vérification interne sont beaucoup plus souvent des entreprises de grande taille, faisant l'objet d'une réglementation plus rigoureuse, plus concurrentielles, plus rentables, ayant davantage de liquidités, plus prudentes dans leurs conventions compatables, possédant une équipe de gestion et un personnel comptable plus compétents et soumises à de meilleurs contrôles de gestion. Les principales variables discriminantes sont le degré de réglementation, la décentralisation, la taille, la durée de l'association avec les vérificateurs actuels, l'existence d'un comité de vérification, le contrôle dans un cadre informatique et les pressions exercées par les tiers sur la direction pour l'atteinte des objectifs budgétaires. Les attributs qualitatifs de la vérification interne sont systématiquement asociés à la qualité globale du cadre de contrôle, de même qu'aux erreurs. L'attribut le plus important semble être le degré d'autonomie du service de vérification interne, c'est-à-dire le caractère approprié de ses liens hiérarchiques. La vérification interne comporte un avantage: les vérificateurs externes font état d'une réduction de 10 pour cent dans le nombre d'heures consacrées à la vérification, et il semble exister une plus grande souplesse dans la proportion du travail de vérification effectué en dehors des périodes de pointe.     

8招化解供应链风险

经济衰退和复苏都会给企业的供应链带来巨大的风险,这里,我们提供8条建议来协助企业更好地管理供应链(客户和供应商)。1可视化风险,做长远打算只有确切了解供应链中的薄弱环节所在,才能很好地控制它。     

The Valuation of American Options with Stochastic Interest Rates: A Generalization of the Geske—Johnson Technique

The Geske–Johnson approach provides an efficient and intuitively appealing technique for the valuation and hedging of American-style contingent claims. Here, we generalize their approach to a stochastic interest rate economy. The method is implemented using options exercisable on one of a finite number of dates. We illustrate how the value of an American-style option increases with interest rate volatility. The magnitude of this effect depends on the extent to which the option is in the money, the volatilities of the underlying asset and the interest rates, as well as the correlation between them.     

OWNERSHIP VERSUS TIMING OF THE GAME

This study examines the impact of timing of the game on the welfare gains of privatisation in the presence of strategic trade policy. We argue that only if the public enterprise acts as a Cournot player will it generate an additional distortion that could outweigh the distortion caused by the oligopolistic behaviour of private firms. But with a first-mover advantage it can serve as an effective regulatory device comparable with a production subsidy. We further show that, in the presence of strategic trade policy, Cournot assumptions are inconsistent with the firms' preferences over the timing of the game. As public Stackelberg leadership is a subgame Nash equilibrium of the extended game with endogenous order of moves, we conclude that it is the timing of the game rather than firms' ownership structure which is responsible for the inefficiency of an international mixed market found by earlier studies.     

Growth and Welfare Maximization in Models of Public Finance and Endogenous Growth

This paper evaluates the trade‐off between growth and welfare maximization from two perspectives. First, it synthesizes and extends endogenous growth models with public finance to compare the growth‐ and welfare‐maximizing tax rates. Second, it examines the distinct model outcomes in terms of the growth rates and welfare levels. This comparison highlights the range of trade‐offs: the growth‐maximizing tax rate can lie above, below, or on the welfare‐maximizing equivalent. We find however that even relatively large differences in growth‐ and welfare‐maximizing tax rates translate into relatively small differences in growth rates, and, in some cases, welfare levels.     

GENERAL AND PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY IN BORK'S ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

In applying economic theory to evaluate antitrust laws, Judge Robert Bork explicitly favors a partial equilibrium over a general equilibrium approach. He believes the general model assumes away too many real-world aspects to be usefully employed as a criterion by which to judge real-world laws.
However, Bork's partial equilibrium replacement, the Oliver Williamson trade-off model, implicitly contains many of the same assumptions as general equilibrium theory. Equilibrium prices in all industries, an absence of external effects, and well-defined demand curves are assumptions of both general equilibrium theory and the Williamson trade-off model. If one theory is judged inadequate because of these assumptions, so should the other.
Bork's analysis is more consistent with market process theory than with his own partial equilibrium approach. Market process theory assumes neither the absence of externalities, nor the presence of well-defined demand and equilibrium prices in all industries.