Does accounting conservatism pay?

We investigate whether or not there is a link between conservative accounting practices and the sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance. Using several accrual‐based measures of accounting conservatism as well as alternative measures of accounting performance, we estimate an econometric model of CEO compensation that incorporates the interaction of accounting conservatism and accounting performance. Consistent with optimal contracting theory, we find that the sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance is higher for firms that report conservative accounting earnings. These results support the hypothesis that accounting conservatism, by limiting earnings management opportunities and improving the reliability of accounting performance measures, allows firms to formulate contracts that tie executive compensation more closely to accounting performance.     

Structural VAR models for Malaysian monetary policy analysis during the pre- and post-1997 Asian crisis periods

This article conducts an in-depth investigation into building a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model and analysing the Malaysian monetary policy. Considerable attention is paid to: (i) the selection of foreign, policy and target variables; (ii) establish identifying restrictions and improve the estimates of impulse response functions; (iii) assess the importance of intermediate channels in transmitting monetary policy mechanism; and (iv) the way in which the 1997 Asian financial crisis affected the working of monetary policy. Malaysia is an interesting small open economy to study because, following this crisis, the government imposed capital and exchange rate control measures. The overall results suggest that the crisis and the subsequent major shift in the exchange rate regime have significantly affected the Malaysian ‘Black Box’. In the pre-crisis period, domestic variables appear to be more vulnerable to foreign monetary shocks. Further, the exchange rate played a significant role in transmitting the interest rate shocks, whereas credit and asset prices helped to propagate the money shock. In the post-crisis period however, asset prices play a more domineering role in intensifying the effects of both interest rate and money shocks on output, and the economy was insulated from foreign shocks.     

Self‐selection,endogeneity, and the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance

This study focuses explicitly on the methodological implications of the endogenous theory of governance as applied to firm performance. In particular, if firms choose their governance structures as part of a constrained performance maximization process, then application of an appropriate empirical methodology should reveal statistical evidence of such behavior. In this study we take advantage of the endogenous switching regression model framework to determine whether such predicted optimizing behavior can be corroborated by the data. The model allows us to test explicitly for selection behavior in accordance with comparative advantage and, concomitantly, the presence of selectivity bias, in estimating the impact of CEO duality on firm performance. The selection and performance equations are modeled in accordance with the extant accounting, economics, and management literature on the impact of the dual governance structure on firm performance. Overall, we tested four performance measures for the entire sample of firm‐year observations as well as for the largest three industries in terms of sample sizes. The major finding, robust in all cases, is that there is no evidence to support a contention that CEO duality is a structure purposefully chosen for optimizing performance. If firms are indeed choosing the dual leadership structure, they are doing so for reasons other than improving performance from what it would be otherwise. In fact, for performance measured as market return and earnings per share, there is evidence of a significant selectivity bias that acts to lower performance below what it would have been under random assignment. For performance measured by Tobin's q and return on assets, we found neither evidence of selectivity bias, nor any significant marginal performance impacts of CEO duality. Such findings are inconsistent with an endogenous governance theory, at least when applied to firm performance. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Economics of Soil Compaction due to Machinery Traffic and Implications for Machinery Selection

To determine the impact of soil compaction, experiments were carried out on corn in 1976 (above-average rainfall year) and in 1977 (below-average rainfall year) with various sizes of tractors and levels of intensities (number of passes). Contrary to the common belief, larger tractors were found to cause less economic loss. These losses ranged from $400/ha for 30 kW tractors to $63/ha for 180 kW tractors in 1976. The losses (or gains in 1977) are added to the fixed, operating, and timeliness costs of machinery, which is obtained by the engineering method of finding the least-cost machinery complement. The optimum machinery sizes are then calculated and discussed for corn silage and grain corn crops, based on the typical six passes/operations under two weather conditions. Afin de déterminer les implications de la compaction du sol, des expériences ont été réalisées sur le maïs en 1976 (année avec des précipitations au-dessus de la moyenne) et en 1977 (année avec des précipitations en dessous de la moyenne). Pour réaliser ces expériences, des tracteurs de différentes grosseurs ont été utilisés à différents niveaux d'intensité (nombre de passages). Contrairement à la croyance populaire, les plus gros tracteurs ont été ceux qui ont le moins affecté le rendement des plantes. En 1976, les pertes de rendement ont varié entre $ 400/ha a avec un tracteur de 30 kW et $63/ha avec un tracteur de 180 kW. Ces pertes (ou gains comme ce fut le cas en 1977) ont été additionnées aux coûts fixes, variables ainsi qu'aux coûts dus aux retards d'exécution associés à la machinerie agricole. Finalement, les grosseurs optimales de tracteurs sont calculées et discutées pour le maïs-fourrager et le maïs-grain en se basant sur une intensité d'utilisation de six passages/opérations pour deux conditions météorologiques différentes.     

Short-term financing in a cash-constrained supply chain

In this paper we consider a two-level supply chain with a single retailer and a manufacturer, where both the firms are facing financial constraints and can not produce/order their optimal quantity. Our work shows that a lender who finances the manufacturer has a motivation to finance the retailer as well. Motivated by this, we investigate lender's problem of financing both the firms by making a joint decision on the loan amount and comparing it with the case when lender makes independent decision on loan amount for both the firms. Our numerical study indicates that if one of the firms in the supply chain has sufficiently low cash, joint decision (we refer to it as supply chain financing) may be better not only for the lender but for the retailer and manufacturer as well.     

The effect of lot-sizing on workload variability

Lot-sizing models which group demand requirements for one or more consecutive time periods into a single production run have received considerable attention in recent years. Material Requirements Planning (MRP) systems must, for instance, make a lot-size decision for each planned order release. Existing decision models attempt to minimize the sum of setup plus inventory holding costs. However, lot-sizing tends to increase the work center load variability, and, consequently, the costs associated with changing production levels from period to period should be incorporated into the economic analysis. This study is concerned, first of all, with analytically describing the relationship between dynamic lot-sizing models and workload variability. Secondly, in order to account for production level change costs we propose a simple modification to existing heuristic models. Lastly, we employ a simulation model to empirically extend these results to a typical MRP multiechelon production environment. An example is included to show clearly that with cost premiums for overtime and severance or guaranteed minimum costs for undertime the traditional lot-sizing techniques significantly underestimate actual costs and can lead to very costly policies.Mean, variance and coefficient of variation of period work time requirements are derived as a function of several algorithm characteristics. Average cycle time (number of periods covered by a single batch) is found to be the most influential factor in determining workload variability. Variance grows approximately in proportion to this cycle time with the proportionality constant being the square of average period workload. Cycle time and demand variability also contribute to workload variability. Results indicate that for a given average cycle time, the EOQ method will minimize workload variability. When N products utilize the same work center, the coefficient of load variation will be reduced by a factor of N^{?$\text{1}\text{2}$} unless requirements are positively correlated. Positive correlation would result when products have similar seasons or parent items. In this case grouping such products cannot help reduce variability.In order to incorporate production level change costs into existing heuristics we may simply introduce a term consisting of a penalty factor times average cycle time. The penalty factor represents the costs of period by period production level changes. Several popular heuristics are extended in this fashion, and it is found that solutions are still readily obtainable, requiring only modifications to setup or holding cost parameters.The effects of level change costs are examined via simulation for a specific yet typical environment. It is found that when setup costs are significant, traditional lot-sizing heuristics can provide cost savings and service level improvements as compared to lot-for-lot production. However, whereas for our model the obtainable profit improvement from lot-sizing was 25% in the case of freely variable capacity, actual improvements were only one half as large when reasonable hiring and firing practices and overtime and undertime costs were considered. Consequently, management needs to consider carefully labor costs and work center product relationships when determining a production scheduling method.     

Charitable giving inside and outside the workplace: the role of individual and firm characteristics

Over the past several decades, charitable solicitations in the workplace have played an increasing role in the fundraising strategies of nonprofit organizations. Although many studies have examined the factors that influence overall charitable giving, very few studies have focused on giving when asked to donate in the workplace. This paper examines the determinants of charitable giving in and outside of the workplace in addition to the role of individual and firm-level characteristics. The study is based on one of the largest surveys of workplace giving including unique information on both workplace giving and overall charitable giving for 6000 employees in the USA. Specific factors uniquely influence charitable giving in the workplace. An employee's personal level of confidence in the nonprofit sector is strongly likely to influence workplace donations. At the firm level, an organization's size and industry also affect the presence of workplace campaigns and giving trends. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Auditor independence, executive pay and firm performance

This paper investigates whether compensation committees actively intervene to adjust accounting performance‐based incentive schemes for the real, or perceived, reduced earnings credibility signalled by the purchase of non‐audit services. Using a nonlinear, two‐stage least‐squares method that accounts for the simultaneity of executive pay, firm performance and non‐audit fees, we find a significant negative relationship between non‐audit fees and the sensitivity of chief executive officer (CEO) pay to firm performance. Point estimates suggest that the reduced weight applied to accounting performance lowers the incentive component of executive pay between roughly 5 and 8 per cent for the CEO of the ‘average firm’.     

Performance choice,executive bonuses and corporate leverage

This study examines the causal link between a firm's leverage decisions and the characteristics of its CEO bonus plans. Results from a simultaneous equations model strongly suggest that highly levered firms are less likely to use return on equity (ROE) or ROE-based accounting performance measures to determine executive bonuses. Estimates also indicate that firms with fewer debt covenants, higher interest rates on debt, and a greater proportion of executive pay in the form of stock options are less likely to adopt ROE-based measures for use in CEO bonus plans. These findings lend strong support to the efficient contracting hypothesis. The conflicting interests of corporate stakeholders, especially between stockholders and creditors, encourage firms to tie executive pay to performance metrics like return on assets (ROA) that will strike the optimal balance between the agency costs of debt and the agency costs of equity.Data availability: all data are available from public sources.