fines,leniency, and rewards in antitrust

This article reports results from an experiment studying how FINES, LENIENCY, and REWARDS for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without LENIENCY reduces cartel formation but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly FINES as punishments. LENIENCY improves antitrust by strengthening deterrence but stabilizes surviving cartels: subjects appear to anticipate the lower postconviction prices after reports/LENIENCY. With REWARDS, prices fall at the competitive level. Overall, our results suggest a strong cartel deterrence potential for well‐run LENIENCY and REWARD schemes. These findings may also be relevant for similar white‐collar organized crimes, such as corruption and fraud.     

Explaining the choice of accounting standards in municipal corporations: Positive accounting theory and institutional theory as competitive or concurrent theories

Municipal corporations exist in an institutional twilight area, being both private and public, a characteristic, which presumably would be reflected in their choice of accounting standards. The literature of accounting choice does not, however, live in a twilight area, but is fragmented into two main divisions: positive accounting theory (PAT) and institutional theory (IT); only in a very few cases do the theories meet or cross-fertilize. We use both theories in this paper and derive hypotheses from them to explain accounting choices made by municipal corporations. Through testing the hypotheses on a sample of 545 Swedish municipal corporations, we indicate the empirical relevance of both PAT and IT. We conclude by suggesting an integrative approach of PAT and IT in an eclectic alternative.     

Why are these Islands of Conscious Power Found in the Ocean of Ownership? Institutional and Governance Hypotheses Explaining the Existence of Business Groups in Sweden

Four hypotheses concerning the existence of business groups are developed and are tested on two Swedish business groups that were found to provide both government and corporate economy with governance solutions. Swedish culture also appeared supportive of the groups, which were not found to be institutionally inert, building their existence solely on power.     

Hold-up of anti-competitive mergers

We construct a model of endogenous mergers and study some issues of whether and how to control mergers, taking into account firms equilibrium response to policy. Anti-competitive mergers benefit competitors more than the merging firms. We show how such free-riding reduces firms incentives to merge (holdup). Firms delay merger proposals, hoping other firms will merge instead. The final result, however, is an overly concentrated market. Merger control may thus preserve competitive markets. In the presence of holdup, even reasonable policies such as requiring divestiture or using cost-benefit analysis, may be worse than not controlling mergers at all.     

A Short Overview of a Methodology for the Ex-Post Review of Merger Control Decisions

Summary  This paper is based on a study commissioned by the European Commission, in which we proposed a detailed methodological approach for the ex-post assessment of decisions reached by the European Commission in the field of merger control. The methodology focuses on how to establish whether the market structure arising from the decision is apt to protect consumer welfare better than the market structures that could have arisen from alternative decisions. It provides suggestions on how assess the impact of the decision relative to the possible counterfactuals and discusses the empirical techniques that can be used to perform this evaluation.