THE REVENUE‐SHARING RULE FOR INTERCONNECTION CHARGES*

In this paper we explore the economic principle behind the revenue‐sharing rule for interconnection charges. Our main finding is that symmetric firms can collude by splitting the revenues equally. We further characterize the optimal revenue‐sharing ratio and discuss the relationship between optimal ratio and the optimal access price. We also show that the revenue‐sharing rule can have the perverse effect of inducing a firm to raise its own costs in order to gain a higher share of revenues.     

Where is the GE? Consumption Dynamics in DSGEs

We offer a partial equilibrium perspective on the behavior of consumption in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. We consider a benchmark dynamic general equilibrium model and show that a standard calibration implies that the real interest rate is essentially fixed. One manifestation of this feature is that, with separable preferences, the reaction of consumption to total factor productivity (TFP) shocks is flat: the random‐walk permanent income hypothesis holds almost exactly, pretty much as in a partial equilibrium consumption‐savings problem. These results help explain the prominent role of aggregate demand, and how it is achieved, in modern DSGE analysis.