Optimality conditions¶and bubbles in sequential economies¶and bounded relative risk-aversion

We provide specific qualifications in order that Kuhn–Tucker type Euler equations and transversality conditions at infinity hold in stochastic equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents and where assets are traded in sequential markets. It is not assumed that uncertainty is modeled as an event-tree structure or that preferences are necessarily bounded. We also describe an important class of preferences based on bounded relative risk aversion which yields relevant simplifications. Our results are used to establish conditions that rule out asset pricing bubbles. Specific examples of economies with bubbles are also discussed. Received: 28 January 2002 / Accepted: 19 July 2002 We are grateful to the editor and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments. This research was partially supported by MURST (Italy), National Group on “Nonlinear Dynamics and Stochastic Models in Economics and Finance”.     

A comparison of different trading protocols in an agent-based market

We compare price dynamics of different market protocols (batch auction, continuous double auction and dealership) in an agent-based artificial exchange. In order to distinguish the effects of market architectures alone, we use a controlled environment where allocative and informational issues are neglected and agents do not optimize or learn. Hence, we rule out the possibility that the behavior of traders drives the price dynamics. Aiming to compare price stability and execution quality in broad sense, we analyze standard deviation, excess kurtosis, tail exponent of returns, volume, perceived gain by traders and bid-ask spread. Overall, a dealership market appears to be the best candidate, generating low volume and volatility, virtually no excess kurtosis and high perceived gain.     

Finance–growth nexus: does causality withstand financial liberalization? Evidence from cointegrated VAR

The main finding of the paper is that, contrary to Rousseau and Wachtel (Economic growth and financial depth. Is the relationship extinct already? UNU-Wider discussion paper no. 2005/10, 2005), a long-run equilibrium relationship between financial and economic development is identified with data up to 2006—well over the financial openness boom of the nineties—in countries whose history is characterized by numerous years of high inflation and/or episodes of crisis or other structural change. Also, financial openness, or lack thereof, proves to be an important feature both in explaining differences in sensitivity of financial development to capital accumulation and in determining the direction of causality between financial and economic development. The paper finds that bidirectional causality between economic and financial development is not as frequent an outcome as in Luintel and Khan (J Dev Econ 60:381–405, 1999), and in several cases, Joan Robinson’s (The generalization of the general theory in the rate of interest, and other essays, Macmillan, London, pp 67–142, 1952) statement on the primacy of economic development over finance is supported by the estimations.     

Reference group influence on binary choices dynamics

The recent literature has analyzed binary choices dynamics providing interesting results. Most of these contributions consider interactions within a single group. Nevertheless, in some situations the interaction takes place not only within a single group but also between different groups. In this paper, we investigate the choice dynamics when considering two populations where one serves as a reference group. Considering this influence effect enriches the dynamics. Although the structurally stable resulting dynamics are attracting cycles only, with any positive integer period, the reference group makes the dynamics of the influenced population much more complex. We considered both the possibility that the reference group has the same or the opposite attitude toward the distribution over the choices. We show how the dynamics and the bifurcation structure are modified under the influence of the reference group. Our results illustrate how the propensity to switch choices in the reference groups may, indirectly, affect choices in the first group.     

The implications of ineffective internal control and SOX 404 reporting for financial analysts

The mandatory reporting of firms’ internal control effectiveness continues to be debated by equity market participants, U.S. regulatory agencies and oversight committees. We investigate the implications of material weaknesses in internal control and SOX 404 required reporting of such for financial analysts because analysts are important intermediaries in the U.S. capital market and it is not known whether analysts’ forecasts or coverage decisions are affected by firms’ internal control problems or reporting, respectively. Results of our empirical tests indicate that analysts provide less accurate forecasts and there is greater forecast dispersion for firms with ineffective internal control. We also find that firms that disclose internal control problems have less analyst coverage and that analyst following declines after the material weakness in internal control is disclosed. The results are robust to controlling for potential self-selection bias and management earnings guidance. Our study documents the consequences of ineffective internal control for an important class of financial statement users and suggests the required reporting on the effectiveness of internal control is beneficial to understanding the properties of analysts’ forecasts.     

Love,hate and murder: Commitment devices in violent relationships

Many violent relationships are characterized by a high degree of cyclicality: women who are the victims of domestic violence often leave and return multiple times. To explain this we develop a model of time inconsistent preferences in the context of domestic violence. This time inconsistency generates a demand for commitment. We present supporting evidence that women in violent relationships display time inconsistent preferences by examining their demand for commitment devices. We find that no-drop policies – which compel the prosecutor to continue with prosecution even if the victim expresses a desire to drop the charges – result in an increase in reporting. No-drop policies also result in a decrease in the number of men murdered by intimates suggesting that some women in violent relationships move away from an extreme type of commitment device when a less costly one is offered.     

Regulatory Capture: A Review

This article reviews both the theoretical and empirical literatureson regulatory capture. The scope is broad, but utility regulationis emphasized. I begin by describing the Stigler–Peltzmanapproach to the economics of regulation. I then open the blackbox of influence and regulatory discretion using a three-tierhierarchical agency model under asymmetric information (in thespirit of Laffont and Tirole, 1993). I discuss alternative modellingapproaches with a view to a richer set of positive predictions,including models of common agency, revolving doors, informationallobbying, coercive pressure, and influence over committees.I discuss empirical work involving capture and regulatory outcomes.I also review evidence on the revolving-door phenomenon andon the impact that different methods for selecting regulatorsappear to have on regulatory outcomes. The last section containsopen questions for future research. Footnotes ¹ E-mail address: dalbo{at}haas.berkeley.edu     

The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis and the Role of External and Internal Factors in Emerging Economies

This article assesses the impact of trade, capital openness and institutions on emerging economies’ output loss during the “Great Recession.” The fixed-effect estimates of an unbalanced panel of 122 emerging countries observed from 2008 to 2010 yield three main results. First, trade openness has exacerbated output loss. Second, capital openness can help mitigate the negative impact of an external shock, but this is conditional on the level of financial development. Finally, the results also point out that the interrelations between financial and institutional development affect the crisis’s severity.