A market model of analysts’ opinions to explain changes in the dispersion of opinions

The demand for and supply of analysts’ opinions in this model yield an equilibrium that demonstrates how the information content of the opinions reacts to changes in exogenous parameters. The model also shows how changes in the parameters make analysts’ opinions more or less dispersed; for example, a decline in investor risk aversion, a decrease in market volatility, and an increase in information costs can lead to analysts’ opinions becoming more similar. Recognizing how exogenous factors can affect the supply and demand of analysts’ opinions gives additional insights into questions concerning what may appear to be herd behavior by analysts and also the relationship between forecast dispersion and information content. (JEL: G29, C71)     

The LeChatelier-Samuelson principle revisited

Within the context of a linear Leontief model, the LeChatelier-Samuelson principle examines the effects of an increase in some final demand on the output levels under the constraint that the production of certain goods is held at its original value. The principle states that the increase in any output is larger when fewer output levels are kept constant. The present paper discusses bounds for such incremental changes, second-order effects, the consequences on the markets for the products with restricted output levels, and generalizations of the original assumptions.I would like to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.     

Trader Anonymity, Price Formation and Liquidity

Using data from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange we analyze priceformation and liquidity in a non-anonymous environment withsimilarities to the floor of the NYSE. Our main hypothesis isthat the non-anonymity allows the specialist to assess the probabilitythat a trader trades on the basis of private information. Heuses this knowledge to price discriminate. This can be achievedby quoting a large spread and granting price improvement totraders deemed uninformed. Consistent with our hypothesis wefind that price improvement reflects lower adverse selectioncosts but does not lead to a reduction in the specialist's profit.Further, the quote adjustment following transactions at thequoted bid or ask price is more pronounced than the quote adjustmentafter transactions at prices inside the spread. Our resultsindicate that anonymity comes at the cost of higher adverseselection risk. JEL Classification: G10.     

Trader Anonymity, Price Formation and Liquidity

Using data from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange we analyze price formationand liquidity in a non-anonymous environment with similarities to thefloor of the NYSE. Our main hypothesis is that the non-anonymity allows the specialist to assess the probability that atrader trades on the basis of private information. He uses this knowledgeto price discriminate. This can be achieved by quoting a large spread and granting price improvement to traders deemed uninformed.Consistent with our hypothesis we find that price improvement reflects loweradverse selection costs but does not lead to a reduction in the specialist's profit. Further, the quote adjustmentfollowing transactions at the quoted bid or ask price is more pronounced than the quote adjustment aftertransactions at prices inside the spread. Our results indicate that anonymity comes at the cost ofhigher adverse selection risk.     

Infrastructures and Societal Change. A View from the Large Technical Systems Field

Infrastructural and societal changes intertwine in multiple ways. This makes the societal implications of infrastructural projects difficult to assess and anticipate. Yet in present day network societies this task is particularly urgent. This paper first identifies two positions that tend to monopolize and deadlock debates. Next it examines two decades of research in the Large Technical System (LTS) research field for alternative approaches to this issue, before finally suggesting distinguishing between the four increasingly indirect moments of (co-) construction of infrastructures and societies. These may be related causally, but also add their own moments of contingency, agency, and choice.     

External technology acquisition in large multi-technology corporations

Based on different contractual forms and their associated degrees of organizational integration, a typology of strategies for technology acquisition (sourcing) is constructed. Based on a sample of corporations in Europe, Japan and US, it is shown that external acquisition of technology through various strategies increases in importance in general. Product case studies further show that external acquisition of technology is associated with technology diversification into increasingly costly new technologies. As a result corporations become multi-technological ('multech'). At the same time quasi-integrated corporate systems of innovation arise in which in-house R&D is managed together with a mix of strategies for external acquisition of technology, using various contractual forms. This presents new challenges to traditional in-house R&D management. Technology diversification is moreover shown to be associated with growth of sales as well as with growth of R&D expenditures. A high level of external technology acquisition presents risks that ought to lead companies to consider technology based product diversification.