Corrigendum to “On randomized matching mechanisms” [Economic Theory 8(1996)377–381]

Ma (in Econ. Theory 8, 377–381, 1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (Econometrica 58, 1475–1480, 1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented – and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 – is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as “symmetric.” We thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. B. Klaus’s and F. Klijn’s research was supported by Ramón y Cajal contracts of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología. The work of the authors was also partially supported through the Spanish Plan Nacional I+D+I (BEC2002-02130 and SEJ2005-01690) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR2005-00626 and the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA).     

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Abstract

Within public administration and policy sciences the concept of policy networks nowadays is well accepted. Not much attention has been paid so far to strategies aimed at institutional design. Therefore, in this article, we develop a conceptual framework to study institutional design more thoroughly. We do this by specifying the nature and variety of institutional rules that guide the behaviour of actors within networks. Given this categorization of rules, we identify possible strategies to change network rules. Next, we focus on the strategic context of attempts to influence the nature of institutional rules: the process of institutional design. We conclude with suggestions to apply the conceptual framework to empirical research into the forms, impacts and implications of attempts to change the institutional features of policy networks.     

Performance Implications of IJV Boards: A Contingency Perspective

This study draws from the corporate governance literature to investigate the implications of board involvement for international joint ventures (IJVs). We extend recent corporate governance research on the value of board involvement by investigating unique sources of complexity related to the nature of the IJV. We argue and find that board involvement can enhance the performance of IJVs, particularly for collaborations that are complex in nature due to their broad functional scope as well the level of market overlap between IJV parents. We complement recent research on joint venture control that has focused on the antecedents and types of control, as well as studies on formal (e.g. contractual safeguards and monitoring) and informal governance mechanisms (e.g. trust) by providing empirical evidence that IJV board involvement is valuable when directors undertake their control and coordination responsibilities. We advance corporate governance research by providing evidence that joint ventures possess several unique characteristics that shape the value of board involvement, thereby showing that applications of corporate governance theory to joint ventures are useful, but should be made with care.     

Corrigendum to “Stable matchings and preferences of couples” [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75–106]

We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in [B. Klaus, F. Klijn, Stable matchings and preferences of couples, J. Econ. Theory 121 (2005) 75–106] or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings [KK05, Theorem 3.3] and a maximal domain result [KK05, Theorem 3.5] are adjusted accordingly.     

Mandatory Pensions and Personal Savings in The Netherlands*

The Netherlands has a relatively generous social security system and a wide coverage of individuals by private (occupational) pension schemes. Total household savings are rather high and fairly stable, although the amount of contractual savings apears to be going up at the expense of non-contractual (free) savings. Using an approach originally pioneered by Feldstein (1974) we employ microdata to investigate the displacement effect of security and pension wealth on free household savings. It turns out that the data available are too noisy to make precise statements about the displacement effects. Our results do suggest, however, that a one-for-one displacement of free savings by social security is consistent with the data. For pensions such a complete offset is less likely. This suggests that increase of coverage by private pensions is an effective way of raising savings.     

Public Management and Policy Networks

In this article we address the elaboration of the central concepts of a theory of networks and of network management. We suggest that the network approach builds on several theoretical traditions. After this we clarify the theoretical concepts and axioms of the policy network approach and argue that this framework has important explanatory power both on the level of strategic interaction processes as well as on the level of institutional relations. We argue that government's special resources and its unique legitimacy as representative of the common Interest make it the outstanding candidate for fulfilling the role of network manager, a role which means arranging and facilitating interaction processes within networks In such a way that problems of under or non representation are properly addressed and interests are articulated and dealt with in an open, transparent and balanced manner.     

Stochastic stability for roommate markets

We show that for any roommate market the set of stochastically stable matchings coincides with the set of absorbing matchings. This implies that whenever the core is non-empty (e.g., for marriage markets), a matching is in the core if and only if it is stochastically stable, i.e., stochastic stability is a characteristic of the core. Several solution concepts have been proposed to extend the core to all roommate markets (including those with an empty core). An important implication of our results is that the set of absorbing matchings is the only solution concept that is core consistent and shares the stochastic stability characteristic with the core.     

Farsighted house allocation

In this note we study von Neumann–Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for Shapley and Scarf (1974) housing markets. Kawasaki (2010) shows that the set of competitive allocations coincides with the unique von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of antisymmetric weak dominance (cf., Wako, 1999). We demonstrate that the set of competitive allocations also coincides with the unique von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of strong dominance (cf., Roth and Postlewaite, 1977) if no individual is indifferent between his endowment and the endowment of someone else.     

Assignment Games Satisfy the CoMa-Property

A balanced game satisfies the CoMa-property if and only if the extreme points of its core are marginal vectors. In this note we prove that assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78.