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Geoffrey See 《Journal of Business Ethics》2009,89(1):1-22
In 2005, Chinese President Hu Jintao instituted a “Harmonious Society” policy marking a new China’s approach toward development. This generated intense excitement among observers of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) who perceive an overlap in objectives between CSR and Harmonious Society and believe that Harmonious Society will lead to increased CSR engagement in China. However, there is little exploration of how Harmonious Society will contribute to increasing CSR engagement. This article seeks to explore whether Harmonious Society will meet this promise. It does so by drawing up a list of actions that if taken by the government would increase the level of CSR in China and make Harmonious Society a relevant factor in the development of Chinese CSR. To do so, my article studies comparative literature on CSR development to develop a framework that divides causes of CSR in a country into environmental constraints and discretionary responses. Understanding what drives the development of CSR allows us to understand what measures the Chinese government can take to influence the level of CSR. Using this framework, my article suggests that Harmonious Society is unlikely to promote CSR in China’s growing private sector because policy measures that affect the “constraints” driving CSR are bounded by other political considerations. 相似文献
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Geoffrey Wall 《Journal of Sustainable Tourism》2013,21(1):38-47
The Bali Sustainable Development Project (BSDP) is described and the procedures, definitions and criteria employed in the formulation of a sustainable development strategy for Bali are presented. Tourism is a major agent of change in Bali so that it has considerable implications for sustainable development there. The BSDP experience indicates the great importance of cultural sensitivity and linkages with and utilisation of existing institutional frameworks when working in an international collaborative context. Pervasive concerns, regardless of culture, are intersectoral linkages and topdown, bottom-up relationships. 相似文献
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Geoffrey Warner 《The Review of Black Political Economy》1997,25(3):95-114
The success of black or white mothers in obtaining adequate prenatal care is examined. Two departures from public health convention
are employed. The independent variables' marginal effects are calculated from their logit coefficients. The odds ratio of
care adequacy between races is derived from race-specific regressions. It yields a smaller variance and type II decision error
likelihood compared to the race dummy method.
A working-class life outlook and apathetic fathers are the highest barriers to adequate care. Wantedness, in the form of desired
timing, is a very strong motivator. Improving upward socioeconomic mobility and paternal attitudes are important aspects of
increasing prenatal care adequacy rates. 相似文献
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This article objects to a recent tendency of legal and economic scholars to "romanticize" the corporate governance role of German universal banks and Japanese main banks. There are potential conflicts between banks' interests as lenders and as shareholders that are likely to make banks less-than-ideal monitors for outside shareholders. Citing evidence that Japanese corporate borrowers pay above-market interest rates for their bank financing, Macey and Miller interpret the high interest rates as "rents" earned by Japanese banks on their loan portfolios in exchange for (1) insulating incumbent management of borrower firms from hostile takeover and (2) accepting suboptimal returns on their equity holdings.
The main problems with the German and Japanese systems stem from their failure to produce well-developed capital markets. Concentrated and stable shareholdings reduce the order flow in the market, thereby depriving the market of liquidity. And the lack of capital market liquidity– combined with the intense loyalty of the banks towards incumbent management–removes the ability of outside shareholders to make a credible threat of takeover if managerial performance is substandard.
The problem with American corporate governance–if indeed there is one–is not that hostile takeovers are bad, but that there are not enough of them due to regulatory restrictions and misguided legal policies. While U.S. law should be amended to give banks and other debtholders more power over borrowers in the case of financial distress, encouraging U.S. banks to become large stockholders is not likely to improve corporate efficiency. Strengthening the "voice" of American equity holders by eliminating restrictions on the market for corporate control would be the most effective step in improving firm performance. 相似文献
The main problems with the German and Japanese systems stem from their failure to produce well-developed capital markets. Concentrated and stable shareholdings reduce the order flow in the market, thereby depriving the market of liquidity. And the lack of capital market liquidity– combined with the intense loyalty of the banks towards incumbent management–removes the ability of outside shareholders to make a credible threat of takeover if managerial performance is substandard.
The problem with American corporate governance–if indeed there is one–is not that hostile takeovers are bad, but that there are not enough of them due to regulatory restrictions and misguided legal policies. While U.S. law should be amended to give banks and other debtholders more power over borrowers in the case of financial distress, encouraging U.S. banks to become large stockholders is not likely to improve corporate efficiency. Strengthening the "voice" of American equity holders by eliminating restrictions on the market for corporate control would be the most effective step in improving firm performance. 相似文献