Optimal disinflationary paths

This paper characterizes optimal monetary policy in the context of a general equilibrium model with optimizing agents and staggered price setting. Starting from a steady state with positive inflation, a rapid disinflation is desirable when announcements of future monetary policy are fully credible. Disinflationary policy yields substantial losses in output and employment when the monetary authority lacks credibility; nevertheless, the benefits of disinflation still exceed the costs. Disinflation often fails to be welfare-improving, however, when lost seignorage revenues must be replaced using other distortionary taxes.     

Where is the opportunity without the customer? An integration of marketing activities, the entrepreneurship process, and institutional theory

Marketing and entrepreneurship have long been recognized as two key responsibilities of the firm. Despite their tight integration in practice, marketing and entrepreneurship as domains of scholarly inquiry have largely progressed within their respective disciplinary boundaries with minimal cross-disciplinary fertilization. Furthermore, although firms increasingly undertake their marketing and entrepreneurial activities across diverse settings, academe has provided little insight into how changes in the institutional environment may substantially alter the processes and outcomes of these undertakings. Herein, we integrate research on marketing activities, the entrepreneurship process, and institutional theory in an effort to address this gap. We first discuss market orientation as enhancing a firm??s opportunity recognition and innovation, whereas marketing mix decisions enhance opportunity exploitation. We then examine how entrepreneurship leads to innovation directed toward market orientation and marketing mix activities. Based on this foundation, we examine differences in marketing and entrepreneurship activities across institutional contexts.     

Corporate distinctive competence,strategy, industry and performance

Corporate distinctive competencies may facilitate effective management of interdependencies among multiple units. Relationships between corporate distinctive competencies and firm performance were examined in 185 industrial firms. Results suggested that distinctive competencies associated with performance vary according to the grand strategy used and the firm's principal industry. Specific distinctive competencies were identified for each strategy and industry type.     

Monopolistic competition and a firm's product range

A model is presented which assumes that firms maximise profits with respect to both the number of varieties supplied as well as the output level of a typical variety. The incentive to produce more than one variety comes from a cost advantage due to inter-product economies. It is found that in a long-run free-entry equilibrium the industry is characterised by too few product varieties and each variety is over supplied compared to the welfare maximum for any conjectural variation elasticity. The former result also holds if the number of firms is held fixed.     

Functional importance and company performance: Moderating effects of grand strategy and industry type

The literature suggests that the appropriate combinations of functional importance (i.e., through resource allocations, type of activities) for high levels of company performance are affected by the type of grand strategy pursued by the firm and the firm's industry type. These relationships were examined for 93 industrial firms. Data on functional importance, grand strategy, and industry type were obtained from top executives while financial data were collected from the Compustat data files. The results showed that both grand strategy and industry type moderated the relationship between functional importance and company performance. These relationships were also examined for each grand strategy by industry type cell to provide data for further research.     

Monetary Policy Implementation: Making Better and More Consistent Use of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet

Since December 2015, the Federal Reserve has operated a new “floor system” in which it brings about desired changes in its targeted federal funds rate by managing the interest rate it pays on bank reserves and other short‐term liabilities. The design of this new system reflects the tendency of Fed officials to view monetary policy as affecting the economy through Keynesian” interest rate channels. From this Keynesian perspective, policy actions that change the size of the balance sheet are seen as tools for influencing credit market conditions that operate in addition to and independently of the Fed's monetary policy stance. The alternative monetarist framework proposed by the author views monetary policy and its effects as operating through the interaction between money supply and demand. Use of this framework makes clear that, even under a floor system, monetary policy actions designed to affect the aggregate price level and the rate of inflation must be accompanied sooner or later by traditional open market operations that have implications for the size and composition of the Fed's balance sheet. Use of the monetarist framework also underscores the likelihood that the Fed, by paying interest on reserves, has unknowingly contributed to the restrictiveness of its own monetary policies since the financial crisis, a period during which inflation has run consistently below target. More generally, the monetarist framework downplays the importance of the zero lower interest rate bound and suggests that monetary policy could be conducted more effectively by adopting and adhering to a consistent, rule‐like manner during good times and bad.     

Bargaining Credibility and the Limits to Within‐firm Pensions

Abstract ** ** Résumé en fin d’article; Zusammenfassung am Ende des Artikels; resúmen al fin del artículo. : A simple bargaining model highlights the role of commitment to a low‐risk investment policy for firms which offer within‐house pension and health insurance schemes. The roles of this commitment level plus bargaining power, and the ability of a failing firm to misappropriate pensions funds, are studied and their influence on the equilibrium pension determined.