Tacit meaning in disguise: Hidden metaphors in new product development and market making

This article explores the role of metaphor in product development processes and market making. Based on a sociocognitive perspective of innovation dynamics and required learning by market actors, the potential of metaphors for mental model development during new product development (NPD) processes is investigated. Three roles for metaphors as cognitive focusing devices for the co-evolution of producers' and consumers' mental models are inferred: mental model communication, mental model matching, and mental model creation. These roles are illustrated by examples that reinforce the need for creativity in applying metaphors as cognitive focusing devices in NPD and market making.     

COMPETITION POLICY AND CARTEL SIZE

This article examines endogenous cartel formation in the presence of a competition authority. Competition policy is shown to make the most inclusive stable cartels less inclusive. In particular, small firms that might have been cartel members in the absence of a competition authority are no longer members. Regarding the least inclusive stable cartels, competition policy can either decrease or increase their size and, in the latter case, the collusive price can rise.     

Revisiting output-price relations in East Asia

Why slower growth and high inflation can occur concurrently, while in other cases growth can be non-inflationary？ Why did aggregate demand policy sometime fail to work, given an orthogonal shock？ This study ponders on these queries by estimating the aggregate supply and aggregate demand curves in four East Asian countries. Applying the Structural Vector Auto-Regression （SVAR） with the restrictions a-la Blanchard and Quah, it is revealed that while the AD and AS curves in most cases follow the textbook definitions, in some countries the AS curve is so fiat that demand expansion would have been effective to stimulate growth, and supply-based policies would be more desirable to control prices. We also found that during the crisis the supply shock played a more significant role in the price fluctuations, suggesting that focusing on AD management alone was not the best approach to take.     

Voting for Redistribution under Desert‐Sensitive Altruism*

We endow individuals who differ in skills and tastes for working, with altruistic preferences for redistribution in a voting model where a unidimensional redistributive parameter is chosen by majority voting in a direct democracy. When altruistic preferences are desert‐sensitive (i.e., when there is a reluctance to redistribute from the hard‐working to the lazy), we show that lower levels of redistribution emerge in political equilibrium. We provide empirical evidence that preferences for redistribution are not purely selfish, and that desert‐sensitive motivations play a significant role. We estimate that preferences for redistribution are significantly more desert‐sensitive in the US than in Europe.     

IMPACTS OF ECONOMIC REFORM ON RURAL-URBAN WELFARE: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM FRAMEWORK

This paper demonstrates how economic reform undertaken in a developing country will impact not only macroeconomic variables but also income distribution between different household groups, particularly between rural and urban households. Unlike the well-known link to macroeconomic variables, the path connecting economic reform with income of rural-urban households is more equivocal and thus demands an inquisition. The CGE model constructed in this study is designed to serve such a purpose. When applied to the Indonesian case, both the static and dynamic simulations indicate that the post-reform progress in the country's macroeconomic condition is likely accompanied by worsening—albeit slightly—household income distribution between income groups. The non agricultural sector appears to be the major beneficiary of the reform. From the dynamic simulation, a worsening distribution is also found between rural and urban areas. However, results of both simulations also show that improved poverty conditions are likely achieved following the reform.     

INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA IN DECENTRALIZATION

The economics of decentralization implies that it generates efficiency improvement (higher growth) due to local government's ability to respond to the needs of local communities. However, this is not always the case. While policies do matter, this paper argues that institutional factors hold the key to the problem. The interactions among these factors and the characteristics of leaders in the region determine the outcome of decentralization. By capturing these important properties, multiple equilibria can be generated, avowing the ambiguous effects of local capture . On this basis, a typology of local leaders is developed. To the extent that welfare-enhancing activities are often related to regional growth, the role of an incentive system in determining the local leaders' behavior is also analyzed. In essence, a lack of incentive mechanisms for local leaders to promote growth and the absence of a stick-and-carrot system explain why post-decentralization growth performance has been generally disappointing.     

Cooperation in collective action*

The ability to cooperate in collective action problems – such as those relating to the use of common property resources or the provision of local public goods – is a key determinant of economic performance. In this paper we discuss two aspects of collective action problems in developing countries. First, which institutions discourage opportunistic behaviour and promote cooperation? Second, what are the characteristics of the individuals involved that determine the degree to which they cooperate? We first review the evidence from field studies, laboratory experiments, and cross community studies. We then present new results from an individual level panel dataset of rural workers.