Regulierungsmöglichkeiten auf dem Markt für Online-Auktionen

Der deutsche Online-Auktionsanbieter eBay hat seit seiner Gründung seine Gebühren um ein Vielfaches erh?ht. Ist dies mit Kostensteigerungen zu begründen? Verh?lt sich eBay wie ein typischer natürlicher Monopolist auf einem schwer bestreitbaren Markt? Wie kann einer Marktkonzentration entgegengetreten werden? Wie k?nnte eine Regulierung des Marktes aussehen? Korbinian von Blanckenburg, 28, Dipl.-Volkswirt, ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Institut für Finanzwissenschaft der Westf?lischen Wilhelms-Universit?t Münster; Michael Michaelis, 31, ist Dipl.-Jurist.     

Does willingness to pay increase with the number and strictness of sustainability labels?

Labels signaling sustainable product attributes are gaining importance, although uncertainty concerning the environmental, micro‐ and macroeconomic benefits of such labels persist. One of the questions still incompletely answered is whether Willingness To Pay (WTP) varies with a gradually increasing number of labels on a food product. In order to answer this question, we conducted a laboratory experiment with 191 student respondents, testing consumer valuations of different labeling strategies. Using the Becker‐DeGroot‐Marschak mechanism, WTP for 15 food products was measured. The products were endowed with up to six different sustainability labels, such that each grocery item was available in eight product versions. For perishable, nonperishable, and plant‐based products, the results indicate that participants are prone to allocating WTP‐premiums to labeled products, more than to unlabeled products. For animal products, however, labels do not influence WTP significantly. Furthermore, the premiums do not vary with an increasing number of labels, irrespective of whether the labels signal substitute or complementary sustainability information. The results are not entirely in line with normative notions of magnitude variation, but rather with the behavioral economic concept of embedding effects.     

How Can a Cartel Be Detected?

There is a long history of analyzing the workability of markets regarding concentration ratios as indicators of workability. In this paper, we discuss a comparatively new concept, the Coordination Failure Diagnostics (CFD) Concept, introduced by Grossekettler (1982, 1999, 2005, 2008). The CFD-concept analyzes real market processes by means of time series analysis and investigates whether they operate efficiently or not. Furthermore, the concept can be used as a tool for detecting cartels. Therefore, we develop a System of Cartel Markers which can be used to analyze real markets. We analyze the German cement industry as an example of a cartel and find significant differences to the competitive benchmark.     

Der deutsche Stahlmarkt nach der Krise: Eine wettbewerbspolitische Untersuchung

Der deutsche Stahlmarkt unterlag in der Vergangenheit heftigen Funktionsst?rungen. Lassen sich diese St?rungen mit Hilfe des Koordinationsm?ngel-Diagnosekonzepts erkl?ren? Wie entwickeln sich das Stahlangebot und die Stahlnachfrage und wie reagiert der Stahlpreis auf Ungleichgewichte? Ist die europ?ische Stahlpolitik zukünftig in der Lage, die Funktionsf?higkeit des Stahlmarkts zu gew?hrleisten?     

Cartel detection — Is market share volatility a significant indicator?

In this short paper, cartel behaviour is analysed with respect to the market shares of cartel members. There is some evidence in previous theoretical and empirical research that market shares under collusion are more stable than in phases of competition. It is shown that this can be an artifact and that market share volatility may not be used by antitrust authorities as an exclusive indicator of tacit collusion. Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the distribution of market share changes during both the competitive and the collusive phases of ten recently discovered conspiracies is compared. Only in 3 of the 10 cartels were the distributions of market share changes significantly different.     

Assessing the predictability of future livelihood strategies of pastoralists in semi-arid Morocco under climate change

This study assesses the predictability of future livelihood strategies of transhumant pastoralists in semi-arid Morocco. A decrease in precipitation due to climate change will likely threaten their traditional livelihood strategy. We examine whether the pastoralists explicitly prefer certain alternative strategies or if their reactions will be contingent. Our analysis uses standardized interviews focussing on two aspects: firstly, which resources are necessary for the pastoralists to be able to choose a livelihood strategy? Secondly, to what degree are expectations of well-being satisfied by alternative strategies? To assign levels of predictability to all investigated strategies, we analyze the interviews using simple methods of partial order theory. We find that under perceived precipitation scarcity, 38% of pastoralists would explicitly opt for sedentarity and localized pastoralism as alternative strategy. Unclear preferences are given for 25% of the cases. Considering a policy scenario of enhanced access to education and capital, our analysis indicates commercial pastoralism as dominant alternative. However, such a scenario would increase the share of unclear preferences to 43%, which increases the likelihood of a contingent development. The method we propose can be considered as a mathematical basis for the concept of historical contingency.     

Subject pool effects in price competition games: students versus professionals

Questioning the external validity of experiments that rely on student participants is an evergreen theme in experimental economics. Yet, there is ambiguous evidence of potential subject-pool bias. We add to the subject-pool debate by enlarging the set of experiments for which subject-pool differences have been studied. In a duopolistic Bertrand market setup designed to test for collusive behaviour, we test two treatments. The first is a baseline treatment, where participants cannot communicate with each other, while the second is a communication treatment in which participants are allowed to communicate. Each treatment is first conducted with students and then replicated with professionals. Our results show that student subjects and professionals differ significantly. However, these differences manifest themselves in quantitative rather than qualitative terms. Professionals do collude more, but their behavioural difference between treatments is similar. Students are thus a valid surrogate, if the research question is qualitative, but results generated by student samples should be handled with caution, if quantitative differences matter.     

The Welfare Implications of the European Trucks Cartel

Intereconomics - This paper presents a pragmatic approach to calculating the total economic loss induced by a cartel, focusing on the European trucks cartel (1997–2011). This comprehensible...