How Should the Graduate Economics Core be Changed?

The authors present suggestions by graduate students from a range of economics departments for improving the first-year core sequence in economics. The students identified a number of elements that should be added to the core: more training in building microeconomic models, a discussion of the methodological foundations of model-building, more emphasis on institutions to motivate and contextualize macroeconomic models, and greater focus on econometric practice rather than theory. The authors hope that these suggestions will encourage departments to take a fresh look at the content of the first-year core.     

Structural FECM: Cointegration in large‐scale structural FAVAR models

Starting from the dynamic factor model for nonstationary data we derive the factor‐augmented error correction model (FECM) and its moving‐average representation. The latter is used for the identification of structural shocks and their propagation mechanisms. We show how to implement classical identification schemes based on long‐run restrictions in the case of large panels. The importance of the error correction mechanism for impulse response analysis is analyzed by means of both empirical examples and simulation experiments. Our results show that the bias in estimated impulse responses in a factor‐augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) model is positively related to the strength of the error correction mechanism and the cross‐section dimension of the panel. We observe empirically in a large panel of US data that these features have a substantial effect on the responses of several variables to the identified permanent real (productivity) and monetary policy shocks.     

Shadow short rate and monetary policy in the Euro area

Empirical modelling of the monetary policy effects using conventional linear econometric models is put to a great test when interest rates approach the zero-lower bound. A possible remedy recently proposed in the literature is to introduce a shadow short rate (SSR) obtained from the yield curve model as an alternative monetary policy measure. This paper examines the usefulness of shadow rates as a policy stance measure for the Euro area. Moreover, the SSR can be used to study the country-specific monetary policy stance. We incorporate the shadow short rate in a standard vector autoregressive analysis to study the effects of monetary policy shocks both at the level of the Euro area and for two periphery EA countries, Italy and Spain, that endured significant financial stress during the crisis. Our analysis shows that monetary policy shocks identified form the SSR produce similar macro responses as shocks identified from the standard policy rate. The Euro area shocks can directly translate to a corresponding change in the country-specific financing conditions in the periphery, whereas the reverse effect is limited. The historical decomposition of the stochastic component of the SSR series shows that the unconventional policy measures were effective in stabilising the sovereign crisis in 2011, however, their relatively limited quantity provided only a weak stimulus to the economy.     

Leading Indicators for Euro‐area Inflation and GDP Growth*

In this paper, we evaluate the role of a set of variables as leading indicators for Euro‐area inflation and GDP growth. Our leading indicators are taken from the variables in the European Central Bank's (ECB) Euro‐area‐wide model database, plus a set of similar variables for the US. We compare the forecasting performance of each indicator ex post with that of purely autoregressive models. We also analyse three different approaches to combining the information from several indicators. First, ex post, we discuss the use as indicators of the estimated factors from a dynamic factor model for all the indicators. Secondly, within an ex ante framework, an automated model selection procedure is applied to models with a large set of indicators. No future information is used, future values of the regressors are forecast, and the choice of the indicators is based on their past forecasting records. Finally, we consider the forecasting performance of groups of indicators and factors and methods of pooling the ex ante single‐indicator or factor‐based forecasts. Some sensitivity analyses are also undertaken for different forecasting horizons and weighting schemes of forecasts to assess the robustness of the results.     

Regulation and administered contracts revisited: Lessons from transaction-cost economics for public utility regulation

This article reexamines the administered contracts approach to regulation in light of recent empirical research that establishes the importance of transaction-costs in the organizational choice and design decisions. After reviewing the fundamentals of transaction cost reasoning and the franchise bidding-versus-regulation debate, the study surveys the empirical literature on franchise bidding, contracting, and vertical integration. The implications of transaction-cost theories for current policies toward pubic utility regulation and deregulation are also addressed.We would like to thank Michael Crew, Victor Goldberg, Mark Lowry, Claude Menard, and Roger Sherman for helpful comments.     

Authority and Commitment: Why Universities, Like Legislatures, Are Not Organized as Firms

This paper explores the functions and limitations of democratic governance by analyzing the allocation of decision-making authority in colleges and universities. Contrary to the conventional perception that large numbers and heterogeneity of voters and issues undermine the efficiency of democratic decision making, data on the allocation of authority for thirty-one decision areas in 826 US colleges and universities show democratic governance to be more prevalent in larger, "full-service" research universities than in smaller liberal arts colleges and special-curriculum institutions. State- and church-affiliated institutions, meanwhile, tend to be governed more like firms. The results overall are consistent with economic theories of political organization that view democratic governance primarily as a means of enhancing the credibility of commitments rather than as a method of aggregating preferences.

"Educational systems, like governments, apparently can never be rational,never a logical and economical means to a definite end.Rather must they be always makeshifts."

— J.P. Munroe (1899)