A noncooperative model of contest network formation

In this paper we study a model of weighted network formation. The bilateral interaction is modeled as a Tullock contest game with the possibility of a draw. We describe stable networks under different concepts of stability. We show that a Nash stable network is either the empty network or the complete network. The complete network is not immune to bilateral deviations. When we allow for limited farsightedness, a stable network immune to bilateral deviations must be a complete $M$-partite network, with partitions of different sizes. We provide several comparative statics results illustrating the importance of the structure of stable networks in mediating the effects of shocks and interventions. In particular, we show that an increase in the likelihood of a draw has a nonmonotonic effect on the level of wasteful contest spending in the society. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to model weighted network formation when the actions of individuals are neither strategic complements nor strategic substitutes.     

Is the Retail Gasoline Market Local or National?

This paper studies the effect of station density on prices in the retail gasoline market in the Czech Republic. We estimate the impact of the number of competing stations in various driving-distance ranges around each station on prices. We find that station density has a negative effect on prices; the effect decreases with distance and is statistically significant up to six kilometers. This suggests that the retail gasoline market is local rather than national.     

Multigroup validation of the service quality,customer satisfaction and performance links in higher education

The notion of ‘students as customers’ continues to be prominent, yet is insufficiently explored, especially from the standpoint of various stakeholders. To address this inadequacy, the present study employs a multigroup analysis of the service profit chain (SPC) model in higher education (HE). Its purpose is to examine the complete SPC model regarding stakeholder perceptions in order to inform its validation and implementation. A cross-sectional survey was employed in order to enable multigroup comparison of a comprehensive research model on subsamples of employees and students by means of structural equation modeling (SEM). Results provide support for the proposed SPC model within the sample of vocational colleges. Besides strongly linked constructs (quality–satisfaction–loyalty), some notable weaknesses (cracked ‘satisfaction mirror’) are found. Multigroup analysis also indicates some important differences between employees and students. Implications are provided for strategic service management in HE, which should acknowledge the differences among stakeholder perceptions.     

Dissertation abstract: Experiments on fairness and reputation

The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration. The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation. The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification. In the third essay¹ we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity. We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower wage respond with exerting a lower effort. JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64 ¹Co-authored with Ninghua Du. Dissertation Committee: Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox Martin Dufwenberg, Price V. Fishback, Ronald L. Oaxaca     

New European Banking Governance and Crisis of Democracy: Bank Restructuring and Privatization in Slovenia

ABSTRACT

The paper makes three contributions to the understanding of the post-crisis European banking governance. First, it offers a more comprehensive approach to banking governance, beyond the Banking Union, through its concept of ‘New European Banking Governance’ (NEBG) that incorporates EU state aid rules and fiscal regulations. Second, it considers the impact of NEBG on democratic institutions and processes in EU member states, an under-researched topic in the literature on European banking governance. Finally, through its in-depth case study of Slovenia it considers the NEBG in relation to peripheral Eurozone states. It argues that the post-crisis banking governance framework of the EU not only severely constrained the Slovenian state in its policy choices but rearranged its policy-making institutions in a way that restricted and continues to restrict democratic banking policy formation.     

The Austrian theory of the cooperative firm

This paper draws on Wicksell's Value, Capital and Rent. The (comparative-statics) response of the cooperative to a change in its parameters (capital stock, rate of interest paid on capital stock, and production function) is examined. Severe employment problems may be expected if, in a cooperative setting, the rate of interest is, by macroeconomic management, kept at a relatively low level. Technological progress also may lead to a contraction in employment and even, under some circumstances, cause a decline in output per man. The cooperative is throughout contrasted with its capitalist counterpart.     

Problems and environment of small businesses in the Czech Republic

The impressive and spontaneous build-up of the private small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the Czech Republic in 1990–93 coincided with the similarly dramatic changes in the public administration and in the whole environment for decision-making. The resulting problems of SMEs in the Czech Republic seem to be common to all economies in transition. A lot of the problems are caused by the macroeconomic policy for which this sector is not the most important part of the national economy. The paper shows some conflicts between macroeconomic anti-inflationary (monetary and fiscal) policies, and interests of small businesses. The authors stress the importance of SMEs during the period of transition. Informal aspects of the functioning of small firms are discussed, especially their relation with banks and public administration. The paper offers some empirical evidence and available statistics on SMEs developments during 1990–94 focusing particularly on manufacturing.     

Valuing Mortgage Insurance Contracts in Emerging Market Economies

We develop a new option-based method for the valuation of mortgage insurance contracts in closed form in an economy where agents are risk neutral. While the proposed valuation method is general and can be used in any market, it may be particularly useful in emerging market economies where other existing methods may be either inappropriate or are too difficult to implement because of the lack of relevant data. As an application, we price a typical Serbian government-backed mortgage insurance contract.