Application of technology roadmaps to governmental innovation policy for promoting technology convergence

The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan has actively involved itself in technology roadmapping in recent years in order to build a broad discussion basis for researchers and business-oriented people in academia, industry and government. This unique attempt is not fully tested in the context whether the “public sector's roadmaps” are viable for promoting innovation and for building tight collaborative relationships between different sectors. However, the authors have been widening the application of roadmapping activities from classical R&D management to new ways of promoting technology convergence, in which the Japanese R&D community is said to be not so accustomed. This paper depicts the governmental agency's objectives, activity details and ways of applications of technology roadmaps and roadmapping. The authors' intention is not only to introduce this kind of governmental activity to the MOT world, but rather to ignite discussions on the usefulness and effectiveness of technology roadmaps and roadmapping in a wide range of knowledge sharing.     

Why do entrepreneurs open tech startups? A comparative study between Brazilian and foreign enterprises

International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - This research identifies and compares the reasons that lead entrepreneurs to open a startup in Brazil or abroad along six factors:...     

Non‐compliance in Executive Compensation Disclosure: the Brazilian Experience

We examine the determinants and consequences of firms’ choice not to comply with a new executive compensation disclosure regulation. We exploit a unique feature of Brazilian markets, where a change in the regulation of executive compensation disclosure could arguably lead to personal security‐related costs for executives. This major reform in executive compensation disclosure in Brazil became effective in December 2009. While some firms complied with the change in regulation, other firms explicitly refused to comply fully with the regulation by using a court injunction. After controlling for firm‐specific characteristics and both social and economic inequality measures, we find that the degree of criminality in the state in which the firm is headquartered (a proxy for security‐related costs) and the level of CEO compensation are important determinants of a firm's decision not to fully disclose executive compensation information. We also show that firms which do not fully comply with the regulation face costs in the form of higher bid‐ask spreads, suggesting investors are leery of the decision not to comply with the regulation. We discuss the potential implications of our results in the context of executive compensation disclosure reform.