排序方式: 共有16条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
We provide a model wherein oligopolists produce differentiated products that also have a safety attribute. Consumption of these products may lead to harm (to consumers and/or third parties), lawsuits, and compensation, either via settlement or trial. Firm‐level costs reflect both safety investment and production activities, as well as liability‐related costs. Compensation is incomplete, both because of inefficiencies in the bargaining process and (possibly) because of statutorily established limits on awards. We compare the market equilibrium safety effort and output levels to what a planner who is able to set safety standards, but takes the market equilibrium output as given, would choose. 相似文献
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Firms communicate product quality to consumers through a variety of channels. Economic models of such communication take two alternative forms when quality is exogenous: (i) disclosure of quality through a credible direct claim; or (ii) signalling of quality via producer actions that influence buyers' beliefs about quality. In general, these two literatures have ignored one another. We argue that firms should be viewed as choosing which means of communication they will employ. We show that integration of these two alternatives leads to new implications about disclosure, signalling, firm preferences over type, and the social efficiency of the channel of communication employed. 相似文献
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We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price competition among firms producing horizontally and vertically differentiated substitute products. Incomplete information about vertical quality (consumer satisfaction) signalled via price softens price competition. Low‐quality firms always prefer the incomplete information game to the full‐information analog. Moreover, for “high‐value” markets with a sufficiently high proportion of high‐quality firms, these firms also prefer incomplete information to full information. We find that an increase in the loss to consumers associated with the low‐quality product may perversely benefit low‐quality firms; we consider applications to tort reform and professional licensing. 相似文献
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Marc R. Reinganum Partha Gangopadhyay 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》1991,1(2):169-176
Since most firms select December fiscal year-ends, theJanuary effect is a fiscal year-end accounting effect, according to the accounting-information hypothesis. This hypothesis attributes the
unusually large stock returns in January to higher risk, caused by uncertainty about the impending announcement of firm performance.
The empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis. Small firms with non-December fiscal year-ends fail to display a fiscal
year-end effect. Yet all small firms, regardless of their fiscal year-end month, exhibit large January returns. 相似文献
5.
The adversarial provision of evidence is modeled as a game inwhich two parties engage in strategic sequential search. Anaxiomatic approach is used to characterize a court's decisionbased on the evidence provided. Although this process treatsthe evidence submissions in an unbiased way, the equilibriumoutcome may still exhibit bias. Bias arises from differencesin the cost of sampling or asymmetry in the sampling distribution.In a multistage model, a prodefendant bias arises in the firststage from a divergence between the parties' stakes. Finally,the adversarial process generates additional costs that screenout some otherwise meritorious cases. 相似文献
6.
Andrew F. Daughety Jennifer F. Reinganum 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2009,18(3):901-934
Two entrepreneurs, each privately informed about her own talent, simultaneously and noncooperatively choose their efforts in producing a new product. Product quality depends on both entrepreneurs' talents and efforts, but is unobservable by potential buyers prior to purchase; however, buyers can observe the entrepreneurs' individual efforts. Because the entrepreneurs share the payoff, each is tempted to shirk. However, the need to signal quality to potential buyers serves as a credible commitment to provide greater effort. Thus, the "problem" of adverse selection mitigates the problem of moral hazard, so that a new venture can perform better than the corresponding mature market. 相似文献
7.
Marc R. Reinganum 《Journal of Financial Economics》1983,12(1):89-104
Small firms experience large returns in January and exceptionally large returns during the first few trading days of January. The empirical tests indicate that the abnormally high returns witnessed at the very beginning of January appear to be consistent with tax-loss selling. However, tax-loss selling cannot explain the entire January seasonal effect. The small firms least likely to be sold for tax reasons (prior year ‘winners’) also exhibit large average January returns, although not unusually large returns during the first few days of January. 相似文献
8.
Over the last eight centuries, lawyers in common law countries have generally been precluded from buying their clients’ cases. Recently, a number of economists and lawyers have argued that sale should be allowed so as to eliminate moral hazard, particularly when contingent fees are used; this argument is based on full‐information reasoning. However, if the lawyer has private information about the case value, then compensation demands potentially signal this value when the client can search over lawyers. We provide a formal model and a family of computational examples that show that allowing (possibly partial) purchase can reduce expected social efficiency. 相似文献
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