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1.
Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk. 相似文献
2.
Willingness to take on risk is influenced by the presence of fair and unfair background risks for decision makers who are risk vulnerable as defined by Gollier and Pratt [1996], for these decision makers are more risk averse when they possess such an uninsurable background risk. We present an alternative derivation of the index of local vulnerability based on Diamond and Stiglitz [1974] compensated increases in risk, such that risk aversion increases with the introduction of any small fair background risk if and only if the index of local vulnerability is positive. We establish that the increase in risk aversion is greater for those who are more vulnerable as measured by the index of local vulnerability. 相似文献
3.
Arthur Snow 《The Journal of risk and insurance》2009,76(2):249-259
Several studies extend the Rothschild–Stiglitz model of competitive insurance contracting with adverse selection by incorporating additional dimensions of private information and conclude that some insurers may earn positive profit in a separating, self-selection equilibrium, provided each insurer is restricted to making a single contract offer. The main result of this article is that these profitable configurations are not sustainable when individual insurers can offer multiple contracts. It is also shown that the ability to offer multiple contracts overturns equilibria that have applicants from different risk classes pooled as well as those where profits are dissipated by a fixed entry cost. 相似文献
4.
Bundled coverage of different losses and distinct perils, along with differential deductibles and policy limits, are common features of insurance contracts. We show that, through these practices, insurers can implement multidimensional screening of insurance applicants who possess hidden knowledge of their risks, and thereby reduce the externality cost of adverse selection. Competitive forces drive insurers to exploit multidimensional screening, enhancing the efficiency of insurance contracting. Moreover, multidimensional screening allows competitive insurance markets to attain pure strategy Nash equilibria over a wider range of applicant pools, resolving completely the Rothschild–Stiglitz nonexistence puzzle in markets where the perils space is sufficiently divisible. 相似文献
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We develop a simple model in which firm-specific advertising has cooperative and predatory effects. Our model is set in a static market where firms are naturally segmented into two distinct submarkets: several large firms located in the core, with small firms operating as a fringe. We test the net effect of opposing market size (cooperative) and market share (predatory) effects of both fringe and core firm advertising on the advertising decisions of large firms in several US consumer industries. Empirically, fringe firm advertising leads to an increase in advertising efforts by large firms, implying strategic complementarity. On the other hand, increased advertising by core firms in an industry decreases advertising expenditures of other core firms, indicating they are strategic substitutes. Our findings imply that equilibrium levels of advertising can be greater with asymmetric, rather than symmetric, strategic interactions. 相似文献
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We present two theorems that provide necessary and sufficient conditions for an expected utility maximizer to become more risk averse in the sense of Ross with respect to bearing a foreground risk after the introduction of any independent fair or unfair additive background risk. We call these decision makers Ross risk vulnerable, and show that Ross decreasing absolute risk aversion and Ross decreasing absolute prudence are jointly sufficient for Ross risk vulnerability. Restrictions on utility necessary and sufficient for Ross risk vulnerability with respect to stochastic dominance deteriorations of an existing background risk are also presented. Our analysis concludes with applications of Ross risk vulnerability. 相似文献
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Journal of Productivity Analysis - The productive efficiency of the U.S. flour milling industry increased substantially between 1850 and 1880. Specifically, a typical flour mill in 1880 was able to... 相似文献
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