Bad Credit,No Problem? Credit and Labor Market Consequences of Bad Credit Reports

We study the financial and labor market impacts of bad credit reports. Using difference-in-differences variation from the staggered removal of bankruptcy flags, we show that bankruptcy flag removal leads to economically large increases in credit limits and borrowing. Using administrative tax records linked to personal bankruptcy records, we estimate economically small effects of flag removal on employment and earnings outcomes. We rationalize these contrasting results by showing that, conditional on basic observables, “hidden” bankruptcy flags are strongly correlated with adverse credit market outcomes but have no predictive power for measures of job performance.     

SURVIVAL OF BUSINESSES USING COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIPS TO COMMERCIALIZE COMPLEX GOODS

Authors with many theoretical and managerial perspectives argue that businesses commercializing technologically complex goods benefit when they collaborate closely with other businesses. Collaboration is viewed as a means for businesses to overcome competency limitations and to achieve the close configuration of components required for complex goods. We predict that collaborative relationships often assist businesses to produce complex goods, but that the relationships might also cause problems for the collaborating businesses. We find that firms using development-oriented and marketing-oriented collaborative relationships in the hospital software systems industry are less likely to shut down than businesses that follow independent approaches when the environment changes gradually, but businesses using collaborative relationships are sometimes susceptible to being acquired by other firms. Following a sudden environmental shock, businesses with collaborative relationships for activities central to the shock became more likely to shut down, while businesses with collaborative relationships for activities outside the focus of the shock became more likely to survive. The study critically evaluates and tests the widely stated but little-tested argument that interfirm collaboration is usually beneficial. The results address the issue of whether organizational choices affect comparative business performance.     

Audit planning: an algorithmic approach*

Abstract. A major task in audit planning is the design of a proper evaluation procedure for the existing accounting and internal control system. In an era when most accounting systems are “engineered” and computerized, a structured “systems approach” can replace the traditional audit planning methods with formal algorithms to assure that the evaluation is economical and within time and resource constraints. This paper combines the concepts of reliability modeling of internal control systems with those of sequential covering in mathematical programming and provides an algorithm for audit planning in two situations: (1) a dichotomous, deterministic condition where each control mechanism can either operate properly or fail, and (2) a probabilistic situation in which probabilities of success and failure are considered. The objective function is the minimization of audit cost in the first case and is the minimization of expected audit cost in the second one. In addition to the optimization effect achieved by applying the algorithm, a “stopping rule” is defined for the termination of the audit investigation. Résumé. Une tâche importante dans la planification en vérification est de concevoir une procüdure d‘évaluation appropriée pour le système de contrôle interne comptable considéré. Dans une ère où la plupart des systèmes comptables sont “machinés” et informatisés, une “approche système” structurée peut remplacer les méthodes traditionnelles de planification en vérification par des algorithmes formels, afin de donner l'assurance que l’évaluation est économique et à l'intérieur des contraintes de temps et de ressources. Cet article combine les concepts de la fiabilité du modelage des systèmes de contrôle interne avec ceux de couverture séquentielle en programmation mathématique, et présente un algorithme pour la planification en vérification dans deux situations: (1) une condition dichotomique et déterministique où chaque mécanisme de contrôle peut soit fonctionner correctement ou ne pas fonctionner, et (2) une situation probabilistique où l'on considère les probabilitès de succès et d‘échec. La fonction “objectif” est de minimiser le coût de la vérification dans le premier cas et de minimiser le coût prévu de la vérification dans le deuxième cas. En plus de l'effet d'optimisation atteint par l'utilisation de l'algorithme, on définit une “règle de fin de vérification” visant à mettre fin à la vérification.     

Costs of Taxation and Benefits of Public Goods with Multiple Taxes and Goods

The fact that raising taxes can increase taxed labor supply through income effects is frequently and erroneously used to justify greater public good provision than indicated by traditional, compensated analyses. We develop a model including multiple public goods and taxes and derive measures of the marginal benefits of public goods and the Marginal Cost of Funds (MCF) using both compensated and uncompensated measures. We confirm that the desirability of tax‐financed public projects is independent of the method used. An important innovation is to show that the benefits of public goods must be adjusted by a benefit multiplier not previously seen in the literature if an uncompensated MCF is used.     

THE INTERACTIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND COMPETITIVE INFLUENCES ON STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE

Despite much debate in the strategy literatures, there is little consensus as to whether organizational capabilities or market competition are more important in shaping firms’ actions and performance. We suspect that simply comparing firm-level and industry-level influences will continue to prove fruitless for two reasons. In the first place, both organization and competition are clearly important in shaping strategy and performance. In the second place, we suspect that the inconclusive nature of much of the existing research reflects the fact that organizational capabilities, competition, strategy, and performance are fundamentally endogenous. That is, reciprocal interactions at multiple levels of analysis between the environment and the firm shape business strategy and performance, while interactions between strategy and performance, in turn, shape both organizational capabilities and competitive environments. This special issue of the Strategic Management Journal includes papers that focus attention on several dimensions of these interactions. A common theme emerges from the work concerning the sequential nature of the interrelationships. The papers suggest that firms develop organizational capabilities as they act in competitive, institutional, and cognitive environments, where capabilities arise both by design and as the unexpected by-products of firm actions. The capabilities, managers’ understanding of the capabilities, and the historical context that surrounds them then condition firms’ reactions to changes in their environment. The reactions and firm performance in turn affect the structure of the industry, and all these changes generate new information which in turn creates new learning opportunities. Thus, the papers view strategy and performance as an ongoing sequence of capabilities-conditioned adaptations by firms which in turn become exogenous events in the environments of the managers of other firms. For strategy researchers, the important question is not that of which disciplinary perspective or mode of explanation is a more appropriate one, but rather that of the conditions under which a given mode of explanation is most appropriate. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.