The Role of Ethical Standards in the Relationship Between Religious Social Norms and M&A Announcement Returns

Journal of Business Ethics - Prior studies suggest that firms headquartered in areas with strong religious social norms have higher ethical standards. In this study, we examine whether the ethical...     

Real Incentive Effects of Soft Information

Both soft, noncontractible, and hard, contractible, information are informative about managerial ability and future firm performance. If a manager's future compensation depends on expectations of ability or future performance, then the manager has implicit incentives to affect the information. We examine the real incentive effects of soft information in a dynamic agency with limited commitment. When long-term contracts are renegotiated, the rewards for future performance inherent in long-term contracts allow the principal partial control over the implicit incentives. This is because the soft information affects the basis for contract renegotiation. With short-term contracts, the principal has no control over the basis for contract negotiation, and thus long-term contracts generally dominate short-term contracts. With long-term contracts, the principal's control over implicit incentives is characterized in terms of effective contracting on an implicit aggregation of the soft information that arises from predicting (forming expectations of) future performance. We provide sufficient conditions for soft information to have no real incentive effects. In general, implicit incentives not controllable by the principal include fixed effects, such as career concerns driven by labor markets external to the agency. When controllable incentives span the fixed effects of career concerns, the latter have no real effects with regard to total managerial incentives—they would optimally be the same with or without career concerns. Our analysis suggests empirical tests for estimating career concerns that should explicitly incorporate noncontractible information.     

Effect Sizes in Qualitative Research: A Prolegomenon

The American Psychological Association Task Force recommended that researchers always report and interpret effect sizes for quantitative data. However, no such recommendation was made for qualitative data. Thus, the first objective of the present paper is to provide a rationale for reporting and interpreting effect sizes in qualitative research. Arguments are presented that effect sizes enhance the process of verstehen/hermeneutics advocated by interpretive researchers. The second objective of this paper is to provide a typology of effect sizes in qualitative research. Examples are given illustrating various applications of effect sizes. For instance, when conducting typological analyses, qualitative analysts only identify emergent themes; yet, these themes can be quantitized to ascertain the hierarchical structure of emergent themes. The final objective is to illustrate how inferential statistics can be utilized in qualitative data analyses. This can be accomplished by treating words arising from individuals, or observations emerging from a particular setting, as sample units of data that represent the total number of words/observations existing from that sample member/context. Heuristic examples are provided to demonstrate how inferential statistics can be used to provide more complex levels of verstehen than is presently undertaken in qualitative research.     

Substance, Form and PFI Contracts

The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) was launched by the United Kingdom Government in 1992 in order to encourage the private sector in the UK to become more involved in public sector development projects. A key theme of the initiative was that the public should receive 'value for money'. This article investigates the accounting issue as to whether or not the private or the public sector should record any property related to PFI projects on balance sheet. It argues that although both HM Treasury and the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) might agree on the accounting principles, the practical impact is that in order for related properties to stay off the public sector's balance sheet, substantial risk needs to be transferred to the private sector. As a consequence of this, the objective of providing value for money to the public may not be achieved.     

Maximum efforts in contests with asymmetric valuations

Efforts may be reduced when players with different valuations participate in a contest. This paper considers the problem of designing a contest to elicit maximum aggregate effort from players with asymmetric valuations. Optimal designs for different classes of contest technologies are computed and characterized. A value weighted contest is optimal in the concave case. In the unconstrained case, the optimal contest is equivalent to a first price all-pay auction with a reserve price. The optimal design discounts the effort of the high valuation player in order to induce him to compete vigorously.     

Understanding the Economic Factors Influencing Farm Policy Preferences

A survey conducted in Mississippi, Texas, Indiana, and Nebraska elicited producers' preferences for various farm policy changes. This permitted examination of the diversity of preferences that single-state studies have not allowed. Five policy choices, including deficiency payments, loan programs, crop insurance, export programs, and disaster payments were examined. Logit model results predicting producer preferences for each of the five dichotomous policy choices are reported. Explanatory variables based on expected utility theory such as risk aversion, price and yield variability, and price–yield correlation are significant in various models.     

Taxes and the acquisition of depreciable assets: The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the alternative minimum tax

Analysis of firm investment behavior during 1982–1993 shows that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86) Public Law No. 99-514 substantially affects both purchases and leases of depreciable assets. The changes in the regular corporate income tax rules are shown to lower asset acquisition. The effect of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) is found to vary with the debt share in firms’ capital structure and with the frequency of AMT exposure during the life of the assets acquired. On average, TRA86 depresses asset purchases less for firms that are subject to the AMT: AMT somewhat mitigates the negative effects of the regular tax rules.