Existence of equilibrium configurations of competitive firms on an infinite two-dimensional space

This paper analytically examines the existence of equilibrium configurations of competitive firms on an infinite two-dimensional space. It is shown that the Löschian configuration (a regular-hexagonal lattice) and a square lattice are in global equilibrium; the Löschian configuration is in the strongest global equilibrium among the regular lattices (in this sense, spatial competition leads to the social optimum); and the so-called back-to-back configuration is not in equilibrium. These results are in marked contrast to those obtained from a one-dimensional model, implying that spatial equilibrium configurations in a two-dimensional space should not be inferred only from one-dimensional models frequently employed in spatial economics.     

Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence

This paper uses laboratory experiments to test the implications of the theory of repeated games on equilibrium payoffs and estimate strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring. We find that subjects' payoffs (i) decrease as noise increases, and (ii) are lower than the theoretical maximum for low noise, but exceed it for high noise. Under the assumption that the subjects' strategy uses thresholds on the public signal for transition between cooperation and punishment states, we find that the best fitting strategy simply compares the most recent public signal against a single threshold.     

Evolution of Beliefs and the Nash Equilibrium of Normal Form Games

The paper formulates a simple two-person model of learning with pattern recognition and discusses its implications. In particular, it focuses on the asymptotic behavior of players' beliefs when the game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.Journal of Economics LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D83.     

Voluntary adoption of ISO 14001 in Japan: mechanisms,stages and effects

This paper seeks to understand what factors contribute to voluntary adoption of the ISO 14001 environmental management system by private sector facilities in Japan. A model based on regulatory, competitiveness, social responsibility and organization theory is applied to 1999 survey data. Analysis shows systematically different factors to be important indicators of voluntarism in different industries and for facilities at different stages of certification. First adopters and second adopters appear to be fundamentally different types of organizations driven by different internal and external factors. Although results do not indicate a clear causal linkage between ISO adoption and greening activity, evidence shows that at least two different stages of adoption have taken place in Japan and that ISO adoption is associated with environmental action. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment     

Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication

This paper studies collusion in repeated Bertrand oligopoly when stochastic demand levels for the product of each firm are their private information and are positively correlated. It derives general sufficient conditions for efficient collusion through communication and a simple grim-trigger strategy. This analysis is then applied to a model where the demand signal has multiple random components which respond differently to price deviations. In this model, it is shown that the above sufficient conditions hold if idiosyncratic noise terms are sufficiently small. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.     

Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

Summary. This paper studies repeated games with imperfect private monitoring when there exists a third-party mediator who coordinates play by giving non-binding instructions to players on which action to take and by collecting their private information. The paper presents a Nash-threat folk theorem for a communication equilibrium based on such mediation when monitoring is jointly -perfect in the sense that every player is almost perfectly monitored collectively by other players.JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D82.I am very grateful to Mark Armstrong, V. Bhaskar, and Michihiro Kandori for helpful comments. Part of this research was conducted while I was visiting the University College London. Their hospitality is gratefully acknowledged.     

Voluntary redistribution mechanism in asymmetric coordination games

Experimental Economics - An inequality game is an asymmetric 2 × 2 coordination game in which player 1 earns a substantially higher payoff than player 2 except in the inefficient Nash...