Monopoly with resale

We examine the intricacies associated with the design of revenue‐maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell. We consider two cases: resale to a third party who does not participate in the primary market and interbidder resale, where the winner resells to the losers. To influence the resale outcome, the monopolist must design an allocation rule and a disclosure policy that optimally fashion the beliefs of the participants in the secondary market. Our results show that the revenue‐maximizing mechanism may require a stochastic selling procedure and a disclosure policy richer than the simple announcement of the decision to sell to a particular buyer.     

Analytic derivatives and the computation of GARCH estimates

In the context of univariate GARCH models we show how analytic first and second derivatives of the log-likelihood can be successfully employed for estimation purposes. Maximum likelihood GARCH estimation usually relies on the numerical approximation to the log-likelihood derivatives, on the grounds that an exact analytic differentiation is much too burdensome. We argue that this is not the case and that the computational benefit of using the analytic derivatives (first and second) may be substantial. Furthermore, we make a comparison of various gradient algorithms that are used for the maximization of the GARCH Gaussian likelihood. We suggest the implementation of a globally efficient computation algorithm that is obtained by suitably combining the use of the estimated information matrix with that of the exact Hessian during the maximization process. As this would appear a straightforward extension, we then study the finite sample performance of the exact Hessian and its approximations (that is, the estimated information, outer products and misspecification robust matrices) in inference.     

Autocorrelation and masked heterogeneity in panel data models estimated by maximum likelihood

In a panel data model with random effects, when autocorrelation in the error is considered, (Gaussian) maximum likelihood estimation produces a dramatically large number of corner solutions: the variance of the random effect appears (incorrectly) to be zero, and a larger autocorrelation is (incorrectly) assigned to the idiosyncratic component. Thus heterogeneity could (incorrectly) be lost in applications to panel data with customarily available time dimension, even in a correctly specified model. The problem occurs in linear as well as nonlinear models. This article aims at pointing out how serious this problem can be (largely neglected by the panel data literature). A set of Monte Carlo experiments is conducted to highlight its relevance, and we explain this unpleasant effect showing that, along a direction, the expected log-likelihood is nearly flat.     

The demand-boost theory of exclusive dealing

This article unifies various approaches to the analysis of exclusive dealing that so far have been regarded as distinct. The common element of these approaches is that firms depart from efficient pricing, raising marginal prices above marginal costs. We show that with distorted prices, exclusive dealing can be directly profitable and anticompetitive provided that the dominant firm enjoys a competitive advantage over rivals. The dominant firm gains directly, rather than in the future, or in adjacent markets, thanks to the boost in demand it enjoys when buyers sign exclusive contracts. We discuss the implication of the theory for antitrust policy.     

The Theory and Practice of Regulation with Multinational Enterprises

The ability of firms to operate in several markets at the same time is changing regulators' tasks. Regulatory bodies are now having to deal with multinational firms which spread their business activities all over the world. This paper analyzes the theory and practice of regulation in terms of the multinational dimensions of regulated firms. We show that the perceived theory of regulation is indeed affected, and that new issues arise both from a positive and normative point of view.     

Indirect estimation of large conditionally heteroskedastic factor models,with an application to the Dow 30 stocks

We derive indirect estimators of conditionally heteroskedastic factor models in which the volatilities of common and idiosyncratic factors depend on their past unobserved values by calibrating the score of a Kalman-filter approximation with inequality constraints on the auxiliary model parameters. We also propose alternative indirect estimators for large-scale models, and explain how to apply our procedures to many other dynamic latent variable models. We analyse the small sample behaviour of our indirect estimators and several likelihood-based procedures through an extensive Monte Carlo experiment with empirically realistic designs. Finally, we apply our procedures to weekly returns on the Dow 30 stocks.     

On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting

This paper studies the exchange of information between two principals who contract sequentially with the same agent, as in the case of a buyer who purchases from multiple sellers. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the downstream level of trade, (b) the agent's valuations are positively correlated, and (c) preferences in the downstream relationship are separable, then it is optimal for the upstream principal to offer the agent full privacy. On the contrary, when any of these conditions is violated, there exist preferences for which disclosure is strictly optimal, even if the downstream principal does not pay for the information. We also examine the effects of disclosure on welfare and show that it does not necessarily reduce the agent's surplus in the two relationships and in some cases may even yield a Pareto improvement.     

Export restraints in a model of trade with capital accumulation

This paper examines the impact of voluntary export restraints (VERs) in an international duopoly modeled as a differential game. With a Ramsey capital accumulation dynamics, the game admits multiple steady states, and a VER cannot be ‘voluntarily’ employed by the foreign firm in case of Cournot behavior in demand substitutes. Hence, the dynamic framework confirms the results of the VERs literature with static interaction in output levels. In the case of price behavior, the adoption of an export restraint may increase the profits of both firms if products are substitutes and the steady state is ‘market-driven’. However, contrary to the acquired wisdom based upon the static approach, the dynamic analysis also admits an equilibrium outcome, identified by the Ramsey golden rule, where the incentive to adopt a VER is ruled out, irrespective of whether firms are quantity- or price-setters.     

Asymptotic standard errors of point elasticities calculated from simultaneous equation systems

An expression for the asymptotic covariance matrix of point elasticities, computed from a simultaneous linear equation system with estimated coefficients, is derived in this paper. Numerical examples are provided using the Klein-I model estimated by 2SLS.     

Estimating asymptotic standard errors and inconsistencies of impact multipliers in nonlinear econometric models

This paper presents and discusses an analytic simulation procedure which can be used to estimate the asymptotic standard errors of impact multipliers in a structural, nonlinear econometric model. A stochastic simulation approach is used to obtain an approximate estimate of the inconsistencies of multipliers when computed from simulated results. A numerical example for the nonlinear Klein-Goldberger model is provided.