Production-location decision and free entry oligopoly: A correction

This paper shows that there is no interior solution in Mai–Hwang's 1992 oligopolistic location model with free entry when the production function exhibits constant or decreasing returns to scale. The comparative static results of the impact of a demand change on the location decision only apply to the case where the production function exhibits increasing returns to scale. It re-examines the impact of a demand change on the location decision of an oligopolistic firm and corrects the propositions derived by [C.C. Mai, H. Hwang, Production-location decision and free entry oligopoly, Journal of Urban Economics 33 (1992) 252–271. Reprinted in: M.L. Greenhut, G. Norman (Eds.), The Economics of Location, vol. I: Location Theory, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1995].     

Capital Flows, Vertical Multinationals, Wage Inequality, and Welfare

Wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor in the US and its trading partners, Mexico and Chile, has increased since 1980, while Taiwan's wage inequality has decreased since the mid‐1980s. The authors provide a new explanation for the latter, involving a rise in capital flows from Taiwan to less‐developed countries (LDCs) in the form of vertical multinationals (MNEs), and a corresponding rise in intermediate‐good exports from the MNEs to subsidiaries in LDCs. Moreover, national income in both countries definitely improves.     

Is the optimum quantity of money compatible with the unique price level under laissez-faire?

The purpose of this paper is to set forth a general equilibrium model to demonstrate that even if the real social costs of producing money are positive, the optimum quantity of money is incompatible with the unique price level under laissez-faire if zero-degree homogeneity of the production-maintenance cost function in M and P is assumed.     

Optimum tariff on imports from imperfectly competitive labor-managed firms

This paper develops a model of international trade between a labor-managed economy and a capitalist economy and examines the short- and long-run optimal specific tariff in the presence of foreign imperfect competition among labor-managed firms. It will be shown that the underlying conditions for the optimal tariff rule are different from conventional wisdom.     

Transport rates structure,optimum location,and theory of production: Reexamination

The two-stage approach consistently to present a generalized location theory of the firm in linear space is employed. It is shown that the second-order sufficient condition for the profit-maximizing and/or cost-minimizing location problem requires that transport rates increase with distance. In the process, it is demonstrated that this approach provides a compact way to analyze the location and production decisions separately and to avoid the errors made by Mathur and others.     

Optimal Tariffs with Endogenous Production Location

This paper attempts to examine how the inclusion of economic space affects trade policies and to make a comparison between optimal tariffs with endogenous location and those with exogenous location. In particular, it is shown that the output effect of a tariff change with endogenous location is greater than that with exogenous location if the production function is non-CRS. Moreover, when the production function is CRS (resp. not CRS), the optimal tariff under endogenous location is the same as (lower than) the one under exogenous location.     

Symbiotic Production and Downstream Market Competition

It is well known that the double marginalization problem in the vertical relation can be eliminated by collusion, but it is undesirable because of the monopoly pricing outcome. This study addresses the role of downstream market competition under symbiotic production and demonstrates that incorporating different types of competition in product markets will partially eliminate inefficiency caused by double marginalization. It suggests that introducing callback services or internet telephones creates an environment similar to downward market competition in the output market; hence, it is observed that international tariffs are significantly reduced.     

Sequential entry and plant location in oligopolistic competition

Weberian location theory is confined to a single firm framework, and pays very little attention to the interdependence among firms. To fill up this gap, this article incorporates oligopolistic competition into a simple Weberian model to investigate industrial location patterns when firms are shortsighted, enter sequentially, and locate once-and-for-all. It is shown that the location of a new entrant is closer to (farther away from) the market site compared with the existing firms if the industry is characterized by diseconomies (economies) of scale.     

Strategic management under duopoly

The purpose of this paper is to present a general conjectural variation model to provide an integrative treatment of strategic management under duopoly. It is shown that the nature of the desired distortion of managers' incentives depends critically on the magnitudes of the managers' conjectural variations with respect to outputs as well as the owners' conjectural variations with respect to incentives. In particular, it has been demonstrated that when the owners' conjectural variations with respect to incentives are zero, the owners will motivate their managers to maximize profits and provide no incentives for sales under consistent conjectures. However, the owners make their managers behave more (less) aggressively and produce more (less) than profit-maximizers if the managers' conjectural variations with respect to outputs are larger (smaller) than the actual response.     

Technology choice under duopoly

This paper presents a conjectural variation approach to demonstrate that competing firms will often distort their cost structures away from strict cost minimization for strategic reasons. In particular, it is shown that the nature of the desired distortions of production technology depends critically on the magnitudes of the firms' conjectural variations with respect to outputs as well as the firms' conjectural variations with respect to technology. These results are in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom based on monopolized or perfectly competitive markets.