SHORT-CUT ESTIMATES OF REAL INCOME

The United Nations International Comparisons Project (ICP) has conducted in-depth purchasing-power parity (PPP) studies of the so-called "benchmark" countries (of which there were 34 in the 1975 sample). In the absence of PPP studies of the rest of the countries in the world, the ICP team has constructed "short-cut" estimates of real income (that is, income converted from domestic currency to dollars at PPP) for the nonbenchmark countries. The idea of a "short-cut" procedure for estimating real income is to run a regression of real income on nominal income (that is, income converted from domestic currency to dollars at a market exchange rate) and other variables among the benchmark countries and then to use this regression to estimate real income for the nonbenchmark countries. The most recent ICP short-cut estimates have been based on regressions of real income on nominal income and the foreign trade ratio. The present study expands the list of candidate variables that might be included in a short-cut regression. The list includes educational attainments, the share of minerals in GDP, the trade balance, the growth of the money supply, tourist receipts, and the share of nontradables in GDP. The theory underlying the inclusion of each of these variables is discussed. Regressions are run with various combinations of these variables and some short-cut estimates of real income for 76 market economies are presented.     

The theory of capital utilization and the putty-rubber production function

This paper extends the theory of optimal shift-work to the presumably realistic case in which the ex post elasticity of substitution between labor and capital services is neither zero nor equal to the ex ante elasticity. The paper considers both the CES and the VES as candidates for the ex post function, and gives reasons for preferring the latter. The introduction of ex post substitutability where none existed before is found to increase the profitability of shift-work.     

Property and contract rights in autocracies and democracies

We present and test empirically a new theory of property and contract rights. Any incentive an autocrat has to respect such rights comes from his interest in future tax collections and national income and increases with his planning horizon. We find a compelling empirical relationship between property and contract rights and an autocrat's time in power. In lasting—but not in new—democracies, the same rule of law and individual rights that ensure continued free elections entail extensive property and contract rights. We show that the age of a democratic system is strongly correlated with property and contract rights.     

Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance

We introduce a new, easily accessed and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. This measure, called contract-intensive money or CIM, is based on citizens decisions regarding the form in which they choose to hold their financial assets. Country case studies show that CIM varies over time in response to political events in ways predicted by our arguments. We also show that CIM is positively related to investment and growth rates, and to the relative size of contract-dependent sectors of the economy.