The Right Choice at the Right Time: A Herding Experiment in Endogenous Time

Herding describes the phenomenon in decision-making where an economic agent disregards his own private information to follow the actions of his predecessors as in Banerjee (1992). With later decision-makers simply copying earlier decisions their private information cannot be inferred by other decision-makers and will be forever lost. There is some experimental evidence on simple sequential herding of this type in the literature, notably Anderson and Holt (1997). This paper differs by allowing subjects to delay their decision-making in order to benefit from observing others' actions as in more recent herding models such as Chamley and Gale (1994). The results in this paper suggest that subjects will indeed delay when their private information is not sufficiently strong. Despite this ability to wait, as predicted in the theoretical literature, cascades remained ubiquitous and more worrying still, reverse-cascades occurred in which incorrect decisions made by early decision-makers produced informational cascades on the wrong action. In an alternative design, informing subjects that they had made incorrect choices only made matters worse as subjects moved further away from rational behavior.     

Intertemporal Substitution and Terms-of-Trade Shocks

The paper examines the relationship between transitory terms‐of‐trade shocks and private saving. Using a model allowing for nonseparability between the consumption of tradables and nontradables, the paper estimates the intertemporal elasticity of substitution while accounting for the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the consumption of tradables and nontradables. Empirical analysis of data for five industrial countries indicates that in response to transitory terms‐of‐trade shocks, intertemporal substitution of consumption and intratemporal substitution of consumption between tradables and nontradables both have large effects on private saving.     

Asset market hangovers and economic growth: the OECD during 1984-93

Asses prices and investment were unusually weak throughout theindustrial world during the early 1990s. This paper highlightsthis stylized fact, and connects it with another: in most ofthe industrial world, asset markets boomed for several yearsbefore collapsing around 1989. The paper suggests that assetmarket bubbles during the late 1980s may have left the industrialworld with an 'asset market hangover' in the early 1990s, inthe form of sluggish asset markets and investment. Empiricalsupport for this hypothesis is provided based on cross-countrydata for equity and real estate markets in most industrial countries.We suggest that financial market developments not justifiedby fundamentals can substantially affect real activity.     

International trade in a differentiated good: Trade elasticities in the world rice market

In many previous rice trade models, the commodity has been regarded as a homogeneous product. However, homogeneity is not an appropriate assumption, given the various types of rice that are traded and consumed. Parameters estimated from these models, therefore, do not reflect the real world market for rice and, hence, may mislead decision makers who use the results for policy evaluation purposes. This study uses an Armington approach to model the world rice trade as a differential good market and to derive trade elasticity parameters.     

Are the Best Small Companies the Best Investments?

Previous research finds that large companies previously judged to be excellent growth companies have subsequently been poor investments. We examine small companies selected by Business Week on the basis of multiple criteria used in annual articles featuring highly rated growth companies. We study the investment performance over the three years before eleven annual Business Week publications and the three years after publication. We find positive excess returns in the pre‐publication period, but negative excess returns in the post‐publication period. This reversal in investment performance appears to be due to a mean‐reversion tendency in operating performance, in which the earnings and the past rates of return on capital of such companies subsequently decrease significantly.     

Research notes and communications strategic planning as competitive advantage

Since 1970, over forty empirical studies have examined the performance consequences of formal strategic planning. This line of research has drawn heavy criticism from reviewers on methodological grounds, and has produced confusing, apparently contradictory results. This article reevaluates the planning-performance relationship from a resource perspective, arguing that strategic planning does not satisfy the criteria for sustainable competitive advantage– although it may produce economic value, it is easily imitated and may be substitutable. The article suggests that previous studies produced inconsistent results because they did not account for the dissemination of strategic planning over time, or for industry differences in strategic planning factor markets. An empirical test in two industries finds that formal strategic planning and financial performance are unrelated in a ‘planning equilibrium’ industry, but positively related in an industry with strategic planning factor market imperfections.     

The economics of land transfer and title insurance

In the presence of uncertainty over the title of land (due to fraud or error), a legal system can protect either the current (innocent) owner, or a previous owner who claims title. The predominant system in the United States generally awards title to the latter in the event of legitimate claim. Thus, current owners frequently purchase title insurance to provide indemnification in the event of a loss. In contrast, the Torrens system awards title to the current owner, but provides for indemnification of any legitimate claimants. We evaluate these two systems and argue that if transaction costs are low, both promote efficient assignment of title (according to the Coase Theorem), but if transaction costs are high, the Torrens system is more likely to award title to the party that values it the most (namely, the current possessor).