Banks’ deferred tax assets during the financial crisis

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Prior studies have demonstrated that the net deferred tax liabilities of industrial firms are valued by market participants in a manner consistent...     

Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts

Summary Theory suggests that optimal contracts should include many contingencies to achieve optimal risk sharing. However, in practice, few contracts are as complex as theory suggests. This paper develops a model which is consistent with this observation. The lack of risk sharing results from the interplay of two factors. First, contingencies must be based on information produced by measurement systems, which may be manipulable. Second, when two parties to a contract meet, they often have incomplete information. The type of contract offered may reveal information about the party who proposes it. Different types of agents have different preferences over contingent contracts, because they have different abilities to manipulate the measurement system. These differences in preferences allow the parties to signal their types through the contracts they offer. Noncontingent contracts may be chosen in equilibrium because they are the only contracts which do not give any type an incentive to distort the measurement system and, hence, do not reveal information about the party proposing the contract.We have benefited from conversations with Oliver Hart, Rick Lambert, Michael Riordan and Jean Tirole and the comments of Michel Habib, Nick Yannelis and two anonymous referees. Financial support from the National Science Foundation under grants SES-8920048 and SES-8720589 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Exchange Rate Pass‐through: The Role of Regime Changes

We consider the effect on the degree of exchange rate pass‐through of the exchange rate regime in operation. We test the hypothesis that pass‐through will be lower under a float as firms may be reluctant to pass appreciations or depreciations on to their customers when there is a strong chance that they will be subsequently reversed. Taylor’s hypothesis that pass‐through will be lower in a low‐inflation environment is also considered. Both hypotheses are assessed in relation to the price of manufactured imports into New Zealand and we find that, whereas the shift to a float dramatically lowered the degree of pass‐through, the later shift to a low‐inflation regime has no significant additional effect on the pass‐through relationship.     

Hazardous waste disposal: A comparative analysis of regulation,taxes and subsidies

This paper contains a critique of existing legislation which deals with hazardous waste disposal and expands on the efforts made by the Office of Technology Assessment and other economists to develop a public policy which will deal effectively with the problems associated with hazardous waste generation and disposal. A new policy is set forth here which encourages both waste reduction and safe disposal while providing revenue to pay for cleanups at Superfund sites.     

Current Issues in the Analysis of Commercial Real Estate

This paper identifies and discusses a number of current issues regarding our understanding of commercial real estate markets. These issues include: 1) accurate estimation of the quantity and location of our nation's commercial space; 2) an understanding of the linkage between the space and capital markets for commercial real estate; 3) identification of the macroeconomic factors that affect the rate of return on commercial property and whether local market factors also affect the rate of return; 4) problems associated with measuring the return characteristics of equity investments in commercial property (including measures of the diversification benefits and inflation-hedging abilities of this asset class); 5) a better understanding of rental markets, including good measures of changes in effective rents over time; and 6) examination of the rationale for ownership of commercial space by corporate users. This paper reviews recent research related to these questions and suggests future research that should prove to be fruitful.     

Action Teams That Work

A growing awareness of workplace hazards and identification of airborne contaminants, coupled with a changing safety and health regulatory environment, created an unexpected demand for new and innovative respirators in the early 1980s. 3M's Occupational Health and Environmental Safety Division broke new ground by taking the team concept further than ever before in the company. The division's Action Teams successfully designed, built and introduced products in less than half the time it would have taken previously. Robert Hershock, Charles Cowman and Douglas Peters describe how 3M learned important lessons about team selection, training, performance and motivation, the importance of project sponsors, and the role of middle management.     

Airbus versus Boeing revisited: international competition in the aircraft market

This paper examines international competition in the commercial aircraft industry. We estimate a discrete choice, differentiated products demand system for wide-body aircraft and examine the Airbus-Boeing rivalry under various assumptions on firm conduct. We then use this structure to evaluate two trade disputes between the United States and European Union. Our results suggest that aircraft prices increased by about 3.7% after the 1992 US-EU agreement on trade in civil aircraft that limits subsidies. This price hike is consistent with a 5% increase in firms' marginal costs after the subsidy cuts. We also simulate the impact of the future entry of the Airbus A-380 super-jumbo aircraft on the demand for other wide-bodied aircraft, notably the Boeing 747. We find that the A-380 could reduce the market share of the 747 by up to 14.8 percentage points in the long-range wide-body market segment (depending upon the discounts offered on the A-380), but would reduce the market for Airbus's existing wide-bodies by an even greater margin.     

Improved estimation of portfolio value‐at‐risk under copula models with mixed marginals

Portfolio value‐at‐risk (PVAR) is widely used in practice, but recent criticisms have focused on risks arising from biased PVAR estimates due to model specification errors and other problems. The PVAR estimation method proposed in this article combines generalized Pareto distribution tails with the empirical density function to model the marginal distributions for each asset in the portfolio, and a copula model is used to form a joint distribution from the fitted marginals. The copula–mixed distribution (CMX) approach converges in probability to the true marginal return distribution but is based on weaker assumptions that may be appropriate for the returns data found in practice. CMX is used to estimate the joint distribution of log returns for the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) index and the associated futures contracts on SGX and TAIFEX. The PVAR estimates for various hedge portfolios are computed from the fitted CMX model, and backtesting diagnostics indicate that CMX outperforms the alternative PVAR estimators. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:997–1018, 2006     

Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

Capital structure and the control of managerial incentives

We present a theory of capital structure based on the power of shareholders, bondholders and managers to control the incentive conflicts in large corporations. The manager–owner conflict produces a trade-off between inefficiency in the low state and rents in the high state, and the shareholder–bondholder conflict produces under-investment as in Myers [Journal of Financial Economics 19 (1997) 147]. Since managers and bondholders both prefer more efficient actions in the low state, the two conflicts are interdependent. With risk-less levels of debt, there are no shareholder–bondholder agency costs, but managerial control over the incentive-setting process produces excessive rents. With risky debt, shareholders focus more on returns in the high state so that shareholder–bondholder agency costs increase but managerial rents decrease. Efficient levels of debt holder protection facilitate a reduction in manager–owner agency costs that outweighs shareholder–bondholder agency costs, and are decreasing in firm performance. The results are consistent with the separate empirical results relating control to both compensation and leverage, and suggest how future studies can be integrated.